

14 OCTOBER 1947

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| <u>Doc.</u><br><u>No.</u> | <u>Def.</u><br><u>No.</u> | <u>Pros.</u><br><u>No.</u> | <u>Description</u>   | <u>For</u><br><u>Ident.</u> | <u>In</u><br><u>Evidenc</u> |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2551-C                    |                           | 3339-A                     | Excerpt from "Reports<br>on the Japan-Manchu-<br>kuo-China Economic<br>Round Table Conference<br>(p.288-289) |                             | 30698                       |
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1 Tuesday, 14 October 1947

2 - - -

3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with  
14 the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE R. B. PAL, Member  
15 from India, not sitting from 0930 to 1600.

16 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

17 For the Defense Section, same as before.

18 - - -

19 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
20 to English interpretation was made by the  
21 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except SHIRATORI, who is represented by counsel.  
5 There is a certificate from the prison surgeon at  
6 Sugamo. certifying that the accused SHIRATORI is ill  
7 and unable to attend the trial today. It will be  
8 recorded and filed.  
9

- - -

10 O K I N O R I K A Y A, an accused, resumed the  
11 stand and testified through Japanese inter-  
12 preters as follows:

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Wiley.

14  
15 CROSS-EXAMINATION

16 MR. WILEY: Mr. President and Members of the  
17 Tribunal, we will now read from exhibit 3339:

18 "Excerpt from 'Reports on the Japan-  
19 Manchukuo-China Economic Round Table Conference.'  
20 (pp. 1-3) 2 November 1938.

21 "Mr. KAYA, Okinori, (Chairman of the Japan-  
22 Manchukuo-China Economic Round Table Conference).

23 "This evening the sponsors are sincerely  
24 pleased and honored that so many people, especially  
25 those influential in financial circles as well as



1 important government officials, were able to attend  
2 this meeting despite pressing business matters.

3 "It is hardly necessary to mention that the  
4 great aim of the Imperial Army's attack in the present  
5 China Incident lies in destruction of that Chiang  
6 Kai-shek regime which is thoroughly ridden with anti-  
7 Japanese and pro-communistic policy ---- a regime  
8 which does not understand the position of the Chinese  
9 nation and its real mission in East Asia. However,  
10 within the last ten days we have received joyful re-  
11 ports that Wuchang, Hankow and Canton have been oc-  
12 cupied. That now the Chiang Kai-shek regime has  
13 suffered a most crippling blow militarily, finan-  
14 cially and economically, and that it has fallen into  
15 a process of destruction is seen as a great advance  
16 toward achievement of the purpose of the holy war.

17 "I am continually lost in admiration of the  
18 valour of the Imperial Army and, at the same time, I  
19 also have the deepest gratitude for the loyalty and  
20 labors of our officers and soldiers. However, it is  
21 also hardly necessary to say that the aim of the present  
22 holy war consists not merely in the annihilation of  
23 the Chiang Kai-shek regime but also in the establish-  
24 ment of a new regime friendly to both Japan and  
25 Manchukuo in order that there may be hope of building

1 a new revived China, and, furthermore, it consists in  
2 the establishment of a basis of peace in the Orient  
3 through formulating a far-reaching plan between Japan,  
4 Manchukuo, and China. Therefore, unless the con-  
5 struction of a new era is completed, it cannot be  
6 said that the mission of our troops in the holy war  
7 has been completed; also for the achievement of so-  
8 called victory, it cannot be said that the mission has  
9 been completed. As long as the completion of this  
10 stage is not in sight, I think that we cannot com-  
11 pensate the millions of souls who have sacrificed  
12 their precious lives in defense of their fatherland  
13 at war and have been enrolled among the gods in the  
14 Yasukuni shrine. In order really to establish a  
15 foundation for peace in the Orient, there must be per-  
16 fected a really strong national union between Japan,  
17 Manchukuo and China, which is more than the single  
18 phrase 'friendly cooperation.'

19 "One may safely say that this is the dawn of  
20 a new East Asia and, moreover, that this is the  
21 foundation period of a new East Asia. To realize  
22 this ideal, namely, to be a real stabilizing force in  
23 East Asia, we must contrive to establish and expand  
24 powerful armaments and commensurable strong economic  
25 power, since it is necessary to have powerful means in



1 order to realize the ideal. The existence of strong  
2 economic power which unites financially all the vari-  
3 ous economic factors such as production, trade, traffic  
4 and communication forms the underlying foundation of  
5 powerful armaments. In the present incident it has  
6 been keenly realized how greatly armaments, on the  
7 material side, depend for support on economic power,  
8 particularly in war times, although it is also true  
9 in normal times.

10 "It is also needless to say that the ex-  
11 pansion of economic power forms the material basis  
12 for the stabilization and improvement of national  
13 life and for welfare of the people. Taking this into  
14 consideration, it is also matter of course that the  
15 great emphasis in our future national policies should  
16 be on the completion and development of the united  
17 economic power of the Japan-Manchukuo-China bloc.  
18 The trend of public opinion, furthermore, is in favor  
19 of this. For this purpose we should, by devoting our  
20 entire national energies, proceed to long-range economic  
21 construction from now on. Moreover, by so doing  
22 government and private enterprises in our country will  
23 eventually be promoted. Diligent people will cer-  
24 tainly be able to obtain employment and their life will  
25 certainly be stabilized. The policy of our country

1 should be oriented to the same end. However, the  
2 stabilized life does not mean, during the period of  
3 construction, idleness and abundant supply of mater-  
4 ials. It will be a life in which industrious people  
5 live frugally and in the best of health. It will be  
6 a life in which one works hard, gets much, and saves  
7 much without spending everything, and thereby con-  
8 tributes to the expansion of economic power. In  
9 other words, a strong Japan will be established to  
10 secure peace in the Orient, the welfare of future  
11 generations will be promoted and this will be left to  
12 our descendants. This will be a life of constructive  
13 efforts, bright with hope.

14 "In short, I think there would be no objec-  
15 tion in saying that the most important point, the  
16 objective of our nation's future endeavor is a great  
17 development of economic power, and that its aim lies  
18 in the united expansion of the economic power of the  
19 three countries, Japan, Manchukuo and China. Moreover,  
20 this is still more keenly felt at the epochal inci-  
21 dent, the fall of Wuchang, Hankow, and Canton.

22 "Since the founding of her country, Manchukuo,  
23 our ally, has been formulating appropriate and great  
24 plans for finance, economics, and people's welfare,  
25 and has been steadily striving for their realization.



1 Our country has also exerted herself to assist her  
2 with funds, materials and manpower. Now that the  
3 people are contented with their lot, the country is  
4 making rapid strides in the exploitation of resources,  
5 in development of heavy industries, and in complete  
6 organization of transportation and communication  
7 facilities. It might be said that, although it has  
8 been but a few years since the foundation of the  
9 country, the greatness of her progress is worthy of  
10 wonder. Furthermore, these schemes for completion and  
11 development of economy aim at the united expansion of  
12 the national power of Japan and Manchukuo based upon  
13 the spirit of the inseparable oneness of Japan and  
14 Manchukuo, as we both know very well. On the other  
15 hand, it is believed that it would be a natural policy  
16 for Manchukuo, hereafter, to take the position of  
17 close cooperation and connection with the revived new  
18 China. In spite of this short existence both the  
19 temporary government of North China and the restored  
20 government of Central China are continually progress-  
21 ing in their endeavours to construct a new regenerated  
22 Chinese nation -- one which will be truly faithful to  
23 its position and mission -- friendly to Japan and Man-  
24 chukuo and opposed to communism. It appears that it  
25 will not be long before there is established a great

1 new regime which will unite all China. There is no  
2 doubt, moreover, that the important trend of the new  
3 Chinese nation is toward the construction of a united,  
4 great, economic power by Japan, Manchukuo and China.  
5 The unified establishment of a strong economic power  
6 between Japan, Manchukuo and China is the glorious  
7 hope of the three nations. The establishment of  
8 peace in the Orient is a great ideal that will foster  
9 the fortune of the peoples of the Orient and will  
10 contribute to world peace; namely, it is a policy  
11 important to the realization of our national spirit.  
12 For this reason, I think it means a great deal that,  
13 meeting together on this occasion, economists from  
14 Japan, Manchukuo and China will engage in a round-  
15 table discussion concerning fundamental plans for,  
16 and policies for development of, unification of the  
17 three countries' economic cooperation on a friendly  
18 basis.

19 "Now, led by influential groups of econo-  
20 mists in Tokyo, Osaka and Kyushu, influential econo-  
21 mists in China and Manchukuo have been invited,  
22 and various preparations are being specially made to  
23 hold a roundtable conference of economic experts  
24 from the three countries in Tokyo, Osaka, various  
25 places of Kyushu, and in Hsinking, Manchukuo. I be-



1 lieve that in order to attain this object much will  
2 depend upon the assistance of you who represent the en-  
3 tire country, particularly who are government officials,  
4 whether it be in the meetings, the round-table dis-  
5 cussions, or in assisting those who assemble from Man-  
6 chukuo and China to recognize clearly the true facts of  
7 our country's economic and industrial development.

8 "With that in mind, I requested your attendance  
9 here this evening with the idea of seeking your under-  
10 standing. I hope you will approve and give me your full  
11 assistance. Together with having stated my impressions  
12 a little, I extend you a hearty welcome."

BY MR. WILEY (Continued):

1           Q   Mr. Witness, is this speech which I have  
2 read from exhibit 3339 your speech that was given on  
3 November 2, 1938?  
4

5           A   According to what you have just read me, I  
6 believe the general gist of my speech is as you have  
7 read.

8           Q   Mr. Witness, do you remember a Japanese-Man-  
9 chukuo-China Economic Round Table Conference taking  
10 place the latter part of November, 1938, at Hiroshima?

11          A   I do remember.

12          Q   Were you present and did you make some remarks?

13          A   I was present at the meeting and I remember  
14 that I made a speech opening the meeting itself.

15          Q   Did you say at this round-table conference,  
16 "Hitherto. China's condition has been something like  
17 cancer, and since surgical removal is necessary, Japan  
18 has been performing that role"?

19               Did you make that statement exactly or in  
20 substance?

21           MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, if this is a state-  
22 ment taken from a speech, we ask that the original  
23 speech or document where it appeared be produced and  
24 reference made thereto and called to the attention of  
25 the witness.



THE PRESIDENT: That course may become necessary eventually. It is not necessary yet.

MR. WILEY: I now offer prosecution document No. 2551-C.

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard no answer to the question. However, there is no objection to this document, apparently.

MR. LEVIN: No objection.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document No. 2551-C will receive exhibit No. 3339-A.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution exhibit No. 3339-A and received in evidence.)

MR. WILEY: I will now read exhibit 3339-A.

"Excerpt from 'Reports on the JAPAN-MANCHUKUO-CHINA Economic Round Table Conference' (p. 288-289) 29 November 1938 at HIROSHIMA.

"Mr. KAYA, Okinori (Chairman of the Japan-MANCHUKUO-China Economic Round Table Conference). (Applause).

"I should like to express my cordial thanks for the attendance of His Excellency, the Governor, and all of the officials and people under whose auspices the HIROSHIMA Economic Round Table Conference was

1 opened today. As Chairman of the Round Table Confer-  
2 ence, I shall extend a brief greeting.

3 "It is needless to say that the aim of the  
4 present China Incident is a war for construction; by  
5 no means is it a war for destruction. Hitherto,  
6 CHINA's condition has been something like cancer, and  
7 since surgical removal is necessary, Japan has been  
8 performing that role. After the operation has been  
9 completed, new flesh and new life will begin to appear  
10 among the truly-awakened masses. In other words, the  
11 temporary government of North China, the restoration  
12 government of Central China, and the Federal Mongolian  
13 Commission, as well as the Peace Preservation Committees  
14 in HANGKO" and CANTON, have made their appearance.  
15 They are at last moving in a trend toward unification  
16 in the near future although they each have their own  
17 peculiarities.

18 "Thus, we are on the way toward construction  
19 of a new East Asia. However, the basis for the future  
20 development of East Asia must be strong unification  
21 within each of those governments. The economists must  
22 first of all proceed toward the welding of an economic  
23 area.

24 "I am one who believes that the foundation  
25 of the people's welfare, as well as culture and national



1 defense, must, apart from personal problems, be based  
2 in general upon economy. Therefore, the basis which  
3 will produce, through JAPAN-MANCHUKUO-CHINA unity, a  
4 union of 'Asia for the Asiatics' must in the last  
5 analysis be an economic one.

6 "The fact that the economic representatives  
7 of those three countries have held in TOKYO, NAGOYA,  
8 and OSAKA, are holding today in HIROSHIMA, and will  
9 hold in MOJI and HSINKING, the JAPAN-MANCHUKUO-CHINA  
10 Economic Round Table Conference is something which his-  
11 tory will not forget. The things which we freely dis-  
12 cussed between ourselves not only in the round-table  
13 discussions but in private meetings and in inspections  
14 of industries are producing most successful results.  
15 Since Mr. TING CHIEN-HSU, who came the great distance  
16 from MANCHUKUO is said to have already visited HIRO-  
17 SHIMA once, it is unnecessary for me to mention him  
18 further. Extremely active at the time of his nation's  
19 founding, Minister of Communications and of Industry  
20 successively, and now as President of the MANSU DENGYO  
21 /TN: Manchurian Electrical Industry Co./ and the HSINK-  
22 ING Commercial and Industrial Association, he is a prom-  
23 inent economist in MANCHUKUO. Also, Mr. CHIN YOUNG-  
24 CHANG, from the Mongolian border and now Secretary  
25 of Industry in the Federal Mongolian Commission, is an

1 ardent patriot who has labored throughout all MONGOLIA  
2 in behalf of the Mongolian independence movement.  
3 Furthermore, since Mr. CHU of Central China and Mr.  
4 CHANG of North China are both influential economists,  
5 I eagerly hope that at today's meeting a start will be  
6 made toward the overseas expansion of HIROSHIMA Pre-  
7 fecture, especially toward development of East Asia."

8 Q Mr. Witness, was that the speech or the re-  
9 marks you made at this meeting in Hiroshima late in  
10 November, 1938?

11 A I don't recall that particular speech for  
12 sure, but I may have made such a speech.

13 Q Mr. Witness, isn't it a fact that after the  
14 army had acquired certain mines and industries you, as  
15 president of the North China Development Company, went  
16 in and operated these mines and industries?

17 A We were not in charge of their operations.

18 Q Mr. Witness, you have stated on page 6, para-  
19 graph 5-C, the last line of your affidavit, which con-  
20 tains your testimony in chief, that the company, the  
21 North China Development Company, had no rights over any  
22 industry except those in which it had financial inter-  
23 est, and even then the rights were limited to those  
24 prescribed in the contract. Are you intending by that  
25 statement to claim that this North China Development



1 Company confined its operations to those mines and  
2 industries in which it had only financial interests?

3 A That is not so. To companies to which the  
4 North China Development Company had given financial  
5 help, that is to say, to companies of which the North  
6 China Development Company was a shareholder or to  
7 which the North China Development Company had made a  
8 loan, we possessed certain rights over certain matters --  
9 we had certain rights of approval over certain matters.  
10 As to where these rights of approval arose, they arose  
11 from the contacts we had made with such companies, that  
12 was all. The actual operation of the companies to  
13 which the North China Development Company had given  
14 financial aid were conducted by the companies themselves  
15 and the Development Company had nothing to do with that.  
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1 Q Mr. Witness, in your interrogation of March  
2 26, 1946 did you not say this: "For instance, I was  
3 the President of the North China Development Company  
4 which operated the mines and manufacturing indus-  
5 tries...."?

6 A I didn't say anything of the kind.

7 Q Well, I'll complete the interrogation.  
8 "The basis for these industries were acquired by the  
9 Army, and we went there to develop them. Actually,  
10 the Chinese people reaped as much, if not more, bene-  
11 fit out of our efforts, so we feel that we have done  
12 some good rather than to be considered an act of  
13 aggression." Did you make such a statement?

14 A That is quite a garbled version. At the  
15 time the interrogator asked me if there were indus-  
16 tries in North China which the Army had taken over,  
17 and I answered yes. I never said the Development  
18 Company operated industries. I said that the Develop-  
19 ment Company was formed for the purpose of furthering  
20 the economic development of both Japan and China and  
21 of advancing the interests of both, and that to this  
22 the Chinese people did reap many benefits. That is  
23 what I said.

24 Q Mr. KAYA, your answer, then, to my question  
25 is no?



1 MR. LEVIN: I object to that question. The  
2 question has already been answered, and the determin-  
3 ation of that is a matter for construction by the  
4 Tribunal.

5 THE PRESIDENT: It is our function to con-  
6 strue his answers. Nevertheless, if the cross-  
7 examining counsel is seeking clarification, he may  
8 put a question to that effect. He must satisfy him-  
9 self whether to pursue the cross-examination or not  
10 and so must have a thorough comprehension of the  
11 answers.

12 MR. WILEY: I will not pursue that question  
13 any further.

14 Q Now, Mr. KAYA, did you on the 1st of December,  
15 1941 tell the Prime Minister that you would not op-  
16 pose war?

17 A The 1st of December?

18 Q I said before the 1st of December.

19 A I did after the arrival of the Hull note --  
20 the so-called Hull note.

21 Q Were you present at the Imperial Conference  
22 of 1 December, 1941?

23 A Yes.

24 Q And did you at that time oppose war with the  
25 United States?

1 A No, I did not, not then.

2 Q Did you have advance knowledge that hostili-  
3 ties were to be opened against the United States in  
4 December of 1941?

5 A Since the opening of hostilities had been  
6 decided on, I thought that hostilities would open  
7 some time in December.

8 Q When you were interrogated, did you not  
9 state as follows: "I did not know the exact date  
10 for commencement of hostilities, but I believe it was  
11 on the night before the commencement of hostilities  
12 that I heard about it"? Is that correct?

13 A This is what I said in answer to the inter-  
14 rogator's question: The actual date of the commence-  
15 ment of hostilities was neither announced in the  
16 Cabinet nor was it announced at the liaison confer-  
17 ence. I heard, the day before hostilities actually  
18 commenced or the day before that, not at a conference  
19 but elsewhere, of the day.

20 Q All right. Where did you hear this?

21 A It was either at the place where the liaison  
22 conference was held or at the Prime Minister's offi-  
23 cial residence. I don't remember whether it was from  
24 the Prime Minister that I heard this or from the Navy  
25 Minister or from the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet,



1 but it was from one of these three. That is how I  
2 knew of the day. That is the answer which I then  
3 made.

4 Q Can you tell us who else was present at  
5 that meeting?

6 A As I said, I did not hear of this at a  
7 meeting.

8 Q Well, occasion then.

9 A I don't remember who was near me then.

10 Q In your interrogatory, Mr. KAYA, didn't you  
11 make this statement: "I believe I heard it from  
12 another member of the Cabinet. If you consider all  
13 our work and all our conversations as official, then  
14 you might say I heard it officially. But I heard it  
15 from another member of the Cabinet, if I remember  
16 correctly. But it might have been at the Premier's  
17 residence from TOJO, from SHIMADA or from HOSHINO.  
18 I am not sure"?

19 A What you have said is quite different from  
20 what I then said. It is true that I heard it from  
21 either TOJO, SHIMADA or HOSHINO, and that I have just  
22 stated, but I never said anything as to whether this  
23 was official or non-official.

24 MR. WILEY: This, Members of the Tribunal,  
25 closes the cross-examination of the defendant.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

3 BY MR. LEVIN:

4 Q Mr. KAYA, what were the circumstances and  
5 why did you make the speech of October 26, 1937 re-  
6 ferred to as prosecution's exhibit 3338-A?

7 A It was at a meeting of members of the Pre-  
8 paratory Committee, and it was a formal kind of  
9 greeting -- formal function. And therefore, since  
10 it was that kind of a meeting, I stated what was  
11 generally known to be the Japanese Government's pol-  
12 icy and the general situation in Japan at the time.

13 Q How many persons attended that meeting?

14 A I don't remember the exact number, but  
15 since we have asked members of the business world  
16 to act as members of the Preparatory Committee, and  
17 also there were interested government officials, I  
18 don't believe that the number can be so very large.  
19 I did not attend the Tokyo Conference of the Japan-  
20 Manchukuo-China economic conference.

21 Q Now, what were the circumstances of your mak-  
22 ing the address of 2 November, 1938 at Hiroshima,  
23 prosecution's exhibit 3339?

24 A That speech also, as the one I made before  
25 the meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Tokyo,



1 was a sort of social formality -- international  
2 formality. Those who attended that meeting were also  
3 comparatively few in number, and, therefore, I made  
4 a very informal kind of speech and talked to the  
5 members on a person-to-person basis. with the idea  
6 of thanking them for their trouble.

7 Q And what were the circumstances of your  
8 having made the address of 29 November, 1938 at Hiro-  
9 shima referred to as prosecution's document 3339-A?

10 A That, too, I believe I made in the same  
11 spirit that I have just described to you.

12 MR. LEVIN: That concludes the redirect  
13 examination, Mr. President. However, I would like  
14 to ask for this reservation: that is, that we be  
15 permitted to examine the book of speeches, exhibit  
16 3338 and, if necessary, to offer evidence in rela-  
17 tion thereto. We had not seen this book before it  
18 was offered in evidence.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Why is that necessary, Mr.  
20 Levin? After all, this is a book, and you have had  
21 it since yesterday. It has been available to you  
22 since yesterday.

23 MR. LEVIN: We have had no time to make any  
24 more than a very cursory examination of it, Mr.  
25 President.

1 THE PRESIDENT: What would you get out of  
2 it? Suppose you did peruse it. Would you expect to  
3 find something which would qualify or modify what has  
4 already been tendered in evidence? What possibility  
5 is there of that? I know the accused denied having  
6 seen the book before, but would he have other  
7 knowledge of it?

8 MR. LEVIN: It is perfectly possible, Mr.  
9 President, that he might have made statements to  
10 modify some of the things that have been already  
11 offered in evidence. We all do know that when we  
12 are making speeches they are very frequently hyper-  
13 bolic, and we make modifications of those speeches.

14 THE PRESIDENT: He has explained the cir-  
15 cumstances under which the speeches were made, and  
16 nothing in his explanation suggested he required  
17 further consideration of anything.

18 MR. LEVIN: I would like to call attention,  
19 Mr. President, to the fact that when one is offering  
20 evidence directly it is required that a book or docu-  
21 ment be deposited at least seven days in advance. We  
22 do not have the same opportunity where a book is in-  
23 troduced on cross-examination.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I think a majority of the  
25 Court are inclined to hear you further at a later



1 stage, if necessary, but that, of course, amounts to  
2 agreeing to a reservation as far as I can judge. If,  
3 after you have perused the book carefully, you find  
4 there is something which, in your opinion, the Court  
5 should know, you may renew your application. At  
6 present it is not granted. That is all I can say.  
7 I think that gives you all you really require, Mr.  
8 Levin.

9 MR. LEVIN: That is satisfactory, Mr. Presi-  
10 dent.

11 This concludes the presentation of evidence  
12 on behalf of the defendant KAYA, Okinori.

13 THE PRESIDENT: The accused will take his  
14 place in the dock.

15 (Whereupon, the witness was ex-  
16 cused.)

17 - - -

18 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, the  
19 accused KIDO, Koichi waives the right he has under  
20 Article 15c of the Charter to deliver an opening  
21 statement. I now ask that the accused KIDO, Koichi  
22 be escorted to the witness stand in his own behalf.  
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1 K O I C H I K I D O, an accused, being first duly  
2 sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters  
3 as follows:

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION

5 BY MR. LOGAN:

6 Q Will you please give your name?

7 A KIDO, Koichi.

8 Q Mr. KIDO, you are one of the accused in this  
9 case?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Will you examine defense document 2502 and  
12 tell us if that is your affidavit?

13 A Yes, it is.

14 Q Are all the statements in that affidavit  
15 accurate and true, including the errata sheet?

16 A Yes.

17 MR. LOGAN: I offer in evidence defense  
18 document 2502.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel.

20 MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, the prosecution  
21 believes defense document 2502 objectionable on the  
22 following grounds: First, its length, 297 pages;  
23 second, the amount of argument it contains; third,  
24 multiple quotations from exhibits or parts thereof  
25 already read into the transcript in open court;



1 fourth, much discussion irrelevant to the issue and  
2 inadmissible under the provisions of the Charter.  
3 The extent of these deficiencies and the fact that  
4 they are continuously so interspersed and inter-  
5 twined with other parts of the document, we state  
6 with regret, makes it impracticable to remove the  
7 parts we object to without requiring a radical  
8 revision or recasting of the entire affidavit.

9 In view of the fact that this affidavit is  
10 offered by one of the accused whose activities in  
11 the matters complained of in the Indictment extend  
12 over almost the entire period thereof, and of this  
13 Court's express desire and order that an accused be  
14 given great latitude when he offers himself as a  
15 witness, we have decided not to press our objections.

16 We have rather adopted the course of request-  
17 ing accused's counsel, first, to refrain from reading  
18 into the record again the parts of the affidavit  
19 quoted and already recorded in the transcript; second,  
20 to eliminate references to revisions in translations  
21 of exhibits unless some especial point requires such  
22 reference; and, third, to delete from the affidavit  
23 purely argumentative matters.

24 We offer this explanation, Mr. President,  
25 for failing to press objections that might otherwise

1 cause the Court to inquire why such patently  
2 objectionable matter remained unobjected to by the  
3 prosecution.

4 In addition to the foregoing, and in further  
5 justification for the course so adopted by the prose-  
6 cution, we respectfully refer to the unavoidable but  
7 vexatious and most undesirable delays that necessarily  
8 follow where these objections, so many in number,  
9 have to be argued out point by point in open court  
10 with the necessary translations into the language of  
11 the accused. We cannot, of course, make any agreement  
12 of this nature with accused's counsel and attempt to  
13 bind the Court, which may have other views as to the  
14 procedure required under the Charter. We would, of  
15 course, expect the Court to take notice that refrain-  
16 ing to press such objections or to cross-examine on  
17 such portions heretofore noted is not intended to  
18 constitute any admission as to the veracity of the  
19 witness or the correctness of any statements so re-  
20 maining in the record.

21 There are some instances where the accused  
22 KIDO has made his own translations of exhibits. The  
23 Court has outlined a regular procedure for resolving  
24 disputes as to the correctness of translations and we  
25 ask, therefore, that all of these be referred to the



1 Language Arbitration Board.

2 Pages in which he challenges the translation  
3 and which should be referred to the Language Arbitra-  
4 tion Board are as follows: Pages 20, 70, 71, 98, 99,  
5 105, 112, 188, 189, 209, 253, 254 and 260 of the  
6 English affidavit.

7 Pages on which passages appear which are  
8 already in the transcript are as follows: Pages 34,  
9 35, 55, 65, 114, 134, 135, 137, 143, 151, 152, 155,  
10 156, 158, 162, 164, 166, 198, 201, 202, 204, 226 and  
11 228.

12 Paper from this Court entitled "Procedure  
13 Regarding General Corrections and Language Corrections  
14 of Official Transcript of Record" provides the manner  
15 in detail for handling disputed translations. It  
16 should be, we most respectfully observe, obeyed by  
17 everyone.

18  
19 THE PRESIDENT: Assuming your objections are  
20 well founded, your attitude appears to us to be reason-  
21 able, Mr. Chief of Counsel. We hope your suggestion  
22 for reducing the amount of reading may be adopted by  
23 Mr. Logan. I am sure he will if he can adopt them.

24 The language disputes will be referred to the  
25 Board.

The document is admitted on the usual terms.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 3340 and received in evidence.)



1 MR. LOGAN: I shall read exhibit 3340, which  
2 is the affidavit of KIDO, Koichi:

3 "1. On May 16, 1946 I pleaded 'Not guilty'  
4 to the 54 counts in which I am named in the Indict-  
5 ment presented to this Tribunal. I hereby reaffirm  
6 that plea and in token of my innocence, I am availing  
7 myself of the opportunity of taking the stand and  
8 presenting facts which I sincerely believe will  
9 demonstrate unquestionably my innocence of each and  
10 every one of those counts in the Indictment.

11 "2. On December 6, 1945 I heard over the  
12 radio that I was to be arrested as an alleged war  
13 criminal. This appears in my diary for that day as  
14 follows:

15 "'December 6, 1945 x x x The radio news at  
16 7 P.M. reports that SCAP issued a warrant for arresting  
17 me together with Prince KOMOYE and others.'

18 "When I was apprehended ten days later, on  
19 December 16, 1945 I voluntarily and of my own free  
20 will and accord revealed to Lieutenant-Colonel Sackett  
21 that I had a diary. I had nothing to hide or fear.  
22 My life had been devoted to fighting the militarists.  
23 Not only did I reveal I had a diary, I voluntarily  
24 caused it to be delivered to him upon the assurance  
25 that it would be returned to me. Each entry in this

1 diary was written by me on the day of its entry  
2 with the exception of a few entries which were  
3 written on the following day. I strove to write my  
4 diary objectively and it was not written with any  
5 thought in mind other than to keep an accurate and  
6 true account of what I heard, saw, said or did.

7 In some instances I recorded my thoughts. Pressure  
8 of time prevented me at times from recording some of  
9 the events and of recording others fully.

10 "The diary itself, in the entry of February  
11 21, 1931, shows I had no ulterior motive for writing  
12 it, as follows:

13 "February 21, 1931 x x x In bed I read  
14 "MacDonald" by Mr. SAITO, Hiroshi, and finished it  
15 at night. In the last part of that book I read the  
16 following description: When Mr. SAITO asked Mac-  
17 Donald, "How would you get along if there were no  
18 political world?" To this MacDonald answered that  
19 "I would live on four hours reading; three hours writing  
20 a day. That would make for me an earthly paradise."  
21 When I read this passage, it showed me the right way  
22 I had been striving in vain to find out.'

23  
24 "3. Out of a total of 5,920 entries in my  
25 diary (January 1, 1930 to December 9, 1945), the  
prosecution has submitted to this Tribunal excerpts



1 from only 123 days. In presenting my case I shall  
2 endeavor to do so chronologically. Many of the excerpts  
3 from my diary introduced by the prosecution were rough  
4 or scanned translations which garbled the text and  
5 contained sinister implications. Even though these  
6 and many others which were offered as final translations  
7 were submitted to the language section and corrected by  
8 eliminating the sinister connotations, it may be that  
9 an erroneous impression has been created from the first  
10 incorrect readings. Perhaps the corrections at later  
11 dates of words, phrases, and even whole paragraphs  
12 which are isolated from their context in subsequent  
13 pages of the record, has not rectified the damage done.  
14 For this, among other reasons, I shall refer to the  
15 excerpts from my diary already introduced into evidence  
16 by the prosecution, as corrected, and will quote  
17 extensively from other entries which were not intro-  
18 duced by the prosecution but which are related to the  
19 excerpts introduced by the prosecution, and to the  
20 charges made by the prosecution. Between the time of  
21 my apprehension and the return of the Indictment, I was  
22 interrogated by the prosecution on thirty-five occasions  
23 from January 15, 1946 to March 16, 1946. The transcript  
24 of those interrogations consists of 775 pages of single-  
25 spaced typewriting. The prosecution has not introduced

1 one word of these comprehensive interrogations in  
2 evidence, either against me or any other accused.

3 "4. I was born July 18, 1889. My grand-  
4 father, Marquis KIDO Takayoshi, was one of the three  
5 founders of the new government of Japan during the  
6 MEIJI Era. He served in various ministries in the  
7 cabinet and played a prominent role in the drafting  
8 of the constitution which established the Diet.  
9 My father, Marquis KIDO Takamasa, was Grand Chamberlain  
10 to Emperor MEIJI's son, who subsequently became  
11 Emperor TAISHO. I graduated from the Political  
12 Department of the Law College of the Imperial Univer-  
13 sity of Kyoto in 1915, having previously attended  
14 Peers School. While at Peers School and at college  
15 I became acquainted with Prince KONOYE, Fumimaro and  
16 Baron HARADA, Kumao who subsequently became Prince  
17 SAIONJI's secretary. My association and friendship  
18 for Prince KONOYE and Baron HARADA grew with the  
19 passage of time and we consulted frequently on various  
20 political matters. During my college days and in my  
21 government work I was primarily interested in polit-  
22 ical economy and social sciences. On August 30, 1917,  
23 I was commanded by the Emperor to succeed to my  
24 father's title of Marquis and I simultaneously became  
25 a member of the House of Peers.



1 "5. Upon my graduation from the Imperial  
2 University of Kyoto I joined the government service,  
3 being assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture and  
4 Commerce. My subsequent 30-year official career may  
5 be divided in two stages. During the first half,  
6 that is, from 1916 to 1930, I was an administrative  
7 official pure and simple, having no connection what-  
8 soever with the political field, though I took part  
9 in industrial administration as official of the  
10 Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and later the  
11 Ministry of Commerce and Industry."

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for  
13 fifteen minutes, Mr. Logan.

14 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess  
15 was taken until 1100, after which the  
16 proceedings were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 MR. LOGAN: I continue reading, page 4,  
4 second line:

5 "The second half of my career began when  
6 Viscount OKABE, Chokei resigned as Chief Secretary  
7 to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on his election  
8 to the House of Peers in 1930, and I was appointed his  
9 successor on the joint recommendation of Prince  
10 SAIONJI, Prince KONOYE, Baron HARADA, Viscount OKABE  
11 and others. Having assumed, as I did, a unique  
12 official post, I had an opportunity to get acquainted  
13 with Japan's politics. At this time I was appointed  
14 concurrently Councillor of the Department of the  
15 Imperial Household.

16 "6. In the spring of the year when I  
17 assumed the post of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper  
18 of the Privy Seal, the London Naval Treaty was con-  
19 cluded with the result that it became obligatory for  
20 Japan, one of its signatory Powers, to reduce her Navy.  
21 This caused intense dissatisfaction in a section of  
22 the Navy, indeed so much so that the so-called ques-  
23 tion of infringement on the High Command by the Lord  
24 Keeper of the Privy Seal was raised, but it had no  
25 foundation. Excitement ran high throughout the length



1 and breadth of the country. It is no exaggeration to  
2 say that a big transformation, which later overtook  
3 Japan, eventually making her what she is now, was  
4 started at that time. It was only two weeks after  
5 my assumption of the post of Chief Secretary to the  
6 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that Prime Minister  
7 HAMAGUCHI was assassinated by a Rightist at Tokyo  
8 Station. A long series of untoward incidents were in  
9 store for Japan including the March Incident, the  
10 Manchurian Incident and the October Incident in 1931,  
11 the assassination of INOUE, Junnosuke by INOUE,  
12 Nissho and others, the May 15th Incident, the so-called  
13 god-sent troop affair, and the February 26th Incident.  
14 It cost Count MAKINO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy  
15 Seal, a great deal of trouble, unheralded and unseen,  
16 to cope with alarming situations so as to set the  
17 Imperial mind at rest. On my part as Chief Secretary  
18 to Count MAKINO, I did everything in my power to  
19 counteract the militarists' forcible machinations  
20 and divert them into proper channels within the pale  
21 of my official duty under the guidance of the Genro  
22 and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and in conjunc-  
23 tion with Prince KONOYE, Baron HARADA and others. I  
24 will describe my strenuous and yet fruitless efforts  
25 in those hectic days.

1 "7. The so-called March Incident in 1931  
2 did not materialize, it being hushed up. But none the  
3 less it caused a big shock to well-informed circles.  
4 It served as a signal for the Army to set its hand to  
5 a reformist movement as a driving power in the polit-  
6 ical field. I think that it is most noteworthy in that  
7 it was a patent manifestation of defiance of the  
8 superior by the subordinate, a deplorable tendency in  
9 the fighting services, which proved to be the curse on  
10 this country, inviting the misery of today. On tips  
11 of the plot for the March Incident, I immediately got  
12 in touch with Prince KONOYE, Baron HARADA, Marquis  
13 INOUE and others and succeeded in obtaining full  
14 information on it. I lost no time in reporting it to  
15 the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I don't know  
16 whether it was the result of the report of the Lord  
17 Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Throne there anent or  
18 not, but I understood that the Emperor cautioned the  
19 Ministers of the fighting services about the necessity  
20 for maintaining discipline strictly. His Majesty may  
21 have possibly acted on the report from the Lord Keeper  
22 of the Privy Seal.

23 "8. One of the major duties of the Chief  
24 Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was to  
25 gather information under the direction of the Lord



1 Keeper of the Privy Seal from government, military and  
2 other quarters which fact for many years tended to  
3 cause general misunderstanding that both the Chief  
4 Secretary and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal par-  
5 ticipated in political and military matters. In truth  
6 and in fact, however, both the Chief Secretary to the  
7 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Lord Keeper of  
8 the Privy Seal were court officials having no power  
9 or responsibility for political or military affairs.  
10 In November, 1930 Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI was shot by  
11 a Rightist and he became so ill that his cabinet re-  
12 signed on April 13, 1931. As an example of one of the  
13 duties of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in the  
14 selection of a new Prime Minister, when the Genro was  
15 alive, I refer the Tribunal to the entries in my diary  
16 of April 13, 1931. The Genro referred to was Prince  
17 SAIONJI and the Lord Keeper was Count MAKINO.

18 "April 13, 1931. Monday.....The Cabinet  
19 held a meeting at 10:00 a.m. and decided on its general  
20 resignation. After 11:00 War Minister UGAKI went to  
21 the Imperial Palace and tendered the resignation of  
22 all the Ministers. Summoning the Lord Keeper, the  
23 Emperor consulted him about the matter, and in reply  
24 the Lord Keeper advised the Emperor to send for the  
25 Genro. At the Emperor's order the Grand Chamberlain

1 SUZUKI went to Okitsu by the 1:00 p.m. express Fuji.  
2 He returned to Tokyo, arriving at the Tokyo Station  
3 at 9:20 p.m., and at once reported to the Emperor.'

4 "9. I always was an ardent admirer and  
5 follower of Prince SAIONJI, his logical reasoning made  
6 a deep impression on me. My diary entry of April 14,  
7 1931, shows why he recommended Baron WAKATSUKI as the  
8 succeeding Prime Minister:

9 "'14 April 1931, Tuesday. The Lord Keeper,  
10 the Household Minister and the Grand Chamberlain met  
11 in the Keeper's office-room. Vice-Grand Chamberlain  
12 KAWAI and I joined them.

13 "'Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI, who at the  
14 Emperor's order went to Okitsu yesterday to see Prince  
15 SAIONJI and convey His Majesty's inquiries concerning  
16 the formation of a Cabinet to succeed the HAMAGUCHI  
17 government (as well as regarding the current situation),  
18 reported to us on the Genro's reply to the Throne.

19 "'Just when he had given an outline of the  
20 Genro's reply, Chamberlain OKAMOTO came to tell that  
21 the Emperor wanted to see the Lord Keeper. As the Lord  
22 Keeper left, we decided to listen to his detailed report  
23 later on.

24 "'After a while the Lord Keeper retired from  
25 the Imperial presence and joined us again.



1        "The Emperor ordered the Lord Keeper summon  
2 Baron WAKATSUKI through the Grand Chamberlain at 10:30  
3 a.m.

4        "The main points of the Grand Chamberlain's  
5 report to us are as follows:

6        "At about 4:50 p.m. on the 13th the Grand  
7 Chamberlain reached the Zagyo-so, Okitsu, and at once  
8 saw Prince SAIONJI.

9        "He first conveyed the Emperor's inquiries  
10 (concerning the formation of a succeeding Cabinet,  
11 His Majesty's solicitude about the difficult financial  
12 and economic situation, and consideration about the  
13 reduction of armaments).

14        "The Prince asked in the first place about  
15 the meaning of the Emperor's solicitude concerning the  
16 financial and economic situation, and the Grand  
17 Chamberlain explained it saying that it would be well  
18 to recommend a person in whom the Emperor could place  
19 confidence with regard to financial and economic  
20 matters. The Prince recommended Baron WAKATSUKI as  
21 the most suitable one to succeed HAMAGUCHI.

22        "By way of giving reasons for the recommend-  
23 ation, the Prince said as follows:

24        "Since the unrest in the political world  
25 began, opinions and informations have been sent to me.

1 There seem to be pretty many who advocate a non-party  
2 cabinet, but I am of the opinion that in these days  
3 when the party cabinet system is established, an  
4 interim cabinet would only confuse the political situ-  
5 ation. In an extraordinary time it may advisably be  
6 advocated, nor can I think of any person suitable to  
7 form such a cabinet at present. So I don't agree to  
8 this opinion.

9 "Some suggest a Seiyu-Kai Cabinet. But (1)  
10 the party cannot be regarded as having won the confi-  
11 dence of the people, and (2) especially some of the  
12 measures advocated by the party (e.g., the reimposition  
13 of the gold ban, the devaluation of currency, etc.)  
14 require careful consideration in view of the actual  
15 financial and economic conditions. Judging from the  
16 present situation, I think it advisable to promote  
17 financial and economic stability by carrying out the  
18 policy which the present Cabinet adopted. I admit some  
19 of its administrative measures are not quite desirable,  
20 but they have not yet come to an impasse.

21 "Particularly, although the immediate cause  
22 of HAMAGUCHI's resignation is illness, his ill health  
23 is the result of an attempt on his life which had  
24 political significance. The general resignation of a  
25 cabinet for such reason may result in encouraging



1 assassination and will have unfavorable effects.

2 From these considerations I deem it most advisable  
3 that this time the Emperor order the president of the  
4 Minseito, WAKATSUKI, to form a succeeding cabinet."

5 "'At 10:30 Baron WAKATSUKI proceeded to the  
6 Imperial Palace, was received in audience and ordered  
7 by the Emperor to organize a succeeding Cabinet.'

8 "10. On June 23, 1931, in my official capac-  
9 ity as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper, Baron HARADA  
10 conveyed information to me about a plot on the part of  
11 military officers in Manchuria which to me was extreme-  
12 ly regrettable as I was opposed to the Army's operations  
13 in Manchuria and China. This is shown from my diary  
14 entry of June 23, 1931.

15 "'June 23, 1931. Tuesday.....At noon, attend-  
16 ing the Tuesday Luncheon Party. Learned from HARADA  
17 deplorable information concerning a serious scheme in  
18 Manchuria on the part of some military officers. It  
19 is another regrettable affair revealing absence of  
20 unity in our policies toward China and Manchuria.'

21 "I relayed the information I had received to  
22 the Lord Keeper as shown in my diary of June 26, 1931,  
23 as I worried about the Army's intrigues.

24 "'June 26, 1931. Friday.....At 9:30 called  
25 on the Lord Keeper at his official residence and

1 reported to him concerning the information on a con-  
2 spiracy in China contrived by the military in conjunc-  
3 tion with some adventurers.'

4 "11. As shown in prosecution exhibit 179-A  
5 (diary July 11, 1931), I learned from Baron HARADA  
6 on July 11, 1931, that there was a report that the  
7 army would assume a resolute attitude toward the  
8 making of the budget and, if necessary, would appeal  
9 to the Throne. I was concerned about this as it might  
10 possibly raise a question of the resignation en bloc  
11 of the Cabinet. Prosecution exhibit 179-B (diary  
12 July 13, 1931) also discusses this matter. In prose-  
13 cution exhibit 179-F, 179-G, and 179-C (diary August 7,  
14 12, September 9, 1931, respectively) I reported the  
15 information I had received about the March Incident,  
16 which was the plot of certain militarists referred to  
17 above, and which disturbed me considerably.

18 "12. On September 10, 1931, Mr. TANI told  
19 us in substance at Prince KONOYE's house that if the  
20 Chinese commenced trouble in China, Japan would have  
21 to defend herself as the position of the Japanese  
22 people in Manchuria was becoming dangerous, with which  
23 I agreed in general. (See prosecution exhibit 179-E,  
24 diary September 10, 1931) I was afraid that they might  
25 be massacred as were the Japanese by Bolshevik Partisans



1 at Nikolaevsk. Hence my passive agreement to Mr.  
2 TANI's contention that in such an emergency it would  
3 be inevitable to invoke the right of self defence to  
4 a minimum extent. On September 12, 1931, I had a  
5 talk with Baron HARADA. We were both concerned about  
6 and opposed to political penetration of the army since  
7 the March Incident. We were watching with close  
8 attention prevalent rumors of further army plotting  
9 in Manchuria, where the situation was tense (see  
10 prosecution exhibit 179-D, diary September 12, 1931).

11 "13. The first information I had of the  
12 Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, was when I read  
13 about it in the morning paper the next day, September  
14 19, 1931. The prosecution in submitting exhibit 179-H  
15 (diary September 19, 1931) omitted the following para-  
16 graphs of my diary for that day:

17 "September 19, 1931. Saturday, cloudy, fine.  
18 This morning papers reported that last night a part of  
19 the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden was destroyed  
20 by Chinese troops, so that the Japanese forces, accept-  
21 ing the challenge, had finally captured Peitayin and  
22 then occupied the walled city of Mukden. I was to go  
23 to Fujigaya to play golf with Prince ASAKA, but can-  
24 celled the arrangement.

25 "At 10:00 a.m. went on duty. We listened

1 to Chief Aide-de-Camp NARA's account of conditions.  
2 At 9:45 the War Minister proceeded to the Palace and  
3 is said to have reported to the Emperor regarding the  
4 situation. As a result of my interview with the  
5 Grand Chamberlain, I immediately communicated the  
6 matter to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal staying  
7 in Kamakura and asked him to return to Tokyo. The  
8 Lord Keeper, arriving at Shinagawa at 1:10 p.m., at  
9 once proceeded to the Palace.  
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1 "14. As shown in prosecution exhibit No.  
2 179-H (diary September 19, 1931) I understood that  
3 Premier WAKATSUKI had called Baron HARADA, private  
4 secretary to Prince SAIONJI, at 6:30 p.m. and in fear  
5 of the strong attitude of the Army and of the imposs-  
6 ibility of making the Government's principles perfectly  
7 understood among the outpost military forces, asked  
8 him if there was any possible means to keep the army  
9 under control. Baron HARADA talked over this matter  
10 with the Minister of the Imperial Household. Concerning  
11 the matter in question, I expressed my views to them  
12 and the Grand Chamberlain to the following effect:  
13 It was quite discouraging to find the Premier himself  
14 making complaints and resorting to external aid without  
15 having made any noticeable efforts himself since  
16 morning. Unless the political cabinet now assumed  
17 resolute attitude, political power might be transferred  
18 to the Army. So it could be said that we were now in  
19 a constitutional crisis. Thus, having been concerned  
20 about the political penetration of the Army circles  
21 since the March Incident, I was most indignant at the  
22 unreliable attitude assumed by Premier WAKATSUKI at  
23 that time.

24 "15. Prince SAIONJI, Baron HARADA and I  
25 seized every possible opportunity to localize the

1 incident, as well as to curb military penetration  
2 into politics. For example, as shown in prosecution  
3 exhibit 179-R (diary September 21, 1931) Prince  
4 SAIONJI did not want the Emperor to give Imperial  
5 sanction lightly to the advance of the Korean Army  
6 into Manchukuo, as this would give the military prestige.  
7 The Army was infuriated over the government's policy  
8 'to strive not to extend further the Manchurian Incident'  
9 because the Emperor had approved this policy as a  
10 result of the efforts of 'his personal attendants' as  
11 shown in prosecution exhibit 179-I (diary September  
12 22, 1931). Fearing for Prince SAIONJI's life, KONOYE,  
13 SAKAI, OKABE, TAKAGI, and I decided it would be wise  
14 if he did not come to Tokyo. We were all opposed to the  
15 Army and conditions were so critical and military  
16 feeling running so high that we were apprehensive for  
17 the Emperor's safety, but he was never advised of our  
18 opinion that it might be wise for him to say nothing  
19 more about the Manchurian affair. We thought it better  
20 for the Emperor to let the Cabinet pursue its policy  
21 on its own responsibility.

22  
23 "As shown in my diary entry of September 23,  
24 1931(prosecution exhibit 179-J) when HAYASHI, of the  
25 War Department, spoke at Kasan Hall to the press, and  
failed to explain how the incident started, I asked



1 him to do so point blank. When he did not clarify  
2 the truth about the railway blow up I deplored his  
3 attitude as outrageous (Kikkai shigoku) since the  
4 Japanese people were suspicious of how it started.  
5 That the military was trying to impose its will on  
6 the government is further evident in prosecution exhibit  
7 179-K (diary September 29, 1931) when the Chief of the  
8 Army General Staff told the Premier that the government  
9 should not interfere with the prerogative of the  
10 Supreme Command. Prince KONOYE, SHIRATORI and I had  
11 a discussion on October 1, 1931, and we expressed our  
12 alarm at the possibility of a coup d'etat by the Army.  
13 We decided some measures should be taken to guide the  
14 militarists before a national calamity would happen  
15 (prosecution exhibit 179-L, diary October 1, 1931).

16 "16. After the outbreak of the Manchurian  
17 Incident on September 19, 1931, the Army's attitude  
18 became so tough that even the problem of national  
19 reform began to be discussed. At the same time, there  
20 was a report that even a reform of the Department of  
21 the Imperial Household was being discussed. Prince  
22 KONOYE told me of his being anxious about this problem.  
23 So we went together to ICHIKI, Minister of the Imperial  
24 Household, and then asked him to be most careful and  
25 deliberate lest he should fall in a trap to be laid

1 by the Army. With regard to the strong attitude of  
2 the Army, the Premier said to the Lord Keeper of the  
3 Privy Seal that the Army seemed to disagree with the  
4 Government on solving the problem of the Manchurian  
5 Incident through political negotiations with the  
6 Nanking Government. The Premier added that, concerning  
7 this point, the Government might come into a head-on  
8 conflict with the Army. This I learned from the Lord  
9 Keeper of the Privy Seal at that time. The foregoing  
10 is the conference referred to in prosecution exhibit  
11 179-M (diary October 5, 1931). The following also  
12 appears in my diary for that day which was omitted by  
13 the prosecution:

14 "I have finished my reading of the Life of Mr.  
15 Page, which I started reading many days ago. Was much  
16 interested to read how he, throughout his life, fought  
17 for democracy. Thought I could find in him a real  
18 typical American gentleman and was much pleased with  
19 that thought."

20 "17. On October 6, 1931, I reported to Count  
21 MAKINO (Prince KONOYE was with us) my deep apprehension  
22 of the Army's intrigues. We told him some appropriate  
23 measures should be taken. This conversation appears  
24 in my diary entry of October 6, 1931, which the  
25 prosecution did not include in prosecution exhibit 179-N,



1 as follows:

2 "October 6, 1931, Tuesday, raining. At  
3 9:00 in the morning went to KONOYE's residence. Mr.  
4 GOTO, Fumio, was already there. Heard from him about  
5 the internal situation of the Minseito, their view  
6 of the political situation, etc., after the local  
7 elections. Drove to Kamakura with Prince KONOYE. At  
8 11:00 a.m. we got to the Lord Keeper's villa and told  
9 him about the stiffening of the military clique, their  
10 plotting, etc, which we had told to the Minister of  
11 the Imperial Household ICHIKI, and wished him to take  
12 some appropriate measure. Then the telephone rang  
13 and it was from the Prime Minister's Secretary, HASHIMOTO.  
14 The telephone message was to the effect that as the  
15 Prime Minister was going to have Imperial audience in  
16 the afternoon, he wanted to have an interview with the  
17 Lord Keeper, so the Lord Keeper immediately rode in  
18 Prince KONOYE's car and returned to Tokyo.'

19 "18. As Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper  
20 of the Privy Seal, in endeavoring to obtain political,  
21 military and other information, I always found it  
22 difficult to get information from army circles. Through  
23 the good office, therefore, of Marquis INOUE, Saburo,  
24 who was then an Army officer, I met the defendant SUZUKI  
25 from time to time to obtain Army inside information.

1 I cultivated his acquaintance solely for this purpose.  
2 As can be noted from prosecution exhibit 179-0, diary  
3 October 7, 1931, I met SUZUKI accompanied by Baron  
4 HARADA, Secretary to Prince SAIONJI, and conveyed the  
5 information I obtained from SUZUKI to Prince KONOYE.  
6 This information concerned a plot by younger officers  
7 to seize control in Japan (later known as the October  
8 Incident). We deemed it imperative that Prince SAIONJI  
9 come up to Tokyo. My diary for October 7, 1931, states,  
10 in addition to the prosecution's excerpt:

11 "October 7, 1931...Took luncheon at noon with  
12 Mr. KONOYE and Mr. HARADA at the Tokyo Club. Heard  
13 from Mr. HARADA who had just returned from Kyoto this  
14 morning, Prince SAIONJI's version of the present  
15 situation....On my way home at about 4:30 called at  
16 HARADA's residence. Mr. KONOYE and Mr. SHIRATORI were  
17 there too. We discussed current topics. I asked HARADA  
18 to do his best to see Prince SAIONJI return to Tokyo  
19 as early as possible as it was the wish of the Lord  
20 Keeper that he do so.'

21 "The reports of a proposed coup d'etat of some  
22 militarists in Japan became increasingly alarming and  
23 we again requested Prince SAIONJI to come to Tokyo to  
24 exert his efforts to prevent it. This is recorded in  
25 my diary of October 12, 1931:



1 "October 12, 1931, Monday. Fine day. Went  
2 to office at 10:00 a.m. In the afternoon the Lord  
3 Keeper of the Privy Seal came to his office. HARADA  
4 was called up. At 3:30 he came. The Lord Keeper  
5 asked HARADA to request Prince SAIONJI to quickly return  
6 to Tokyo in view of the acute situation. In the  
7 evening Mr. OTAIRA, Shinichi, of the Chugai Shogyo  
8 and Mr. MORI, Tetsuo, of the Hochi (T.N. newspaper)  
9 called on me. The fact that Count KIYOURA called at  
10 the Lord Keeper's was an important event to both of  
11 them and they asked me various questions. At 10:00 p.m.  
12 called at HARADA's. Just then HARADA was called up from  
13 the Prime Minister's residence. He was asked by the  
14 Prime Minister to convey to Prince SAIONJI his wish  
15 that the Prince return to Tokyo quickly. On HARADA's  
16 return we talked over the latest development of the  
17 situation and I left his house at 11:30."

18 "19. This plot progressed rapidly and on  
19 October 14, 1931, Mr. YASUOKA told me and some others  
20 about it. We thought a national welfare society should  
21 be formed on a permanent basis to meet such situations  
22 (cf. prosecution exhibit 179-P, diary October 14, 1931).  
23 In the meantime there was an idea developing among the  
24 militarists to establish a new regime in Manchuria.  
25 (cf. prosecution exhibit 179-Q, diary October 15, 1931).

1 When I heard of this from HAYASHI, I thought that it  
2 was regrettable that the militarists were planning such  
3 a move.

4 "20. On October 17, 1931, the rumors which  
5 we had been hearing became realities and they are  
6 recorded in my diary for that day:

7 "'October 17, 1931, Saturday....Returned home  
8 towards evening. Just then the telephone rang. It was  
9 from HARADA of Kyoto. Was told of the arrest of several  
10 General Staff officers. Immediately I called on Marquis  
11 INOUE from whom I heard a story approximately as follows:  
12 Leading generals of the Army, including the War Minister,  
13 MINAMI, sat in conference at the War Minister's official  
14 residence last night. It was a very important conference.  
15 It lasted until 3 o'clock this morning. It was only at  
16 that hour that the final decision was reached, with the  
17 result that at 4 this morning Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Lt.  
18 Colonel NEMOTO and 10 others were arrested 'for protection'  
19 by the gendarmerie. They were planning to besiege and  
20 occupy the War Department and the General Staff Office  
21 and then to carry out a coup d'etat. For that purpose  
22 they were going to assemble young officers at the  
23 Kaikosha this noon to give them directives. Within  
24 their faction was an Imperial Guard Regiment commander  
25 and it seems they were in a position where they were well



1 able to mobilize a force of one or two companies. This  
2 is indeed an astonishing event. Called the Lord Keeper  
3 at 7 and reported the above information.'

4 "21. About this time there was some talk about  
5 establishing a Council of former Prime Ministers to  
6 direct the Cabinet. It was my opinion that there  
7 should be no such council as it would be an interference  
8 with our constitutional government. I have always been  
9 opposed to outside interference with the cabinet by the  
10 Minister of the Imperial Household, the Lord Keeper of  
11 the Privy Seal, the General Staff, Senior Statesmen or  
12 anyone else. My stand on constitutional government is  
13 set forth in my diary of October 19, 1931:

14 "'October 19, 1931, Monday. Fine day. Went  
15 to office at 10:00 a.m. At noon OKABE and SHIMOMURA,  
16 Hiroshi, called on me. We took luncheon together and  
17 frankly exchanged our views on the urgent questions of  
18 the hour. Mr. SHIMOMURA was entertaining uneasiness over  
19 the so-called Council of former Prime Ministers. I share  
20 his view on that issue. Young men of today possessing  
21 far different outlooks from those of the past consider  
22 it as incompetency on the part of these older statesmen  
23 should they confer together but merely end up by recommend-  
24 ing the continuation of the existing cabinet. If any-  
25 thing like such a conference be held, it must produce a

1 clear cut result. But this seems to be a difficult  
2 proposition. It follows, therefore, that the holding  
3 of such a conference should be preceded by deliberate  
4 consideration. Noreover, we have already a responsible  
5 cabinet system well established. Why is there any  
6 need to form a Council of former Prime Ministers? It  
7 is like trying to have a roof upon the roof. Thus I  
8 expressed my unreserved view of this question. He  
9 applauded it and said he was of the same opinion. Both  
10 of them were here until about 4 and then returned.'

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1 "When the question of punishment of those  
2 involved in the October Incident arose, it was my  
3 opinion that the dignity of the law should be main-  
4 tained; that they be dealt with deservedly and the  
5 army should not relegate to oblivion these irregular-  
6 ities committed in its own house by making their  
7 investigation and punishment ambiguous as was its habit.  
8 My diary records my opinion on this.

9 "October 28, 1931. At 10:30 p.m. OTSUKA  
10 came and told me that in the army no definite policy  
11 had yet been decided on in the case we all know of.  
12 He said that General MUTO and several division com-  
13 manders are firm in insisting that due punishment  
14 should be meted out to the offenders. If this is true,  
15 it is a matter upon which the state should be con-  
16 gratulated. The dignity and holiness of law should  
17 be guarded.

18  
19 "22. My opposition to the policy of the army's  
20 advance in North China and regret that the government  
21 had no fixed national policy to combat the military  
22 policy is shown in my diary entry of November 13,  
23 1931.

24 "November 13, 1931. From 6 p.m. a meeting  
25 of the association by the name of Juichikai was held  
at my house, with the attendance of KUROKI, ODA, HARADA,

1 URAMATSU, SASAKI, OKABE, SAKAI and YANAGISAWA. The  
2 meeting continued until about 12:30 a.m. devoted to  
3 heated discussion of various current topics.

4 "Agreement in opinion has been reached  
5 regarding the fact that a deep concern rather than  
6 grief is being caused over the present state of the  
7 country having no national measures relating to the so-  
8 called "Northward Advance Continental Policy" held forth  
9 by the military, by which the country is being vainly  
10 dragged along. As for the countermeasures to be  
11 practiced, it is, however, extremely regrettable that  
12 no concrete plan could be found after all."

13 "All my strenuous efforts to localize the  
14 incident proved to be fruitless, however, and the inci-  
15 dent went on expanding. It would appear that the  
16 cabinet's policy of localization and non-expansion was  
17 virtually ignored. Hence the questions of cabinet  
18 reconstruction and formation of a national or coalition  
19 cabinet were raised. On November 17, 1931, Finance  
20 Minister INOUE stated that a coalition cabinet would  
21 not be strong enough to control the military, and if  
22 unchecked in its disregard of international relations,  
23 the country might lead to its own ruin. I said I agreed  
24 with this (as now appears prophetic statement) and  
25 advocated a strong national government policy to combat



1 the military policy. This all appears in my diary of  
2 November 17, 1931.

3       "November 17, 1931. The result of the meeting  
4 held at KONOYE's residence yesterday may be explained  
5 as follows: Our consideration regarding the material-  
6 ization of a coalition cabinet shows that the greatest  
7 barrier to the proposed collaboration between the Seiyu  
8 and Minsei parties is not the foreign policy, but the  
9 financial policy, especially the problem centering round  
10 the gold embargo.

11       "Therefore, judging it to be essential to  
12 be informed of the frank opinion of Finance Minister  
13 INOUE, another meeting was called at KONOYE's resi-  
14 dence from 8 this morning.

15       "The three personages of KONOYE, HARADA and  
16 ITO, Bunkichi, with the attendance of Finance Minister  
17 INOUE, took breakfast together and exchanged opinions  
18 until about 10 a.m.

19       "The opinion of Finance Minister INOUE regard-  
20 ing the present political situation was as follows:  
21 Neither the so-called national cabinet nowadays highly  
22 advocated nor a Seiyu-Minsei coalition cabinet would  
23 be strong enough to restrict and control the military.  
24 Therefore, consideration of the future of the country  
25 would not permit him to accept such cabinets. In case,

1 however, the military was allowed to have its own way  
2 further than that, in its disregarding the international  
3 relations the country might lead to its own ruin.

4 "The present cabinet, although lacking in  
5 strength, is exerting itself in restricting, as best  
6 it can, the activities of the military through every  
7 available means. Accordingly it cannot be helped if  
8 the present cabinet is not well spoken of by the mili-  
9 tary. The formation of a more powerful cabinet than the  
10 present one is a matter not to be conceived of at pre-  
11 sent. If, however, a cabinet really strong enough to  
12 enforce control over the military could be organized  
13 it would be a most desirable thing, and we should be  
14 ready to offer our full support for it. Such was the  
15 gist of the opinion of Finance Minister INOUE.

16 "I was also of the same opinion with him and  
17 stated as follows: The cause which has given rise to  
18 the current tense situation is that the military has  
19 had a so-called national policy and has achieved its  
20 growth and self-discipline in line with the said policy,  
21 while outside the military circle there has existed no  
22 firmly-established policy for the future. This, I  
23 think, is the cause which has brought about the present  
24 difficult situation.

25 "Therefore, I believe, it is necessary to



1 somehow establish at this juncture a national policy  
2 for the future, with the cabinet as its chief author.  
3 I, moreover, seeing the real condition of the Manchurian  
4 Army, should like to suggest that under the present  
5 circumstances in which staff officers such as ITAGAKI  
6 and ISHIHARA are exercising full powers and carrying  
7 out the maneuvers worked out by them, it is advisable  
8 at this juncture to send an official from the Foreign  
9 Office, say, Mr. SHIRATORI, and make him negotiate with  
10 those military officers, apart from their respective  
11 official positions connected with the War and Foreign  
12 Minister, and try to come to good mutual understanding.

13 "It is important to have reasonable restric-  
14 tions imposed on the military activities by some such  
15 means.

16 "Finance Minister INOUE agreed with me on  
17 this point. Mr. HARADA, however, suggested that a  
18 council in the Imperial Presence be held at this juncture  
19 in order that a definite principle by way of a national  
20 policy, might be established to be followed in the  
21 future. I, however, objected to this, stating that  
22 the present real situation being such that the military  
23 had a so-called national policy and outside the military  
24 circle there existed almost no established measures  
25 worthy to be mentioned, a hasty holding of an Imperial

1 council before sufficient preparations were made to  
2 cope with the said circumstances, would only lead to  
3 serious results as it would be prevailed upon by the  
4 principle set up by the military.

5 "I insisted that a prudently conducted inves-  
6 tigation was, therefore, necessary. Under the present  
7 situation I stated I would rather disapprove of holding  
8 of the proposed Imperial council. Finance Minister  
9 INOUE stated as follows: The result of the discussion  
10 by the Council of the League of Nations cannot be  
11 easily inferred at present.

12 "But if the Japanese Army should further  
13 advance to Tsitsihar, Japan will be disabled to hold  
14 her seat in the League of Nations on army account. It  
15 will bring about such a situation that Japan, taking  
16 her own initiative, shall have to withdraw her repre-  
17 sentatives. Thus stating, Finance Minister INOUE  
18 expressed his deep grief.

19 "The synthesis of the opinions offered today  
20 has given me the impression that if the military, fur-  
21 ther disregarding the government's policy, should occupy  
22 Tsitsihar, the cabinet would have eventually to surrender  
23 itself up.'

24 "On December 11, 1931, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet  
25 resigned en bloc. My diary for December 12, 1931, shows



1 Prince SAIONJI's political idea which attached impor-  
2 tance to party government in recommending Mr. INUKAI,  
3 President of the Seiyukai Party, and explains the rela-  
4 tions between the Genro (Elder Statesmen) and the Lord  
5 Keeper of the Privy Seal in recommending a succeeding  
6 Prime Minister to the Throne, and also shows that pub-  
7 lic opinion and the views of those close to the Throne  
8 tallied in the selection of a succeeding Prime Minister.

9 "December 12, 1931. The press reported that  
10 INUKAI, Tsuyoshi, was generally expected to be given an  
11 Imperial mandate to form a new cabinet. About 12:30 p.m.  
12 the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal attended the office.  
13 He has been suffering from neuralgia in the feet since  
14 yesterday. At 2:23 p.m. Prince SAIONJI arrived at the  
15 Shimbashi Station. I talked with HARADA by telephone and  
16 got the following information: Prince SAIONJI went  
17 to the palace at 3:10 p.m. and had a talk with the Lord  
18 Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Minister of the Imperial  
19 Household, and the Grand Chamberlain in the office of  
20 the Lord Keeper, about the measures to be taken in order  
21 to tide us over the present emergency. Previously,  
22 HARADA had told me that Prince SAIONJI had determined  
23 to let INUKAI form a new cabinet. The Lord Keeper's  
24 opinion was, however, that under these urgent circum-  
25 stances, the formation of a cabinet supported by the

whole nation was to be desired if possible. Prince  
1 SAIONJI was received in audience by the Emperor at  
2 4:10 p.m. He retired from the Imperial Presence after  
3 a thirteen minutes audience. It appears that he asked  
4 the Emperor for a brief delay in order to give his  
5 answer to the question of how to save the present si-  
6 tuation. Prince SAIONJI changed his previous arrange-  
7 ments to leave Tokyo at 6:00 p.m. this evening and  
8 stayed in Tokyo. He invited Mr. INUKAI to his Tokyo  
9 residence and it seems that he heard INUKAI's opinion.  
10 It is reported that at this talk Prince SAIONJI  
11 explained his views as follows: Adequate measures must  
12 be taken to keep the army under the complete control  
13 of the government. Great prudence is needed in dealing  
14 with financial and domestic affairs. The formation of  
15 the cabinet must be on the broadest possible basis.  
16 Mr. INUKAI agreed with his opinion and stated frankly  
17 that he could not approve of cooperation with such as  
18 KUHARA and ADACHI as publicly rumored.. He expressed  
19 his determination to exert all efforts for the purifi-  
20 cation of political circles. In compliance with Prince  
21 SAIONJI's summons, Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI visited him  
22 and received his opinion to the effect that INUKAI, Ki  
23 would be the best qualified for the post of succeeding  
24 premier. The Grand Chamberlain immediately went back  
25



1 to the palace and reported the answer to the Emperor.  
2 INUKAI, Ki was received in audience by the Emperor at  
3 8:00 p.m. and received an Imperial mandate to form a  
4 new cabinet. I returned home at 6:30 p.m., but, as I  
5 received a telephone call from Chamberlain OKAMOTO,  
6 I again attended the office at 7:30 p.m.'

7 "23. Prince SAIONJI's political philosophy  
8 which I admired and followed is further exemplified in  
9 my diary for December 16, 1931. I agreed with his  
10 advice which he did not hesitate to submit even to  
11 princes of the blood to be cautious of the actions of  
12 some schemers who were opposed to armament reduction  
13 and to use care in the selection of a Vice-Chief of  
14 the General Staff:

15 "December 16, 1931. At 1:00 p.m. Baron HARADA  
16 telephoned me from Shizuoka and informed me of the  
17 opinion of the Genro (T.N. Prince SAIONJI) about the  
18 appointment of Imperial Prince KAN-IN to the post of  
19 Chief of the General Staff. The Genro's opinion was  
20 as follows: "I will say nothing about Imperial  
21 Prince KAN-IN's acceptance of the post as there is  
22 nothing objectionable in the matter itself. Although  
23 his nomination depends solely upon his own will, I  
24 wish to direct his attention at least to the following  
25 three points: (1) There should be a perfect

understanding between the Emperor and the Prince.

1 (2) The Prince should be especially cautious in dealing  
2 with the Armaments Reduction Conference to be opened  
3 in February of the next year, for there is danger the  
4 Prince might become involved in undesirable movements  
5 schemed by certain plotters. (3) The Prince should  
6 use great prudence in the selection of the Vice-Chief  
7 of the General Staff." I reported the matter to the  
8 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and obtained his consent.'

9  
10 "24. Having been saddled with the Manchurian  
11 Incident, the government early in 1932 was faced with  
12 the problem of further intrigues of the army in the  
13 establishment of some form of government or state in  
14 Manchuria. I was opposed to the military plan of the  
15 establishment of a state controlled by the military.  
16 Colonel ITAGAKI delivered a lecture on the new state  
17 and my diary records my astonishment at the plan of  
18 the militarists. (As shown in prosecution exhibit 2191,  
19 diary January 11, 1932.) (Incidentally the prosecution  
20 served three different translations of the diary for  
21 this date. All three of these were practically identical  
22 with the exception of the last sentence.)

23 "The last sentence of the first translation  
24 served reads:

25 "'Hearing this from ITAGAKI I was astonished



1 to find that there was such a wide difference between  
2 my ideas and theirs.'

3 "The last sentence of the second translation  
4 served reads:

5 "'Hearing this from ITAGAKI I was rather  
6 astonished to find there are a wide difference between  
7 my "head" (T.N. idea?) and that of theirs.'

8 "The last sentence of the third translation  
9 served reads:

10 "'Hearing this from ITAGAKI I was astonished  
11 to find that there was such a wide difference between  
12 our ideas and theirs.'

13 "The first translation served is correct, not  
14 the second one which is in evidence.

15 "25. As my actions in later years, taken in  
16 support of my desire and duty to see that constitutional  
17 government was enforced in Japan have been questioned  
18 by the prosecution I refer to the so-called Sakurada Gate  
19 incident recorded in my diary of January 13, 1932. A  
20 Korean, on January 8, 1932, had thrown a bomb at the  
21 Imperial cortege but there were no casualties. This  
22 was an isolated incident, and I favored no reprimand  
23 by the Emperor to the officials responsible at that  
24 time, as there was constitutional machinery based on  
25 legislation to handle such matters.

1       "January 13, 1932. At the office the Lord  
2 Keeper of the Privy Seal consulted my opinion on the  
3 question whether or not it would be proper to entreat  
4 the Emperor to give a talk in some way to officials  
5 responsible for the deplorable incident before the man-  
6 ner of their official reprimand is decided. He added  
7 that this idea had been suggested by Vice-Grand Cham-  
8 berlain KAWAI who called on him yesterday. To this  
9 the Lord Keeper replied that he would answer to this  
10 suggestion after due consideration, for this is matter  
11 of great importance involving the Imperial house. To  
12 him I replied that I felt exactly the way he did. So  
13 long as there exist agencies in our administrative setup  
14 to deal with this type of incident it would not be proper  
15 for the Emperor to make a statement which might influence  
16 the agency concerned in reaching a verdict. Indeed,  
17 inasmuch as the case falls within the jurisdiction  
18 of the Disciplinary Committee, there can be no way but  
19 to wait for a decision of that committee. In the case  
20 of the famous Kotoku Incident, the Imperial amnesty was  
21 given after the decision of the court had been announced.  
22 At any rate, I stated that I consider it not proper  
23 for the Emperor to take any action before the Disciplinary  
24 Committee reaches a verdict.  
25



1           "26. The Emperor, Mr. SHIGEMITSU and I  
2 among others, were always solicitors for the main-  
3 tenance and promotion of friendly relations between  
4 Japan and China. That I knew the Emperor's wishes  
5 is shown in my diary of January 21, 1932, which also  
6 throws more light on the October incident.

7           "January 21, 1932. From 2 p. m.  
8 Mr. SHIGEMITSU, Japanese Minister to China, delivered  
9 a lecture in his Majesty's presence on the present  
10 situation in China. I also had the honor to hear it.  
11 After the lecture, the Emperor asked Minister SHIGE-  
12 MITSU as follows: Then, is it not possible for the  
13 time being, to hope for as intimate friendship with  
14 China? The Minister answered that, as long as the  
15 Manchurian problem exists, he felt that it was diffi-  
16 cult to enjoy a good friendship. We felt very sorry  
17 for His Majesty because we knew well that His Majesty  
18 is always hoping for good friendship between Japan  
19 and China. . . When I met the Lord Keeper today, I  
20 got reliable information about the coup d'etat schemed  
21 by some army officers. Incidentally, the Lord Keeper  
22 told me that a few days ago he had been asked by the  
23 British Ambassador about the truth of the rumor that  
24 a coup d'etat is being planned by some army officers  
25 including ARAKI. The information which I got from

1 the Lord Keeper is as follows: SHIGETO and some  
2 other army officers who were transferred to remote  
3 places in connection with a plot within military  
4 circles last autumn are still in Tokyo and are  
5 attempting to accomplish the plan in cooperation  
6 with OKAWA, Shumei, KITA, Ikki; SHIMONAKA, MIKAWA  
7 and others. And a report shows that they are attempt-  
8 ing to carry out the plot on or about February 10th  
9 with the aid of AKAMATSU and his followers who are  
10 known as tougher members of the Social Democrat Party.  
11 It is said that they have often held meetings at  
12 second or third class "Machiai Houses" in or near  
13 Akasaka.

14 "27. My diary entry of January 28, 1932  
15 has been introduced in evidence by the prosecution  
16 as exhibit 2251. This entire entry is my resume of  
17 General MINAMI's lecture delivered in the Imperial  
18 Presence on the Manchurian-Mongolian question.  
19 Although the Tribunal's language section said on  
20 April 17, 1947, on page 20,134 of the record, that the  
21 last paragraph of the exhibit 'does not appear to be  
22 a part of the report of the speech made by General  
23 MINAMI,' it is the last part of his lecture as he  
24 recited it. It is not my idea. That I was opposed  
25 to a state controlled by the military is apparent



1 from exhibit 2191 referred to above. When I listened  
2 to General MINAMI's lecture I thought I could under-  
3 stand to some extent the whole aspect of positive in-  
4 tentions of the army, and I wrote it for future  
5 reference. The prosecution's conclusion on page 3  
6 of document 0001 -- 'Supplement to Chronological  
7 Summary' that I 'thought it advisable to unify Jap-  
8 anese organs in Manchuria and Mongolia under one  
9 Japanese organ under a Governor-General' is absolutely  
10 erroneous. At no time did I ever entertain any such  
11 thought, and my diary does not record my thought.

12 "28. In February, 1932, the Shanghai Inci-  
13 dent started. Shanghai, which was an international  
14 port town, was entirely different from Manchuria.  
15 Should the Shanghai Incident spread, there was fear  
16 that a full-dress war might be unleashed between Japan  
17 and China. In view of Shanghai's international nature,  
18 the Genro and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal felt  
19 deep concern over the incident, which might seriously  
20 affect the powers concerned. Especially concerned  
21 were they about the reported dispatch of troops to  
22 Shanghai, which might further stimulate China. I  
23 thought it vitally necessary to make the army give  
24 up its idea of sending troops to Shanghai. My diary  
25 for February 4, 1932 states:

1 it is becoming impossible to raise funds abroad.  
2 If the condition is left as it is, the war funds  
3 will not be able to hold out three months more, and  
4 it will lead to a grave situation at home. Therefore,  
5 the Finance Minister will make a strong assertion  
6 on this point at the cabinet council today.'

7 "29. The prosecution has said that I re-  
8 jected General UGAKI as Premier in October 1941,  
9 'the only man who might perhaps have averted war al-  
10 together.' (Document 0003-page 49)." I will omit  
11 the next sentence. "However, I wish to show at this  
12 time that I held General UGAKI's abilities in high  
13 esteem by quoting from my diary of February 8, 1932.

14 "'February 8, 1932. At 9:30 a. m. visited  
15 HARADA at his residence. Mr. INUKAI, Ken, also called  
16 on him. Informing me that Governor General of Chosen,  
17 UGAKI, had tendered his resignation, Mr. INUKAI asked  
18 my opinion about how to treat it. I replied that if  
19 the Premier and the Governor General reached an agree-  
20 ment and the Premier desired the latter to stay, the  
21 Premier might report to the Throne the intention of  
22 the Cabinet to have UGAKI remain in office and apply  
23 for Imperial approval on the matter.

24 "'At noon saw the Lord Keeper in his office  
25 room and had a talk. At 12:30 p. m. took lunch with



1 Messrs. HARADA and OKABE at the Tokyo Club.

2 "The Lord Keeper told me that as the  
3 Premier consulted him about General UGAKI's resigna-  
4 tion, he replied that if the Premier wanted UGAKI  
5 to stay, he might, when reporting UGAKI's resignation  
6 to the Throne, state, in addition, that the Cabinet  
7 wanted to keep the Governor General in office con-  
8 sidering the present condition of Korean administra-  
9 tion and thus obtain His Majesty's approval.

10 "At 2 p. m. Mr. MATSUOKA, Yosuke, delivered  
11 a lecture before the Emperor on "The Relations between  
12 Japan and Manchuria and the History of Diplomatic  
13 Relations with Manchuria and Mongolia." I was allowed  
14 to attend it. After the lecture, His Majesty asked  
15 him about the possibility of close friendship be-  
16 tween Japan and China. MATSUOKA replied that accord-  
17 ing to the principle of biology, it was difficult  
18 for close races to come into friendly relationship  
19 with each other. Therefore, he thought the close  
20 friendship between the two countries would be difficult  
21 of realization. We could not but be impressed by His  
22 Majesty's earnest desire for close relations between  
23 Japan and China.'

24 "30. The question of the responsibilities  
25 of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had been much

1 discussed by the people in Japan. In order to ob-  
2 tain some reliable information on this subject, I  
3 consulted with Dr. SHIMIZU Cho, an authority on the  
4 Japanese Constitution. His advice is contained in  
5 my diary of February 12, 1932.

6 "February 12, 1932. Had a talk with  
7 Dr. SHIMIZU: heard his opinion on the responsibility  
8 of the Lord Keeper for giving counsel to the Throne  
9 in the case of cabinet change. His final conclusion  
10 is that from the point of view of the Constitution  
11 the Lord Keeper is not held responsible to give  
12 counsel to the Emperor. Therefore, there is no  
13 person responsible to the Throne except the State  
14 Ministers so far as State affairs are concerned.'

15 "31. Another legal problem which had been  
16 worrying me was the establishment of a new state in  
17 Manchuria. This problem also perplexed Count MAKINO  
18 and Baron HARADA. The three of us had always op-  
19 posed the army's actions in Manchuria. So we con-  
20 sulted Dr. TACHI Sakutaro, the highest authority on  
21 international law in Japan. This is reported in my  
22 diary of February 16, 1932.

23 "February 16, 1932. At 11:30 a. m. Baron  
24 HARADA called at my office. The Lord Keeper gave  
25 me the full particulars about his interview with



1 Dr. TACHI. At 4 p. m. had an interview with Dr.  
2 TACHI at HARADA's and heard his opinion about the  
3 relations between the new state in Manchuria and  
4 Mongolia and the Nine-Power Treaty. His opinion  
5 is that from the standpoint of international common  
6 law the open intervention on the part of our country-  
7 men could not but be regarded as violation of  
8 Article I of the treaty. Mr. Batey of the Foreign  
9 Ministry has a stronger opinion that a state which  
10 is founded under the pressure of foreign armed forces  
11 cannot be regarded as an independent country. Dr.  
12 TACHI does not go so far, but he says that, indeed,  
13 conditions today seem to have gone beyond a question  
14 of law.'

15  
16 "32. The Emperor, Count MAKINO and I were  
17 solicitous for nonexpansion and localization of the  
18 Shanghai Incident and His Majesty not only disliked  
19 General MAZAKI's strategy, but feared that Japan  
20 would be attacked by the League of Nations for the  
21 Shanghai Incident. This is recorded in my diary of  
22 February 17, 1932.

23 "February 17, 1932. The Lord Keeper told  
24 me about the current situation from various points  
25 of view. His talk may be summed up as follows:

"His Majesty is deeply concerned about the Shanghai

1 Incident and the attitude of the League of Nations  
2 in regard to the incident. Moreover, judging from  
3 the Foreign Minister's report, His Majesty seemed  
4 to have felt as if the Foreign Minister had given  
5 up hope of solving the problem. So the Lord Keeper  
6 replied to His Majesty that perhaps Mr. YOSHIZAWA  
7 meant that having tried every means to settle the  
8 situation, we could but wait and see what action the  
9 Chinese would take. The Lord Keeper further said  
10 to the Emperor that if the Foreign Minister's report  
11 had given such an impression, it was because Mr.  
12 YOSHIZAWA's words were insufficient. When Vice  
13 Chief of the General Staff MASAKI had an audience  
14 with the Emperor, he said to His Majesty that if  
15 Chiang Kai-shek's army should support the 18th Route  
16 Army, we might have to reinforce our troops. In  
17 that case, war between China and Japan would be un-  
18 avoidable, and the situation must then inevitably  
19 become serious. And His Majesty asked General  
20 MASAKI if there were any means to prevent the ex-  
21 pansion of the trouble, such as temporary evacuation  
22 of residents from the area."  
23

24 "I was deeply impressed when hearing the  
25 Lord Keeper's report and could not help sympathizing  
with His Majesty in his anxiety."



1           "Further efforts of the Emperor to prevent  
2 the dispatch of reinforcements to Shanghai, parallel-  
3 ing the efforts of mine and others close to the  
4 Throne, are revealed in my diary of February 21,  
5 1932.

6           "'February 21, 1932. I called on the Lord  
7 Keeper at his official residence at 4:30 p. m. He  
8 told me as follows:

9           ""If more reinforcements are sent to  
10 Shanghai, the situation will become serious, and  
11 there will be growing possibility of its develop-  
12 ing into a war. In that case it may become necessary  
13 to hold a conference of the Genro and Senior States-  
14 men or to open a session of the Privy Council to  
15 deliberate on His Majesty's inquiry, or joint counsel  
16 of elder statesmen may be required to be submitted to  
17 the Throne. Therefore, in order to confer with the  
18 Genro beforehand, I decided to go to Okitsu on the  
19 20th, and when I spoke about it to the Emperor during  
20 a recent audience, His Majesty ordered me to have  
21 full conference with the Genro about the matter. But  
22 on the 20th, when Premier INUKAI had an audience with  
23 the Emperor, he was asked by His Majesty whether more  
24 reinforcements would be dispatched or not. To this  
25 the Premier answered decisively that his cabinet

1 would not send more troops. His Majesty asked him  
2 repeatedly, but as the Premier replied in the same  
3 way, the Emperor seemed to have felt relieved. After  
4 the Premier, I was received in audience, and His  
5 Majesty told me about the conversation. So I put off  
6 going to Okitsu. I requested the Premier that in  
7 case more reinforcements be needed hereafter, he  
8 report it to His Majesty beforehand to give time for  
9 consideration.

10 "However, the Imperial Household Minister  
11 and the Grand Chamberlain called on me this morning  
12 and told me that development of the operations at  
13 Shanghai might require a sudden dispatch of troops,  
14 and in that case there would be no time to confer  
15 with the Genro. And they requested me to see the  
16 Genro and ask his opinion beforehand, if possible.  
17 I agreed with them and decided to leave Tokyo tomorrow  
18 morning to visit the Genro."

19 "I rang up HARADA on the telephone and  
20 arranged to get in touch with Okitsu."

21 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-  
22 past one.

23 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
24 taken.)  
25



## AFTERNOON SESSION

1  
2  
3 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at  
4 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's per-  
8 mission the accused OSHIMA will be absent from the  
9 courtroom for the whole of the afternoon session  
10 conferring with his counsel.

11 Mr. Logan.

12 - - -

13 K O I C H I K I D O, an accused, resumed the stand  
14 and testified through Japanese interpreters as  
15 follows:

16 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I shall  
17 continue reading from KIDO's affidavit, page 27.

18 "33. When Prince SAIONJI asked Prince KONOYE  
19 for his advice about his retirement as he was indignant  
20 over the army's attitude, Prince KONOYE came to me for  
21 my opinion. After consideration I advised Prince KONOYE  
22 that Prince SAIONJI should not retire but should work  
23 harder to bring about a reform in politics. My regard  
24 for General UGAKI's ability is again expressed in my  
25 diary entry of February 26, 1932.

1           "Feb. 26, 1932. ... At 9:30 a. m. called on  
2 Prince KONOYE at his mansion. Heard from him about  
3 his interview with Prince SAIONJI at Okitsu the day be-  
4 fore yesterday. It may be summarized as follows:  
5 Prince SAIONJI stated that the recent tendency of politi-  
6 cal circles was contrary to what he had been consider-  
7 ing and expecting, and, in the case of political change,  
8 he could not bring himself to recommend a soldier as a  
9 successor to the Premiership. Therefore, if he did not  
10 make a resolution after careful consideration, at present,  
11 he would disgrace himself forever. So at this juncture  
12 he wanted to decline the honorable treatment and as  
13 Genro surrender his peerage and was giving careful con-  
14 sideration to the matter. Then the Genro asked Prince  
15 KONOYE's opinion. As it was so unexpected, Prince  
16 KONOYE could not give a ready reply and left Okitsu,  
17 promising the Genro to reply after carefully thinking  
18 over the matter for a few days.

19           "Prince KONOYE asked me what I thought of it.  
20 When I talked over the telephone the evening before last  
21 I could roughly guess and thought about it. It was such  
22 a serious matter that I could not form any good opinion.  
23 But it seems to me that after all, just as in the case  
24 of Prince YAMAGATA years ago, the Emperor would not grant  
25 approval. Even though His Majesty granted approval, it



1 would be to no purpose, for it would merely elicit  
2 various conjectures on the part of the public. If  
3 Prince SAIONJI is going into politics again after his  
4 surrender of peerage and the privilege of Genro, it is  
5 another matter. But even in that case, it will per-  
6 haps be impossible for him to accomplish reconstruction  
7 of the political world as he expects. Therefore, I be-  
8 lieve that he had better remain in the present position  
9 and take a more positive part in bringing about reform  
10 in politics. I stated my view to Prince KONOYE and  
11 promised further consideration on the matter. Then  
12 Prince KONOYE told me about his interview with War Min-  
13 ister ARAKI last night. His talk with General ARAKI  
14 revealed that the "direct Imperial Rule" as advocated by  
15 the General and others was different from what the words  
16 literally mean, but similar in substance to what we were  
17 thinking of. According to Prince KONOYE, General ARAKI  
18 further said that as regards the Shanghai Incident, the  
19 activities of diplomats could not catch up with military  
20 operations and, to his regret, the army was always looked  
21 upon with suspicion. The General also said that, recent-  
22 ly the Army had found that MORI was utilizing the Army.

23 "Mr. INUKAI, Ken, telephoned to me requesting  
24 an interview. I asked him to go to KONOYE's residence.  
25 "Then we met there Mr. INUKAI consulted us concerning

1 the Governor General of Chosen UGAKI. I replied to him  
2 that the Cabinet might deal with the matter as I had  
3 told him before.'

4 "34. The Government of Manchukuo was estab-  
5 lished in March, 1932, and Henry Pu Yi was appointed  
6 Regent. As shown, I was Chief Secretary to the Lord  
7 Keeper of the Privy Seal for about one year prior to the  
8 commencement of the Manchurian Incident and continued  
9 as such during the Incident and for four years after the  
10 new State was created. I had no connection whatsoever  
11 in the formulation or execution of any plans in support  
12 of it. I was not in any position to do so, nor was I  
13 in any position to issue any orders adding or abetting  
14 it. In my minor position I, and others close to the  
15 Throne, strove to the best of our ability to localize  
16 the Incident. Needless to say, I never collaborated or  
17 conspired with anyone to bring it about or encourage its  
18 continuance.

19 "35. On page 46 of prosecution document 0003  
20 the Prosecution says about me: 'In the beginning he was  
21 anti-militarist and we do not suggest that he was one  
22 of the original conspirators.' The prosecution contents,  
23 however, that exhibits 179-E, 179-I and 2251 show I  
24 'was not against the Manchurian aggression on principle,  
25 but because the Army was getting too powerful and was



1 against the Emperor doing anything to stop it.' I  
2 was against the Manchurian affair in principle and in  
3 practice as shown by all the excerpts from my diary  
4 heretofore quoted. Even the excerpts cited above by the  
5 prosecution bear out this contention, as they have not  
6 been construed properly by the prosecution, as has been  
7 shown. I was not against the Emperor or anyone else  
8 trying to stop it. I exerted my best endeavours in my  
9 limited capacity to stop it.

10 "36. On March 9, 1932, I found out the truth  
11 of the March, 1931, and October, 1931, incidents from  
12 Colonel NAGATA. The facts confirmed my fears that the  
13 army was planning a coup d'etat in attempting to seize  
14 political power. There were maneuvers against which I  
15 was constantly on guard. The facts are contained in my  
16 diary for the day.

17 "March 9, 1932. At noon invited Colonel  
18 NAGATA, Tesuzan, Chief of Ministry Affairs Bureau of the  
19 War Ministry, to a luncheon party in my house. Includ-  
20 ing Prince KONOYE, Counts FUTAARA, KUROKI, SAKAI and  
21 Viscount OKABE, we exchanged frank views on the latest  
22 situation in military circles. After lunch the sub-  
23 stance of remark by the Colonel was as follows:

24 "1. Regarding the March Incident: There  
25 are sufficient reasons that the military authorities

1 should begin to be interested with political matters  
2 as well as military affairs. The most important are:

3 "(1) Following the disarmament problem,  
4 militarists were falling into disfavour with the world  
5 and they were in danger of being disbanded.

6 "(2) The question of the so-called right of  
7 supreme command raised at the London Conference.

8 "(3) The question of the reduction of sala-  
9 ries.

10 "(4) Maladministration of personnel affairs in  
11 the army.

12 "The outline of the March Incident is that to  
13 bring about a political change in the Diet while it was  
14 in session by gaining control of the Court at the same  
15 time presuming to petition the Emperor to form a non-  
16 party cabinet of persons of their own choice. Thus,  
17 they plotted to carry out National Socialistic Politics.  
18 The leading figures of the movement were OKAWA's parti-  
19 sans, OKAWA stated that present state of affairs could  
20 not be surmounted as it was and explained the above plot.  
21 He said he had told him that in case the plot be attempt-  
22 ed, he would not expect an active support from the army  
23 but would rather wish the army to adopt an indifferent  
24 attitude not pursuing any policy calculated to retard  
25 or suppress it. Further, he said he had requested him



1 to supply the bombs, etc. necessary to carry out the  
2 plot.

3 "OKAWA and his associates pretended that  
4 War Minister UGAKI agreed with his proposal. Then in  
5 certain quarters of the army, they participated in the  
6 plan because the War Minister had approved it and sup-  
7 plied bombs, etc. At the same time, from other quarters  
8 of the army there arose sound argument to the effect  
9 that the army should not try to carry out political re-  
10 form having dealings with outsiders and thereby violat-  
11 ing the sanctity of the army itself. Thereupon, they  
12 reconsidered the weakness of the plan and it was frus-  
13 trated before fruition.

14 "II. The October Incident: Then certain  
15 members of the Army General Staff who were indignant at  
16 the failures of their seniors began to plot to execute  
17 the plan by means of the Army alone, with no dependence  
18 on outsiders. By degrees they proceeded with the plan  
19 which was to initiate the sort of coups d'etat which had  
20 been carried out abroad.

21 "First, they planned by penetration (1) to  
22 interfere with the regular functioning of the army by  
23 suppressing its governing body by force; (2) at the same  
24 time, by occupation of the Metropolitan Police Headquarters  
25 with forces under their command to make strong resistance

1 impossible; (3) by arrangement with court circles to  
2 submit their plot to the Imperial hearing in order to  
3 expedite the formation of their own cabinet, its Premier,  
4 War, Navy and Home Ministers to be chosen from their  
5 associates.

6 "The same plan was prepared and proceeded to  
7 a considerable degree. As the program was in progress,  
8 some of those involved, some ten or more, began to doubt  
9 the wisdom of those activities and the plot was betrayed  
10 by them before it was put in practice.

11 "But as a result of the punishments they re-  
12 ceived, most of them began to admit that they had been  
13 in error and to reconsider their position after reprimands  
14 from their senior officers. So, although they  
15 should have been charged according to the military penal  
16 code, their motives and mentality were taken into con-  
17 sideration and also the prestige of the Army and their  
18 cases were disposed of administratively. Those who  
19 seem to hold such opinion may be limited to three per-  
20 sons, HASHIMOTO, SATO and CHO.

21 "III. Recent opinions held in Army circles:  
22 They can be classified in three categories. Those who  
23 have connection with OKAWA's faction, those who are  
24 indoctrinated with the ideas of KITA, IKKI and NISHIDA,  
25 ZOI, and those who are indignant about the question of



1 the right of Supreme Command. And from these different  
2 viewpoints there are some who are trying to start activi-  
3 ties in cooperation with outside bodies, while not a few  
4 are against moves by the Army to plot in cooperation with  
5 outsiders. At present, those who hold the latter opinion  
6 are in majority and it does not seem likely that they  
7 should act blindly right away. But their antipathy  
8 against the existing party is deep rooted, so they are  
9 studying a constructive plan among those who are inter-  
10 ested in the matter. The ideal book for those who  
11 respect HISHIDA is the one entitled "Plan for Recon-  
12 struction of Society."

13 "37. On March 27, 1932, I had a conversation  
14 with Baron HARADA who advised me that it was Prince  
15 SAIONJI's intentions to have Prince KONOYE take over  
16 the helm of the government at the appropriate time and  
17 wanted me to assume an important position close to the  
18 Throne. It was my thought then that he planned to do  
19 this because he had confidence in us and that we would  
20 be able to check the militarists. My diary for March  
21 27, 1932, records:

22 "March 27, 1932. At noon HARADA called me  
23 by telephone, so visited him and called on Shiseido on  
24 the way to Kamakura from Shimbashi Station. Visited  
25 KONOYE and was entertained at dinner. Left there by the

1 car at 9:23 and came back. HARADA reported the Genro's  
2 opinion to us at the time he visited Okitsu recently.  
3 According to the Genro's opinion he intended to put  
4 KONOYE in as President of the House of Peers as soon  
5 as possible and by doing so, keep him away from the  
6 trouble of the various movements, then when chance came,  
7 put him in the position of Premier.

8 "Genro wanted me to be in the position of  
9 Vice Grand Chamberlain in the possible near future and  
10 said that he intended to put me in the active position  
11 as one of His Majesty's attendants. Guessed from Genro's  
12 feelings he considered that the present situation is  
13 approaching a revolution. I sympathized deeply about  
14 Genro's responsibility.'

15 "38. Prince SAIONJI's thoughts on this matter  
16 are further recorded in my diary of April 8, 1932.

17 "April 8, 1932. In the morning Baron  
18 HARADA called on me. He returned from Okitsu bringing  
19 advice from the Genro (Prince SAIONJI). The plan of  
20 having Prince KONOYE form a cabinet would be satisfac-  
21 tory, so the Genro thought, but he chose rather to make  
22 him president of the House of Peers at this juncture and  
23 to appoint him the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal 1 or  
24 2 years later. Further that I should be the Grand Chamber-  
25 lain in the future, so as to make the Emperor's position



secure with reliable advisers. The above, he thought, might be most appropriate. I think this is a most difficult question.'

"39. The day following the so-called May 15 incident, in which a group of young officers of the Army and Navy on May 15, 1932, threw a bomb at the official residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and stormed the Prime Minister's official residence and assassinated Prime Minister INUKAI in attempts to carry out a political reform, I counselled Count MAKINO, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, never to meekly acquiesce in the army's outrageous attempts, that he should form a succeeding cabinet based on political parties, and meet the Presidents of the Seiykai and Minseitō Parties and urge them to form a party cabinet. This counsel was given by me to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to form a party Government in the face of STOUT opposition voiced by Major General OBATA to the emergence of a party government. With due modesty I wish to point out that it required considerable fortitude on my part to offer such advice in the face of military opposition due to the high tension existing at that time. My diary for May 16, 1932, is self-explanatory of these facts.

"May 16, 1932 ... Returned home at 3:00 a. m. After resting a while, called on Marquis INOUE

1 from whom I heard about the attitude of military cir-  
2 cles towards the present incident. He told me that so  
3 far it seems to have caused no appreciable excitement in  
4 the Army. But in his view it will be necessary to have  
5 firm resolution, and exercise full consideration with  
6 regard to the settlement of the situation, especially  
7 the formation of a new cabinet. He thinks the military  
8 will by no means be pleased if some political party,  
9 merely pursuant to the so-called constitutional normalcy,  
10 be ordered by the Throne to form a succeeding cabinet.  
11 After returning home, talked over the phone with HARADA,  
12 who was at Okitsu. Told him it would become necessary  
13 for Prince SAIONJI to come up to Tokyo and urged him  
14 to make preparations for it.

15 "Attended office at 9:00 a. m. The Lord  
16 Keeper came to the office too. At 10:00 a. m. the cabi-  
17 net held a meeting and decided to resign en bloc.  
18 Premier TAKAHASHI proceeded to the palace and tendered  
19 their resignations. In obedience to the Imperial order  
20 to send for Prince SAIONJI, the Board of Chamberlain  
21 dispatched the subordinate KAWAI with the Grand Chamber-  
22 lain's letter to the Prince.

23 "At 5:00 p. m. went to the Premier's official  
24 residence to express my condolence. Went to HARADA's  
25 residence at 6:00 p. m. Dined with HARADA, Prince



KIDO

DIRECT

30,778

1 KONOYE and ex-Ambassador TANAKA. We heard from  
2 TANAKA about the condition of Manchoukuo. Before dinner  
3 Prince KONOYE told us about Major  
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1 General OBATA's view on the present incident, which  
2 may be summarized as follows:

3 "The present incident, too, has some rela-  
4 tion to the November affair. Since the November affair  
5 occurred, the army devoted itself to establishing  
6 control within itself, and as a result, it has suc-  
7 ceeded in doing so almost to a marvelous degree.  
8 (Although my diary states "November" this is error as  
9 I was referring to the "October" Incident). Those  
10 army officers who were of the rank of major or below  
11 at that time and had been acting together with the  
12 naval officers who are concerned in the present inci-  
13 dent have gradually been out of touch with and  
14 estranged from the latter, until at last they became  
15 out of touch with naval circles. So the naval officers  
16 acted upon younger military men, especially cadets,  
17 and at last brought about such a grave affair. The  
18 younger military officers in general were originally  
19 of the same mind with those who have participated in  
20 the affair and, naturally, show an attitude of sympathy  
21 towards the latter. Fearing that the affair may prove  
22 fruitless, some of them requested an interview with  
23 the War Minister, General ARAKI, yesterday evening.  
24 There are also others who have called on Major General  
25 OBATA several times since yesterday evening. They



1 seem to be striving to take this opportunity to attain  
2 their long cherished object. If a party cabinet is  
3 formed again, the dissatisfaction of the military will be  
4 such that even General ARAKI will find it difficult to  
5 exercise control over the military elements. They seemed  
6 to disfavor even a HIRANUMA Cabinet, but according to  
7 Major General OBATA, who telephoned Prince KONOYE this  
8 evening, he (OBATA) had given them an account of Baron  
9 HIRANUMA's character and dissuaded them from objecting to  
10 the Baron forming a cabinet.

11 "Today in the morning saw the Lord Keeper in  
12 his room and set forth measures to cope with the current  
13 situation as follows:

14 "Summary of Measures to Cope with the Situa-  
15 tion: Jeopardizing the national foundation by such rash  
16 direct action, as in the present incident, should be  
17 strictly avoided. The people should be warned against be-  
18 ing induced to side with it. It would be always borne in  
19 mind not to act contrary to the spirit of the Imperial  
20 Constitution which was granted during the Emperor MEIJI's  
21 reign and the Imperial Oath of Five Articles which the same  
22 ruler proclaimed. All national programs should be formed  
23 along this line. At this juncture efforts should be made  
24 to form a cabinet based upon the true unity of the  
25 nation, by urging the political parties with bases in the

1 Diet to rouse themselves to action. As head of the  
2 cabinet a man of character in an impartial position should  
3 be selected, for instance, Viscount SAITO. To apply to the  
4 Throne for the promulgation of an Imperial script in  
5 which our future national policy is set forth.

6 "The said Imperial rescript should be, so to  
7 speak, a new interpretation of the Constitution and the  
8 Five Article Oath in accordance with the change of times.  
9 While admonishing the military against their recent  
10 tendency to go beyond their proper sphere, on the other  
11 hand stress should be put on remedying the degeneration  
12 and corruption attendant on party politics and urge the  
13 establishment of a policy adapted to the age. As the means  
14 to carry out the above measures, the following may be  
15 suggested: To ask the Genro to come up to Tokyo; to have  
16 confidential talks with War Minister ARAKI and Navy  
17 Minister OSUMI over the general policy and obtain a full  
18 understanding in those quarters. After that, the Lord  
19 Keeper should have an interview with the presidents of the  
20 Seiyukai and Minseito Parties and persuade them to rise  
21 to action. On the whole, the Lord Keeper supported the  
22 above measures.'

23  
24 "40. The prosecution has introduced several  
25 sentences and half sentences from my diary entry of May  
17, 1932, as exhibit 2252 as corrected by Language Sec-



1 tion, record page 16,215. These choice excerpts tend to  
2 create the impression that my thoughts and opinions are  
3 set forth in that entry. As a matter of fact, I have  
4 only recorded information I received from Lieutenant  
5 Colonel SUZUKI, Major General NAGATA and others as to the  
6 intention of the army and young officers' tendency in  
7 connection with the May 15 Incident. I had an interview  
8 with Prince KONOYE and them to obtain information which  
9 would be offered to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
10 for his reference in respect to how to deal with the  
11 situation following the resignation en masse of the  
12 cabinet. An examination of the complete entry clearly  
13 shows this to be true:

14 "May 17, 1932. Went to the office at 10:00 a.m.  
15 At about 11:00 a.m. Count KODAMA came and we had a talk.  
16 At noon, went to HARADA's where we took lunch with Prince  
17 KONOYE, Marquis INOUE and Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI and  
18 talked about remedial measures and the succeeding  
19 cabinet.  
20

21 "According to Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI, the  
22 present incident has been brought about by men of the same  
23 faction as the November affair. A few months ago (about  
24 March) when officers of the rank of captain who were  
25 conspirators in the November affair met in secret with  
naval officers who took part in the present incident,

1 the naval men urged decisive action but the army officers  
2 refused it saying that the military should act as an  
3 organized body. Exchange of hot words followed and they  
4 parted without reaching an agreement. In the army, War  
5 Minister ARAKI seems to have been intending first to  
6 strengthen unity within itself and then, after the  
7 extraordinary session of the Diet, recommend to the  
8 government some means to bring about national unity by  
9 doing away with the antagonism between the military and  
10 others. But before he had realized his intention, the  
11 untoward incident happened. As the younger military  
12 elements have been supporting the cause, it is natural that  
13 once the incident has occurred, they should make efforts,  
14 lest the actions of the participants may come to nothing.

15 "Should a party cabinet be again formed, an  
16 affair like the present one will be repeated again and  
17 again. So some means to remedy the past evils to any  
18 extent should be devised. A "whole nation" cabinet may be  
19 suggested. War Vice Minister KOISO seems to be in favor  
20 of a HIRANUMA Cabinet. It further seems to SUZUKI that  
21 the Declaration for the Safeguarding of Political  
22 Parties gave a direct incitement to the present incident.  
23 Among the younger military officers there are some who  
24 are extremely enraged at it.  
25



1           " 'At 6:00 p.m. went to HARADA's again where  
2 HARADA, KONOYE and myself had an interview with Major  
3 General NAGATA, Tetsuzan, from whom we heard his view  
4 on the current situation. Saying preliminarily that he is  
5 most moderate in opinion in the army, he gave us a talk.  
6 But his opinion does not differ much from that of  
7 Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI. The following is the summary  
8 of his talk:

9           " 'The military are dead set against party  
10 government. Should the formation of any single party  
11 cabinet be attempted, there would perhaps be none among  
12 them to take up the portfolio of War (T.N. which is to be  
13 held by a military officer on active service) and after  
14 all the attempt will prove abortive.

15           " 'It is obvious that Major General NAGATA has a  
16 considerable aversion to political parties, for he even  
17 asked us if it is difficult for a party member willing to  
18 join a cabinet to have his name struck off the party  
19 register. According to information obtained by Prince  
20 KONOYE, MORI, Kaku had a strictly private interview with  
21 WAKATSUKI, NAGAI and MIKI of the Minseito Party to  
22 discuss the question of the succeeding cabinet.  
23 WAKATSUKI, it is reported, has left the matter entirely  
24 to MIKI who after all is unwilling to join the cabinet,  
25 but NAGAI is expected to do so. It is, therefore, likely

1 that a coalition cabinet will be organized.

2 "MORI submitted a condition to President  
3 SUZUKI (of the Seiyukai Party) that a powerful cabinet  
4 with a vigorous foreign policy be formed and said that if  
5 it was not accepted, he would not enter the cabinet.  
6 OBATA visited and told MORI that as military circles  
7 were severely criticizing him (MORI), OBATA as well as War  
8 Minister ARAKI had always been screening him, and that  
9 should he (MORI) join the succeeding cabinet, his  
10 political life would be at an end. As a result of  
11 OBATA's persuasion, MORI seems to have resolved not to  
12 join a SUZUKI Cabinet which is based on existing  
13 political parties. Further, it is said that MORI had  
14 an interview with ARAKI at 7 this evening and confirmed  
15 his determination.'

17 "40. On May 21, 1932, I received information  
18 from Director of the Police Bureau about public opinion and  
19 the political situation. In my diary for that day I  
20 also state that I thought it was necessary to reach a  
21 full understanding with the political parties in  
22 recommending to the Throne a succeeding Prime Minister  
23 who would form a new Cabinet in succession to the Seiyu-  
24 kai Government, headed by Mr. INUKAI, who was assassinated,  
25 and that the Emperor commanded Prince SAIONJI, the



1 Genro (Elder Statesman), to select a non-militarist and  
2 non-fascist person as candidate for succeeding Prime  
3 Minister. My thought was the same as the Emperor's.  
4 My diary for that day is as follows:

5 "May 21, 1932. At 9:30 paid a visit to  
6 HARADA. Director of the Police Bureau MORIOKA was also  
7 a visitor and we obtained from him information about the  
8 political situation which is as follows: "Gathering from  
9 the reports of the prefectural governors in connection  
10 with the recent affair: It has had no considerable effect  
11 on financial circles. The cry against the military's  
12 tyranny is heard everywhere denouncing the recent acts of  
13 young officers. With regard to the succeeding cabinet,  
14 opinion in favor of a party cabinet is pretty dominant.  
15 If the succeeding cabinet is not based on political  
16 parties, it will inevitably give rise to the so-called  
17 constitution safeguarding movement. In the event of a  
18 'fire-riot' breaking out in the Metropolis, the new  
19 cabinet will have to enforce martial law. If things  
20 come to such a pass and a state of internal disturbance  
21 develops, it will be extremely difficult to cope with  
22 the situation. So in submitting to the Throne plans for  
23 a succeeding cabinet, it is necessary to take steps so as  
24 to obtain beforehand a full understanding of the political  
25 parties. If necessary, the promulgation of an Imperial

1 rescript might be suggested as a last shift, though it  
2 is regrettable to have to adopt such means. . . ."

3 "At 3:00 p.m. called again at HARADA's. The  
4 Emperor's words to the Elder Statesmen were as follows:  
5 "His Majesty desires that the Genro select a person as  
6 the next Premier who has no fascist leanings; about  
7 whose character there has been no unsavoury rumour;  
8 who is moderate in thought; who is not militaristic."

9 "42. As has been heretofore shown, Prince  
10 SAIONJI, as Genro (Elder Statesman) used to recommend  
11 to the Throne a succeeding Prime Minister at a cabinet  
12 change, but as he advanced in age, he desired Count  
13 MAKINO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to seek the  
14 views not only of the Genro, but also of the Senior  
15 Statesmen. Subsequent conferences of Senior Statesmen  
16 were held in accordance with Prince SAIONJI's opinion,  
17 and, thereafter the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
18 attached great importance to the Senior Statesmen's  
19 views. Prince SAIONJI's opinion is found in my diary  
20 entry of August 26, 1932. This entry demonstrates one  
21 of the historical developments of the duties of the Lord  
22 Keeper of the Privy Seal:

23 "August 26, 1932. Had a talk with the Lord  
24 Keeper. He said when he visited Gotemba the other day,  
25 Prince SAIONJI wished that in the future the Emperor's



1 inquiry as to a new Premier be addressed not to the  
2 Genro alone, but to a conference of "Senior Statesmen"  
3 which the Lord Keeper shall call and after deliberation  
4 the Lord Keeper shall submit an answer to the Emperor,  
5 and also expressed his wish to decline the privileges of  
6 being a Genro because of his advanced age and infirmity.  
7 The Lord Keeper told me to keep these points in mind in  
8 visiting Prince SAIONJI.'

9 "43. I wish to point out that this entry  
10 refutes the prosecution contention in document 0003, page  
11 47, that when I became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,  
12 eight years later, I ' . . . developed a new function,  
13 that of advising the Emperor on the choice of every new  
14 premier. . . .'

15 "44. The next day, August 27, 1932, I visited  
16 Prince SAIONJI. Among other things he spoke of his  
17 idea of the Senior Statesmen's Conference in the selec-  
18 tion of a new Prime Minister. He also approved of my  
19 opposition to making the office of Lord Keeper of the  
20 Privy Seal another Sumitsuin (Privy Council), that is to  
21 say, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal going deep into  
22 politics. My diary states:  
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1           "August 27, 1932. Sat. Cloudy. Took the  
2 6:20 train at Shimbashi for Gotemba. At once visited  
3 the Prince by the automobile sent by Prince SAIONJI.  
4 He is, as usual, so strong that he hardly appears a  
5 man of such an advanced age as eighty-four. From  
6 about 9:30 to about 11:15 he talked on various topics  
7 ..... As to the Senior Statesmen's Conference, he said  
8 practically the same thing that the Lord Keeper told  
9 me yesterday. "Though I don't approve of a conference  
10 in the Emperor's presence," he said, "it will be a  
11 good idea, when a cabinet resigns and a new Premier  
12 is to be recommended, to make a Senior Statesmen's  
13 Conference deliberate and submit an answer to the  
14 Emperor." However, he did not touch the question of  
15 his declining the privilege of Genro.  
16

17           "Further, on the question of creating ad-  
18 visers in the Lord Keeper's Office, I said that I  
19 was against it on the ground that creation of such a  
20 system would only result in providing another organ  
21 similar in nature to the Privy Council and would be  
22 ill-advised. He agreed with me on this too, saying  
23 "Exactly." He said, "The Lord Keeper suggested the  
24 creation. I am very glad you are aware of that point.  
25 I hope you will investigate and deliberate on this  
question."



1 "45. My diary of September 16, 1932, dis-  
2 closes that at the request of the Lord Keeper of the  
3 Privy Seal, I prepared a draft of procedure to be  
4 used in connection with a Senior Statesmen's Con-  
5 ference to be called at the time of cabinet changes.  
6 I set forth in the draft a provision that the Presi-  
7 dents of the House of Peers and of the House of Rep-  
8 resentatives should be included among the Senior  
9 Statesmen, so as to make it more democratic, but Mr.  
10 ICHIKI, the Minister of the Imperial Household, ob-  
11 jected to this, and after reporting this to the Lord  
12 Keeper of the Privy Seal, it was stricken. This is  
13 recorded in my diary:

14 "September 16, 1932. Completed and submit-  
15 ted a draft of the Senior Statesmen's Conference to be  
16 called when cabinets change, which I was requested to  
17 draw up by the Lord Keeper some time ago. The Lord  
18 Keeper ordered me to consult the Household Minister.  
19 Visiting the Household Minister at his office in the  
20 Department, I submitted the draft and demanded his  
21 criticism on it. He was against including the speak-  
22 ers of both Houses among the senior statesmen; but  
23 on the whole he approved the draft. Reported to the  
24 Lord Keeper on the matter and revised part of it.'

25 "When I heard on October 18, 1932 Prince

1 SAIONJI's opinions as related to me by Baron HARADA,  
2 I resolved more firmly than ever against militarism  
3 and in favor of cooperation with the United States  
4 and Great Britain.

5 "October 18, 1932 .... HARADA talked on  
6 Prince SAIONJI's recent thought: The aged Prince  
7 recently told HARADA, at length, of Japan's policy  
8 followed since the Meiji restoration, the coalition  
9 with Great Britain and U.S.A., Japan with her aim  
10 of advancing in the world, and readjustment of her  
11 recent abnormal conditions. In view of the disgust-  
12 ing conditions existing today and the aged Prince's  
13 thoughts, I was somehow deeply moved.'

14 "46. Another entry in my diary which relates  
15 the historical development of the duties of the Lord  
16 Keeper of the Privy Seal is that of December 15, 1932.  
17 Here again appears my views on the duties of the  
18 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and my advocacy of  
19 Senior Statesmen's Conference at a Cabinet change.  
20 In my interview with Prince SAIONJI on that day I  
21 implored him not to resign but to continue to fight  
22 the militarists and politicians who ingratiate them-  
23 selves with the militarists.

24 "December 15, 1932. At 9:00 a.m. leaving  
25 in the automobile sent by SAIONJI family, visited the



Prince at the Zagyeso (villa) at Okitsu. When Prince  
1 KONOYE visited him the other day, he was consider-  
2 ably tired I was told. But today he did not look  
3 tired at all, but looked as well as ever.

4 "Today he talked rather intimately for him.  
5 He said that he wished to see the Genro system abol-  
6 ished while he was living. Producing the draft of  
7 the Senior Statesmen's Conference to be called at a  
8 political crisis which I had drawn up by his order  
9 and which the Lord Keeper had submitted to the  
10 Prince, he wanted me to explain it as it had been  
11 touched on by quite a few persons. I explained,  
12 whatever we might plan, we could devise no system  
13 apart from the Genro; thus it had to be such a com-  
14 plicated one.

15 "I also said: I thought it impossible to  
16 abolish the Genro system while he lived; but by the  
17 time he dies, the system will have been abolished;  
18 then the Senior Statesmen's Conference alone will  
19 remain; and this is the best we can do under the  
20 circumstances.

21 "Then he asked my opinion on a system of  
22 letting the Lord Keeper alone recommend a Premier.  
23 I answered: "In that case, the position of the Lord  
24 Keeper would be so important, and it is feared that  
25

1 his position would be unsteady." As I explained that,  
2 in the Senior Statesmen's Conference, the speakers of  
3 both Houses, Marshalls and Fleet Admirals are not  
4 included, as a rule but may be included by a con-  
5 ditional clause, he said, "I thoroughly understand  
6 the substance of the draft; it has defects as well as  
7 advantages; let me think it over again ....."

8 "I answered: "The present time especially  
9 needs you. Though it is no small inconvenience to  
10 you, I am afraid you have to bear the whole burden of  
11 politics in view of the frequent self-willed activi-  
12 ties of the military and the degraded attitude of  
13 politicians in recent times."

14 "As to Prince KONOYE, he said, "If he be-  
15 comes Household Minister now, I am afraid he will find  
16 himself in a plight because it is a weakness of his  
17 to decline requests which might be made by his too  
18 many acquaintances in all quarters. I think it will  
19 be better for the Prince to become Speaker (T.N. of  
20 the House of Peers) in the future."

21 "47. As an example of another duty of the  
22 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, that of advising the  
23 Emperor on foreign affairs when requested to do so,  
24 I refer to my diary of March 8, 1933 where the Lord  
25 Keeper's advice was sought by the Emperor on Japan's



1 withdrawal from the League of Nations. This excerpt  
2 also shows the custom of the Emperor in following  
3 constitutional government and the separate functions  
4 of the Lord Keeper and the government, which I later  
5 followed when I held that office.

6 "March 8, 1933. Today the Minister of  
7 Foreign Affairs, on being received in audience by  
8 the Emperor, reported to the Throne that the govern-  
9 ment intends to petition for the promulgation of an  
10 Imperial Rescript to our people to be simultaneous  
11 with an announcement of withdrawal from the League  
12 of Nations; now that it has been decided to withdraw  
13 therefrom. After the Minister's withdrawal, the  
14 Emperor gave instructions to the Prime Minister and  
15 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs through the Grand  
16 Chamberlain to the effect that when the Rescript is  
17 promulgated, the following two points should be in-  
18 cluded in the text: (1) It is very regrettable for  
19 Japan that she has been placed in the unavoidable  
20 position of being forced to withdraw from the League  
21 of Nations. (2) Even though Japan withdraws from the  
22 League of Nations she will continue to cooperate and  
23 maintain intimate international relations with other  
24 Powers.  
25

"I visited the Foreign Minister at his

1 official residence by order of the Lord Keeper of  
2 Privy Seal, at half past one, and delivered to him  
3 the Imperial intention, and asked him to deliver it  
4 to the Prime Minister. I came back immediately to  
5 the office and reported to the Lord Keeper that it  
6 was done.

7 "In connection with the withdrawal from the  
8 League of Nations the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal  
9 told me confidentially about his interview with the  
10 Emperor. This is what he said: "The Emperor inquired  
11 of me upon my visit concerning our arrangements to  
12 resign from the League of Nations and asked whether  
13 we would still have need to withdraw from the League  
14 now that the situation had improved as a result of  
15 the favorable settlement of the Jehol problem. Upon  
16 this inquiry, I said that while His Majesty's words  
17 were reasonable, our Plenipotentiary was already  
18 acting in every direction in accordance with the  
19 government's previous decision to withdraw and that  
20 the Imperial Government had taken a firm stand on  
21 this matter and that if we should now suddenly change  
22 our attitude, externally foreign countries would have  
23 the impression that we are vacillating while intern-  
24 ally the people would become utterly confused. With  
25 the matter being so, I advised the Emperor that there



1 was nothing else to do but to let the government carry  
2 out its decision.'

3 "48. In serving under Count MAKINO, I be-  
4 came steeped in the duties of his office. As another  
5 example of the type of advice he gave, I quote from  
6 my diary of March 24, 1933.

7 "'March 24, 1933. At 3:00 I visited the  
8 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in his official resi-  
9 dence. He told me the following concerning the Im-  
10 perial Rescript:

11 "''Regarding the Imperial Rescript to be is-  
12 sued on our withdrawal from the League, the Emperor  
13 said that we have already gained enough results as  
14 far as the advancement of military virtues were con-  
15 cerned, and that now we need to show forth words of  
16 encouragement concerning civilian virtues also. There-  
17 upon the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal showed His  
18 Majesty the draft forwarded from the Cabinet, and  
19 said he thought that the phrase 'Military and civil-  
20 ian officers must be true to their duties, etc.,' in  
21 the latter part of the Rescript revealed the Imperial  
22 Wish. Whereupon His Majesty was satisfied and ac-  
23 cepted the draft. Furthermore, the Emperor warned him  
24 not to change the above phrase, 'not to be one-sided  
25 about the Far East, etc.,' and so the Lord Keeper of

1 the Privy Seal invited Foreign Vice Minister ARITA  
2 to his official residence and told him of this."

3 "49. On its face prosecution exhibit 2253  
4 (diary of April 18, 1933) records the opinion of  
5 Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI about Russia, whose five-  
6 year plan was showing remarkable progress at that  
7 time. When General HISHIKARI was appointed Commander  
8 of the Kwantung Army, and concurrently Ambassador  
9 to Manchukuo the Emperor stressed two points at his  
10 appointment ceremony. I made an entry in my diary  
11 of July 31, 1933, as I deemed these important factors  
12 to be followed by Japan.

13 "July 31, 1933 ..... The Lord Keeper said  
14 that the Emperor had stressed the following two points  
15 concerning foreign policy at the appointment ceremony  
16 of General HISHIKARI:

17 "(1) To respect the principle of equal  
18 opportunity.

19 "(2) To maintain friendly relationships with  
20 neighboring countries.'

21 "On August 24, 1933, I was appointed by the  
22 Minister of the Imperial Household to the position of  
23 President of the Bureau of Peerage to serve current  
24 with my position as Chief Secretary to the Lord  
25 Keeper.



1 "50. The prosecution apparently attaches  
2 great importance to the fact that I received a decor-  
3 ation from the Japanese Government on April 28, 1934  
4 in connection with the Manchurian Incident. Over  
5 300,000 other persons received the same decoration.  
6 These included members of the Army and Navy, all  
7 members of the House of Peers and House of Represent-  
8 atives, other public officials and civilians. I was  
9 not singled out because of anything I had done in  
10 connection with the affair. I only received the  
11 decoration because I happened to be a member of the  
12 House of Peers, and not because I was Chief Secre-  
13 tary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I have  
14 never received any decoration from any foreign  
15 government.  
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1 "51. Even when there were no particular  
2 problems to be discussed with Prince SAIONJI, I  
3 used to visit him because I admired his statesmanship  
4 and was anxious to learn from him. On August 9, 1934,  
5 I visited him. His views on the relationship between  
6 the Emperor and His people, as well as his views  
7 on Anglo-Japanese relationship, deeply impressed me  
8 as being sound and worthy of strenuous efforts on  
9 my part in support of them.

10 "'August 9, 1934. Thursday. Fine. By the  
11 7:04 train left Zushi for Gotomba, joining Baron  
12 HARADA on that day at Ofuna and interviewed Prince  
13 SAIONJI from 9:30 to 11:00 p.m. I brought no special  
14 matter to talk over with him, but in the interview  
15 I was told that the ministers of the cabinet should  
16 represent their views of general current problems  
17 to the Throne more frankly, rather than formally.

18 "'He advised Premier OKADA in the same  
19 way when the Premier had paid him a visit a couple  
20 of days before. When the Premier asked the Genro's  
21 view as to whether the Grand Chamberlain should  
22 attend on the Emperor in case the cabinet ministers  
23 are received in audience, the Genro announced it  
24 decidedly because such a form for form's sake would  
25 make the reports of cabinet ministers more formal



1 and empty, when the relations of sovereign and  
2 subject should be more familial and less formal.

3 "The Genro then said: The Emperor's  
4 intention, in my opinion, may be more reflected  
5 outside since he has already attained maturity.  
6 In regards to international relations, he said  
7 philosophically it was a shame that, instead of  
8 leaning heavily to the Greater Asia Principle con-  
9 cerning the Orient like we do at present, we did  
10 not settle world questions in concert with Great  
11 Britain and the United States thus establishing  
12 a strong foundation as one of the acknowledged  
13 "Big Three."

14 "52. On the morning of May 30, 1935, I  
15 was shocked when I read in the newspaper that the  
16 Japanese stationary forces in North China had made  
17 an important proposal to the Chinese authorities.  
18 Therefore I inquired of this state of affairs of  
19 SHIGEMITSU, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. His  
20 full explanation is contained in prosecution exhibit  
21 2192 (diary May 30, 1935). Fortunately this incident  
22 did not later develop into a serious affair and  
23 was settled, thanks to the efforts of Commander  
24 UMEZU.  
25

"53. Prince SAIONJI well knew from my

1 innumerable conversations with him that I was  
2 opposed to the militarists and that I thoroughly  
3 agreed with the Emperor's policy of maintaining  
4 peaceful relations with other nations. When there  
5 was some talk of Count MAKINO's resignation as  
6 Lord Keeper, Prince SAIONJI expressed his preference  
7 to have me accept the position, but it was my  
8 opinion that Prince KONOYE would be a better  
9 choice and so expressed myself as appears in my  
10 diary of August 29, 1935.

11 "August 29, 1935....Today HARADA told me  
12 that the old Prince, too, has not been unmindful  
13 of the matter but having misgivings about Prince  
14 KONOYE, he would rather appoint me to the post  
15 at once. So I said that to make Prince KONOYE  
16 his successor now is to find an expedient to settle  
17 the minds of the people, and requested HARADA to  
18 convey my wish to the old Prince.'

19 "54. After the discharge of General MAZAKI  
20 from the post of Inspector-General of Military  
21 Education and the assassination of General NAGATA,  
22 Tetsuzan, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau  
23 in the War Office by Lt. Col. AIZAWA in August,  
24 1935, as a turning point, not only sectionalism  
25 ~~became recrudescence in Army circles, but also the~~



1 tendency to defiance of the superior by the sub-  
2 ordinate was accentuated. I kept a vigilant watch  
3 on the development of the situation and gathered  
4 information thereon for the information of the  
5 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The Emperor deemed  
6 the increased activities of the younger militarists  
7 of such alarming importance that he importuned the  
8 War Minister to deal severely with them, as is set  
9 forth in my diary of September 30, 1935:

10 "September 30, 1935. At 2:00 p.m. I visited  
11 at the Lord Keeper's residence and reported to him  
12 about the latest development of the organ-theory  
13 question. The Lord Keeper then told me that the  
14 Emperor told the War Minister to deal with younger  
15 men more firmly even at the sacrifice of the War  
16 Minister himself, as they seem to be going too far in  
17 their conduct. His Majesty, the Keeper also told  
18 me, asked Prince Kan-In when he was received in  
19 audience, to help the War Minister on this matter as  
20 he had told it to the War Minister. The Emperor told  
21 the Grand Chamberlain to report the above fact to the  
22 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. So the story runs, the  
23 Lord Keeper said.'  
24  
25

"55. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal is answerable only to the Emperor and serves at His pleasure. If at any stage the views of the Lord Keeper do not coincide with those of the Emperor, the Emperor would ask for his resignation. In other words, the Emperor wanted a Lord Keeper who was sympathetic to and understood his views and basic policies. This is shown in my diary entry of December 17, 1935, where it appears that the Emperor wished Count MAKINO, who was ill at that time, to remain as Lord Keeper, and if this was not possible that SAITO accept the post.

"December 17, 1935.....At the Imperial preserve, Marquis HIROHATA said to me that he was asked by the Emperor as to the proposed resignations of the Lord Keeper and the President of the Privy Council. As for the Lord Keeper, I learned the Emperor's view on it, which may be summarized as follows:

"The question of the Lord Keeper should be best settled by his remaining in office, but if it were not possible SAITO would be desirable."

"On December 26, 1935, Count MAKINO resigned as Lord Keeper and on the same day Viscount SAITO, Makoto, was appointed his successor by the Emperor. I continued in office as his Chief Secretary.



1 "56. Notwithstanding the Emperor's admonition  
2 to the War Minister on September 30, 1935, to control  
3 the younger militarists, the February 26th, 1936,  
4 incident broke out before we heard anything about the  
5 measures taken by the War Minister in pursuance of the  
6 Imperial command. It is true that the incident broke  
7 out suddenly but we had discerned an ugly atmosphere  
8 long before which indicated that an untoward incident  
9 might crop up. Even now I cannot understand why the  
10 military authorities failed to take precautionary  
11 measures in advance. The full details of the  
12 February 26th incident are contained in my diary of  
13 that and succeeding days.

14 "A group of Army officers, leading more than  
15 1,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers on  
16 February 26, 1936, started a revolt in Tokyo in attempts  
17 to set up a military government and carry out the so-  
18 called Showa reform. They seized the central part of  
19 the Metropolis and assassinated Mr. SAITO, Lord Keeper  
20 of the Privy Seal, Mr. TAKAHASHI, Finance Minister,  
21 and others. The Emperor was angry not only with the  
22 insurgents, but also with the attitude of the Army's  
23 leaders. In view of the death of the Lord Keeper, I  
24 became quite active, close to the Throne, in my  
25 position as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the

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Privy Seal. My diary entries are as follows:

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1       "February 26, 1936. Snowfall. Was awakened  
2 from sound sleep at 5:20 A.M. by the voice of ICHIKAWA  
3 telling me of a telephone call from private secretary  
4 ONO. Was instantly on the phone. ONO said: "The Lord  
5 Keeper of the Privy Seal is now being attacked in his  
6 private residence by a company of soldiers. Both he  
7 and his wife seem to have fallen victims." ONO added  
8 that the above report was given to him over the tele-  
9 phone by a house-boy of the SAITO family. Knew in-  
10 tuitively of the outbreak of an untoward incident of  
11 great proportions. At once telephoned the Police Com-  
12 missioner. Although I was able to contact him, I could  
13 not ascertain what sort of arrangements had been made  
14 by the Metropolitan Police Board. Therefore, sent for  
15 a car from the office and proceeded to the Court at  
16 6:00 A.M. While waiting for the car I had reported on  
17 the incident to Prince KONOYE and Baron HARADA. Both  
18 of them had not known of it yet. At 6:40 telephoned to  
19 Prince SAIONJI about the outbreak of the incident (stated  
20 below) at Okitsu. We felt reassured when we were told  
21 by the servant that the Prince himself and others were  
22 still quietly asleep. Immediately went to the office.  
23 Minister of the Imperial Household TUASA and Vice Grand  
24 Chamberlain HIROHATA were already present. Was told that  
25 the Grand Chamberlain, Premier OKADA and Finance Minister

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2 from sound sleep at 5:20 A.M. by the voice of ICHIKAWA  
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22 still quietly asleep. Immediately went to the office.  
23 Minister of the Imperial Household TUASA and Vice Grand  
24 Chamberlain HIROHATA were already present. Was told that  
25 the Grand Chamberlain, Premier OKADA and Finance Minister



1 TAKAHASHI had also been attacked. The car coming for  
2 me, having been stopped in front of the Metropolitan  
3 Police Board Building, had to make a detour. Knowing  
4 that the Metropolitan Police Board was already in the  
5 hands of the rebels, I also made a detour around the  
6 Department of Overseas Affairs Building, in order to  
7 get to the office. When the War Minister was received  
8 in audience by the Emperor, the latter said: "Whatever  
9 their excuses are, I am displeased with this incident.  
10 It has brought disgrace on the vital essence of our  
11 national character." War councillors appeared in the  
12 Court, but none of the Cabinet Ministers had proceeded  
13 to the Court yet. Unless a central organ for adminis-  
14 tration was established, there was no working out any  
15 remedial measures. Therefore, consulted HIROHATA with  
16 respect to this matter, and under the directive of the  
17 Minister of the Imperial Household contacted the Minister  
18 of Overseas Affairs KODAMA by telephone, asking that  
19 Cabinet members proceed to the Imperial Palace. Further-  
20 more, because the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had been  
21 killed, we decided to ask the President of the Privy  
22 Council to come to the Imperial Palace and he did so  
23 after we had contacted him by telephone about 3:00 P.M.  
24 The Emperor, it was said, told the President to keep  
25 in close quarters by himself. Therefore, the President

1 was to stay in the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's  
2 room until the Cabinet formation was completed. There  
3 were two different opinions among the War Councillors.  
4 One held that the rebels should be disbanded by an Im-  
5 perial Decree. The others insisted on the enforcement  
6 of martial law.

7 "Around 5:00 P.M. Minister of Overseas Affairs  
8 KODAMA gave me a message that they wanted to recommend  
9 the Emperor to appoint a Premier ad interim. However,  
10 after consulting the Minister of the Imperial Household,  
11 replied to Minister KODAMA as follows: "The official  
12 residence of the Premier is now surrounded by insurgents,  
13 so we do not know whether the Premier was killed or not.  
14 Therefore, it is not timely to submit such recommenda-  
15 tions to the Throne."

16  
17 "It was understood that junior officers of  
18 the War Department and the Army General Staff agreed to  
19 forming a provisional Cabinet and made a proposal to  
20 this effect to their seniors. It seems that the Cabinet  
21 they intended will have a strong tendency toward Fascism.  
22 The same idea has also been shared by the insurgent de-  
23 tachments. The War Minister demanded enforcement of  
24 martial law. I heard that Colonel ISHIHARA had insisted  
25 on this. The Naval Minister was of the opinion that  
there was no need for martial law, but that if the Army



1 was unable to take responsibility there might be no  
2 other way than its enforcement. Although Home Minister  
3 GOTO was against this proposal, he yielded at last.  
4 President of the Privy Council ICHIKI expressed his  
5 wish to resign on the ground that he was originally  
6 responsible for causing the present incident to happen.  
7 The Emperor did not approve of formation of a provisional  
8 Cabinet. The Emperor is said to have confided his idea  
9 to Chief Aide-de-Camp HONJO, using words which implied  
10 that the Army wanted to "suffocate him by using floss-  
11 silk for strangling." (TN. Ostentatiously kind, but in  
12 reality afflicting one.)'

13 \* \* \* \* \*

14  
15 "'At 9:00 P.M. Home Minister GOTO was installed  
16 as Premier ad interim. Then he tendered resignations of  
17 Cabinet members en bloc. The Emperor said: "The insur-  
18 gents should be brought under control as soon as possible.  
19 Attend assiduously to your duties until peace and order  
20 our restored."'

21 "'At 11:30 P.M. the Privy Council in Imperial  
22 presence passed the draft proclamation of a state of  
23 siege.'

24 \* \* \* \* \*

25 "'February 27, 1936. At 7:00 A.M. I had a talk  
with the Chief Aide-de-Camp in regard to the trend in

1 Army circles. It is understood that the military are  
2 boosting Prince FUSHIMI for the position of the Lord  
3 Keeper of the Privy Seal.'

4 "'February 28, 1936. Cloudy. At 7:00 re-  
5 ceived information that despite last evening's indi-  
6 cations for a favorable turn of events, two of the  
7 leaders of the insurgents had still obstinately adhered  
8 to their original contentions. Consequently, the author-  
9 ities concerned had decided to positively bring pressure  
10 to bear upon the insurgents as from 8:00 A.M. The Min-  
11 ister of the Imperial Household consulted regarding the  
12 successor to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. We  
13 could think of no other person for the post than Prince  
14 KONOYE and President of the Privy Council ICHIKI also  
15 agreed to this idea. At 8:30 telephoned Prince KONOYE,  
16 asking him to come to the office to have an interview  
17 with Mr. YUASA, Minister of the Imperial Household. I  
18 heard the following fragmentary information from Prince  
19 KONOYE: (1) Prince KONOYE had received reliable infor-  
20 mation that this present incident was jointly motivated  
21 by Major-Generals OKAMURA and YAMASHITA and Colonel  
22 ISHIMOTO. (2) A rumor runs that under joint support  
23 of Colonel ISHIHARA and KUHARA an attempt was made to  
24 put Admiral YAMAMOTO, Eisuke, in an important position,  
25 but was flatly rejected by the Navy side. (3) Con-



1 nection has been maintained among ISHIHARA, HASHIMOTO  
2 and NEMOTO, etc. with respect to the incident. (4) It  
3 is a confirmed fact that Assistant Professor HASHIZUME  
4 was urged to expedite the mapping out of a reconstruct-  
5 ion plan.

6 \* \* \* \* \*

7 "As Premier OKADA proceeded to the Palace,  
8 Home Minister GOTO was relieved of his current post of  
9 Premier ad interim. The resignation which was tendered  
10 by Cabinet Ministers on February 26 had been based on  
11 the reason that the Premier of the OKADA Cabinet, on  
12 account of serious obstruction, could not eventually  
13 assume duties, and now that Premier OKADA today pre-  
14 sented himself at the palace, the reason which was set  
15 forth in the resignation has become void. Accordingly,  
16 we thought it necessary for Premier OKADA to tender  
17 afresh a collective resignation, and made Chamberlain  
18 OGANE convey a message to this effect to the Cabinet  
19 side. Afterward, about 10:50 A.M. Premier OKADA pro-  
20 ceeded to the Palace and again tendered the resigna-  
21 tion of the Cabinet members.'

22 "February 29, 1936. At 6:30 A.M. Commander  
23 KASHII of the forces enforcing martial law issued a  
24 proclamation in which he explained the reason why the  
25 suppression of the rebel army was so delayed and de-

1       clared that he had decided to suppress them at last  
2       because they came to defy the Imperial Order. At  
3       8:30 A.M. the Army began to take action against the  
4       rebel army. I found it necessary to make a preparation  
5       for remedial measures to tide over the present diffi-  
6       culties. At 9:00 A.M. conferred with the Minister of  
7       the Imperial Household and the Vice-Grand Chamberlain,  
8       agreeing that it was indispensable to nominate the  
9       forthcoming Cabinet as soon as possible, in order to  
10      keep the public feeling at rest. After making arrange-  
11      ments as to the procedure, we furthermore conferred  
12      with President ICHIKI of the Privy Council, and de-  
13      cided that things should be followed in order as stated  
14      below.

15                "(1) The Vice-Grand Chamberlain will report  
16      to the Throne that we are holding a conference on re-  
17      medial measures from time to time, and that we wish  
18      the Emperor to seek counsel of the President of the  
19      Privy Council concerning the appointment of the next  
20      Premier.

21                "(2) When the President of the Privy Council  
22      is summoned and sought counsel of by the Emperor, the  
23      President will reply that it is advisable for the Em-  
24      peror to ask for the advice of Prince SAIONJI.

25                "(3) The Vice-Grand Chamberlain, in obedience



1 to the Emperor's intention, will convey it to Prince  
2 SAIONJI.

3 "(4) Considering the present case of emergency  
4 he will convey the Emperor's intention to Prince  
5 SAIONJI by telephone, instead of dispatching a mes-  
6 senger with the letter of the Grand Chamberlain, as was  
7 the practice hitherto.

8 "At about 9:10 A.M., in compliance with the  
9 foregoing agreement, Vice-Grand Chamberlain HIROHATA  
10 proceeded to the Throne to convey to the Emperor our  
11 opinion of the situation. Though at first the Emperor  
12 seemed not to care for so early a launching of the  
13 remedial measures, as the Vice-Grand Chamberlain ex-  
14 plained the circumstances, the Emperor summoned the  
15 President. When the President came into the presence  
16 of the Emperor the Emperor said: "At last as we have  
17 taken steps to sweep away the rebels we must deliberate  
18 on the matter of the succeeding cabinet. But how is  
19 the current situation? We think that we might well think  
20 about a succeeding Cabinet upon the rebel Army's being  
21 completely suppressed."

22 "The President replied: "As for the succeeding  
23 Cabinet I desire your Majesty to seek counsel of Prince  
24 SAIONJI at the earliest opportunity. And as the Prince  
25 also must prepare himself for the Emperor's inquiry,

1 it is not always necessary that the time of the in-  
2 quiry should be determined after the settlement of the  
3 rebellion, and I shall inform your Majesty of the  
4 time at which the Inquiry can be made upon my investi-  
5 gation of the circumstances."

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At 2:00 p.m. Chief Aide-de-Camp MORIO  
reported to the Throne that the greater part of the  
rebel army was suppressed. Consequently, the Vice-  
Grand Chamberlain, upon conferring with the President  
of the Privy Council and the Minister of the Imperial  
Household, asked the Emperor how it would be to make  
an Imperial Inquiry to Prince SAIONJI at this moment.  
The Emperor approved of it. Then the Vice-Grand  
Chamberlain conveyed the following to Prince SAIONJI  
through Baron HIRADA by phone.

"The Emperor is going to ask for your  
advice on the formation of the succeeding Cabinet,



1       " 'The Emperor expressed his opinion that  
2       the coming Cabinet seemed very difficult to organize;  
3       a Cabinet of which the military circles approve would  
4       be hated by the financial circles, and yet we could  
5       not afford to concern ourselves only about the inter-  
6       ests of the financial circles. The President replied  
7       to the Throne that of course it might be very diffi-  
8       cult to form the Cabinet now, but a way would be found  
9       of itself and SAIONJI was sure to be considering the  
10      situation. When the Emperor summoned the Vice Grand  
11      Chamberlain, the Emperor expressed nearly the same  
12      opinion on the time when the Imperial Inquiry was to  
13      be made.

14                " 'At 2:00 p.m. Chief Aide-de-Camps HONJO  
15      reported to the Throne that the greater part of the  
16      rebel army was suppressed. Consequently, the Vice-  
17      Grand Chamberlain, upon conferring with the President  
18      of the Privy Council and the Minister of the Imperial  
19      Household, asked the Emperor how it would be to make  
20      an Imperial Inquiry to Prince SAIONJI at this moment.  
21      The Emperor approved of it. Then the Vice-Grand  
22      Chamberlain conveyed the following to Prince SAIONJI  
23      through Baron HARADA by phone.

24                " 'As the Emperor is going to ask for your  
25      advice on the formation of the succeeding Cabinet,

1 please proceed to the palace, if you can. Due to  
2 the unusual situation I am conveying the Emperor's  
3 intention by phone, dispensing with a messenger to  
4 you.'''

5 "57. Prince CHICHIBU, the Emperor's younger  
6 brother, stressed to Baron HARADA, secretary to Prince  
7 SAIONJI, that it would be absolutely improper to make  
8 General MAZAKI form a succeeding Cabinet following  
9 the February 26th incident. At that time, persistent  
10 rumor had it that General MAZAKI was behind the  
11 February 26th incident which was nothing but the Army's  
12 coup d'etat. My diary for March 2, 1936, says: 3



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1           "March 2, 1936. At 3:35 P... Prince SAIONJI  
2 reached the Ministry of the Imperial Household and  
3 entered the lodging room in the Vice-Minister's room.  
4 After taking a short rest, the Prince asked the Emperor  
5 whether it was convenient now to see him. At 4:10 P.M.  
6 the Prince was received in audience by the Emperor.  
7 Prior to this, at about 2:00 P.M., Count MAKINO came  
8 to the Palace and had a talk with me. He also talked  
9 with the old Prince.

10           "At 9:00 P.M. I called on Messrs. HARADA and  
11 SAIONJI, Hachiro at the Ministry's lodging room.  
12 H. H. Prince CHICHIBU summoned HARADA to his residence  
13 and talked to him as follows. HARADA came back after  
14 9:00 o'clock. Today middle grade officers assembled  
15 to confer about the purge of the Army. Their conclu-  
16 sions were that all of the present Generals should  
17 retire, and such a person as Lieutenant-General  
18 ITAGAKI should be appointed War Minister, and that a  
19 person who would be able to cooperate with Lieutenant-  
20 General ITAGAKI should be nominated as Premier; and  
21 that both KAWAI and ARAKI were not satisfactory; that  
22 fair persons who had heretofore no connection with the  
23 Army would be more preferable; that is to say, a person  
24 other than from the military circles was most desirable as  
25 Premier; and that HIRANUMA was also not satisfactory;

1 and that what they want to stress especially was about  
2 General MAZAKI: some circles in the House of Peers  
3 seemed to back up General MAZAKI but a MAZAKI Cabinet  
4 would be absolutely unsatisfactory.

5 "58. The prosecution broadly infers I was a  
6 protagonist of Fascism (document 0003, page 47). I  
7 have always opposed Fascism, an example being found  
8 in my diary entry of March 3, 1936, when I recommended  
9 Ambassador MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, for the post of Lord  
10 Keeper of the Privy Seal.

11 "March 3, 1936. Prince SAIONJI said that  
12 the Imperial Household Minister had already told him  
13 about the choice of Ambassador MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, as  
14 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The Prince asked my  
15 view on the choice. I replied that he might well be  
16 fitted for the post, because, as he was our delegate  
17 at the London Treaty Conference, he was well-informed  
18 in diplomatic affairs and had no inclination toward  
19 Fascism. I also replied that I thought him a leading  
20 candidate for the post.

21  
22 "59. My diary for the same day also shows that  
23 I also recommended Prince KONOYE to Prince SAIONJI,  
24 Genro, as succeeding Prime Minister as a man of moder-  
25 ation and rectitude, that Prince CHICHIBU, the Emperor's  
younger brother sent his message to Prince SAIONJI,



1 warning him against General MAZAKI and others, and that  
2 when Prince CHICHIBU proceeded to the Palace, His High-  
3 ness stressed to the Emperor the necessity for dismiss-  
4 ing General MAZAKI.

5 "Prince SAIONJI asked me whom I would  
6 consider most suitable for the Premiership in the  
7 forthcoming Cabinet. I told him that under the  
8 prevailing circumstances, no one but Prince KONOYE  
9 could be found as a person of impartiality. When I  
10 told him that the President of the Privy Council  
11 ICHIKI also had the intention of resigning from his  
12 post, and in my opinion it would be very difficult  
13 to find a successor, and that the President had  
14 expressed his view that this time there might be no  
15 other choice than the promotion of Baron HIRANUMA, to  
16 which Prince SAIONJI strongly objected, adding that it  
17 would not be necessary to make haste in appointing a  
18 new President of the Privy Council. The Prince also  
19 said that Baron HIRANUMA was unsatisfactory as  
20 Premier of the succeeding cabinet.  
21

22 \* \* \* \*

23 "At 2:30 I was summoned by Prince CHICHIBU  
24 to see him at the Ante-Chamber for the Imperial Family.  
25 His Highness said, "A rumor prevails now that MATSUDAIRA  
would be appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, but

1 I am afraid some trouble would result, because he  
2 was associated with the London Treaty. My opinion  
3 is that though I am not worrying about the danger  
4 to his life, I would like to avoid frequent sad  
5 events involving those senior statesmen who are close  
6 to the Throne, because the Lord Keeper is different  
7 from the Premier."

8 "I replied to the Prince, "You are right;  
9 however, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal being  
10 different from any other cabinet member, must enjoy  
11 the full confidence of the Throne. And such a person  
12 who wins the admiration of those who are now criticiz-  
13 ing everything in general would not be able to acquire  
14 the full confidence of the Emperor. Some people may  
15 criticize MATSUDAIRA but nevertheless we cannot but  
16 select him."

17 "Vice-Grand Chamberlain HIROHATA spoke to me  
18 that the Emperor had told HIROHATA about the tenure of  
19 the conversation between the Emperor and H.I.H. Prince  
20 CHICHIBU and the Emperor had ordered HIROHATA to speak  
21 to me of that tenure. Its summary is as follows:

22 "As to Prime Minister of the succeeding cabinet,  
23 Baron HIRANUMA is improper. MAZAKI shall be discharged.  
24 As for War Minister, it is necessary to appoint such a  
25 young person as having no relation whatever in all



1 directions and to get him to organize such substance  
2 that he may freely exercise his ability.'

3 "60. On March 4, 1936 Prince SAIONJI recom-  
4 mended Prince KONOYE as the succeeding Prime Minister  
5 but he was unable to accept, due to his health.  
6 Prince SAIONJI then recommended HIROTA, Koki, who  
7 accepted the Imperial Mandate on March 5, 1936.  
8

9 "61. When I resigned my position as Chief  
10 Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on  
11 June 13, 1936, I felt relieved as I had spent seven  
12 years of my life fighting militarism, and needed a  
13 rest. I tried to complete every task assigned to me  
14 to the best of my ability. I am a firm believer in  
15 the axiom that if a job is worth doing at all it is  
16 worth doing well. I will leave to others whether or  
17 not I succeeded. My diary recapitulates:

18 "June 13, 1936. I went to my office at  
19 10:00 A.M. At 11 A.M. I was officially received at  
20 the office of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of  
21 the Privy Seal by Minister of the Imperial Household,  
22 MATSUDAIRA. Marquis MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa was appointed  
23 my successor. Seven years have elapsed since I was  
24 appointed to the post in October 1930. During this  
25 period the following incidents took place:

"The assassination of Premier HAMAGUCHI;

1 the March Incident; the September 16 Incident; on  
2 the assassinations of INOUE and DAN (TN: President of  
3 the MITSUI Trusts) by the Ketsumeidan; the May 15  
4 Incident; the Shimpeitai Incident; the November  
5 Incident; the NAGATA Incident; and the February 26  
6 Incident.

7 "Considering this series of Incidents, I  
8 am glad to have been free from serious fault all this  
9 while. Now that I have been relieved of my duty I  
10 feel much easier. At the time of the February 26  
11 Incident I exerted my efforts to the best of my ability.  
12 As an official, I am truly happy."

13 "By various expe-  
14 riences and experiments in my long past public life,  
15 I have come to realize that after all we cannot do  
16 much beyond what is allowed to the average ability  
17 of the people as a whole." He also said, "Of all  
18 the meritorious services rendered by the leaders of  
19 the MEIJI Reform like your grandfather, I am most  
20 grateful for the fact that they firmly fought down  
21 the insistence of many people at that time on the  
22 establishment of a state religion and bequeathed to  
23 us the religious freedom we enjoy now."

24 "63. I can't understand why the prosecu-  
25 tion introduced exhibit 2254, my diary of July 14,  
1937, in evidence. It reads as follows:



1 "62. When I called on Prince SAIONJI on  
2 July 4, 1936 and told him I had retired from the  
3 office of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of  
4 the Privy Seal, I was deeply moved by his praise  
5 of my grandfather and others and felt he was en-  
6 deavoring to convey a thought to me to 'do likewise.'  
7 My diary states:

8 "July 4, 1936, Saturday. At 10:00 A.M.  
9 called on Prince SAIONJI. He was in good health.  
10 Reported to him about my retirement from the office  
11 of Chief Secretary. The Prince talked on various  
12 subjects as usual. He said, "From my various expe-  
13 riences and experiments in my long past public life,  
14 I have come to realize that after all we cannot do  
15 much beyond what is allowed to the average ability  
16 of the people as a whole." He also said, "Of all  
17 the meritorious services rendered by the leaders of  
18 the MEIJI Reforms like your grandfather, I am most  
19 grateful for the fact that they firmly fought down  
20 the insistence of many people at that time on the  
21 establishment of a state religion and bequeathed to  
22 us the religious freedom we enjoy now."

23 "63. I can't understand why the prosecu-  
24 tion introduced exhibit 2254, my diary of July 14,  
25 1937, in evidence. It reads as follows:

1        "'MATSUI came at 8:00 o'clock. He talked  
2        on matters such as discontinuing the dispatching of  
3        troops to North China, and became indignant.'

4        "The MATSUI referred to is Mr. MATSUI, Seikun,  
5        not General MATSUI, Iwane. Mr. MATSUI, Seikun was  
6        a civilian and never held a governmental position.  
7        He told me that he was furious because the government  
8        had stopped sending troops to North China as Japanese  
9        residents there were in danger from Chinese bandits.  
10       I was not furious as the prosecution's first transla-  
11       tion of this excerpt read. The China Incident had  
12       commenced on July 7, 1937 and that is why Mr. MATSUI  
13       was indignant. Needless to say, I had absolutely  
14       nothing to do with the commencement of this incident,  
15       as I held no position in the government or in the  
16       military for one year and 21 days before it broke  
17       out. My position as President of the Board of  
18       Peerage during that period was a very inactive one.  
19       Prince KONOYE who was President of the House of Peers  
20       during that time (up to June 4, 1937 when he became  
21       Premier) used to seek my views from time to time,  
22       but aside from this I had no direct connection with  
23       politics. I know of no preparations for that incident,  
24       did not participate in any preparations, did not know  
25       it was going to happen and did not conspire or plan



1 with anyone to bring it about.

2 "64. Prince KONOYE, who extremely re-  
3 gretted the opening of hostilities between Japan  
4 and China did his best to pursue a policy of local-  
5 ization and nonexpansion. On my part, I gave counsel  
6 to him in the execution of his policy to my best  
7 ability. With hostilities spreading to Shanghai  
8 area in August, however, the hopes for fulfilment  
9 of his policy grew extremely slim. At first, the  
10 Army made light of the affair, and I understood that  
11 the Army leaders vauntingly stated that China would  
12 be fixed up in three months. But realities were not  
13 so simple. The hostilities went on expanding.

14 "65. Prince KONOYE asked me to join his  
15 cabinet as Minister of Education on October 17 of  
16 the same year. But I declined the offer at first as  
17 I did not desire to join his cabinet, having felt  
18 dissatisfaction as I did with the continuance of  
19 hostilities with China. I thought it proper to  
20 assist the Prince from outside the cabinet as his  
21 close friend. The Prince insisted, however, that I  
22 should join his cabinet to assist him in terminating  
23 the China affair. I was moved by his importunate  
24 request and accepted the offer, especially as I  
25 sympathized with a close friend of mine in a dilemma.

1 My diary for October 17, 1937 is as follows:

2 "October 17, 1937. At 11:30, called on  
3 Prince KONOYE and had lunch with him. He informed  
4 me of Education Minister YASUI's firm resolution to  
5 resign and of the necessity of granting his request.  
6 He desired me to succeed him in the cabinet. I  
7 accepted it only as a means of assisting Prince  
8 KONOYE."

9 "66. In order to join the cabinet I had to  
10 resign as President of the Board of Peerage. The  
11 Emperor approved of my resignation and his evaluation  
12 of me appears in my diary of October 21, 1937.

13 "Thursday -- fine. On duty at 9:30. The  
14 Minister of Imperial Household told me that having  
15 been informed by the Premier of the details of con-  
16 versations in connection with the change of the  
17 Education Minister, and considering it unavoidable,  
18 he had applied for the Emperor's permission. Accord-  
19 ing to a confidential talk of the Minister of  
20 Imperial Household, the Emperor said that KIDO was a  
21 man needed in the Household Department; but the  
22 Emperor was willing to let him go since the Govern-  
23 ment needed him more, and should KIDO go into the  
24 cabinet, he would do his best in persuading KONOYE  
25 not to take unreasonable steps in the amnesty question.



1 I doubt whether I shall be able to live up to the  
2 Emperor's most gracious wishes. I was profoundly  
3 impressed.'

4 "The amnesty in this entry referred to  
5 those responsible for the February 26th Incident.  
6 No amnesty was granted. On October 22, 1937, at  
7 4:00 p.m. I was duly awarded a written appointment  
8 as Minister of Education.

9 "67. Prosecution exhibit 239, a plan  
10 establishing heavy industries in Manchuria was  
11 approved by the cabinet on October 22, 1937 at  
12 1:00 p.m. which was three hours before I joined  
13 the cabinet. I did not attend the cabinet meeting  
14 that day, and thus I did not vote for this plan.

15 "68. Prosecution exhibit 2255, my diary  
16 of October 27, 1937 refers to a decision of an  
17 extraordinary session of the cabinet with respect  
18 to its statement and answer to the council in connec-  
19 tion with the Nine-Power Pact. This was five days  
20 after I had joined the cabinet, and the cabinet policy  
21 in regard to this had been decided by the cabinet  
22 prior to my entry into the cabinet. I don't remember  
23 that I expressed my views at this meeting.

24 "69. Being interested in fulfilling my  
25 duties as Minister of Education to the best of my

1 ability, I was anxious to receive information,  
2 suggestions and opinions, so that I could make  
3 proper decisions. For example my diary of October  
4 29, 1937 and November 9, 1937 records:

5 "October 29, 1937. At 8 P.M. President  
6 NAGAYO of the Tokyo Imperial University called and I  
7 listened intently to his frank criticism of the past  
8 administration in the Education Ministry.'

9 "'November 9, 1937. At 9 A.M. had a call  
10 from TANAKA, Dean of Law Department, Tokyo Imperial  
11 University and Professor TAKAGI. They stated the  
12 request on the part of the University.'

13 "During my tenure of office as Minister of  
14 Education, I respected their request for a self-  
15 autonomy and never interfered with their freedom of  
16 thought.

17 "70. After I joined the cabinet I found  
18 that teamwork was conspicuous by its absence in it,  
19 not withstanding Prince KONOYE's efforts. Prosecution  
20 exhibit 2256, my diary of November 3, 1937, records  
21 the subject matters of a conversation I had with War  
22 Minister SUGIYAMA. It was at Prince KONOYE's request  
23 that I met and talked with Minister of War SUGIYAMA.  
24 I intended to bring forth a better understanding between  
25 the Prime Minister and the Minister of War by having



1 a talk with the latter at leisure, by finding out  
2 his real intentions regarding the settlement of the  
3 China affair and by communicating Prince KONOYE's  
4 idea concerning the same problem to him. Even  
5 before I joined the KONOYE Cabinet, I had heard from  
6 Premier KONOYE that he had been discontented with  
7 Minister of War SUGIYAMA's attitude. When I became  
8 a member of the cabinet, I found the relation between  
9 them divergent beyond my expectations and thought  
10 that it was not good for the solution of the China  
11 problems too. The prosecution introduced exhibit  
12 2257, part of my diary of November 16, 1937, as  
13 corrected on page 16,220 of the record. This entry  
14 standing alone might create an impression that I  
15 had positive intentions to carry out the war. It must  
16 be read in connection with my diary entry of November  
17 15, 1937 to be intelligible. The reason why I joined  
18 the cabinet was to make every effort for settling  
19 successfully the affair as soon as possible according  
20 to the agreement made between Prince KONOYE and me  
21 when I was going to enter his cabinet. Whereas, as  
22 soon as I joined the cabinet Prince KONOYE proposed  
23 beyond my expectation, his resignation.

25 "November 15, 1937. I was told that during  
my absence, Prince KONOYE called me over the telephone

1 several times; so immediately after my return home,  
2 I called on him at his official residence at 4 P.M.  
3 He revealed that the Imperial General Headquarters  
4 would be established in the near future; and that  
5 at the time he formed his cabinet, he had little  
6 expected the situation would make such serious de-  
7 velopments. He then said he would resign by all  
8 means; for should he miss this opportunity, he  
9 would never have the chance. So saying, he asked  
10 me to obtain the understanding of the Genro and the  
11 Lord Keeper about the matter. Further, he added  
12 that even though he were requested by His Majesty to  
13 form a new cabinet, he would not accpet it. I was  
14 surprised to hear his intention so suddenly, and in  
15 view of the serious effects it might have urged him  
16 to reconsider the question of resignation; but he  
17 would not change his mind. At any rate, I promised  
18 him that I would consider the matter further, and  
19 left at 5:30 P.M."

20  
21 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for  
22 fifteen minutes.

23 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
24 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings  
25 were resumed as follows:)



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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 MR. LOGAN: I shall continue to read, page 60:

4 "71. I considered that so long as the Prince  
5 was in such a mood, it would be impossible for him to  
6 settle the affair and that he should engage himself  
7 more sincerely in dealing with it. Therefore, I  
8 dissuaded him from resigning and that was not for the  
9 purpose of carrying out the war. On the contrary,  
10 Prince KONOYE had extremely close relations with China  
11 since the days of his father, so there was no one who  
12 would settle successfully the China Affair except  
13 Prince KONOYE. In the light of this, prosecution  
14 exhibit 2257 as corrected on page 16,220 of the record  
15 clearly shows what effect his resignation would have  
16 had at that time when the immediate military operation  
17 in the field was not defensive. I wish to point out  
18 at this time that in document 0003 the prosecution  
19 refers to its exhibits only. It does not refer to  
20 pages in the record where these exhibits have been  
21 corrected by the Language Section. As many exhibits  
22 of my diary were corrected, it is necessary to refer  
23 to both the exhibit and the correction in the record  
24 at later dates to understand the diary entries.  
25

"72. Prosecution exhibit 2258 as corrected,

1 record, page 16,221, is my diary entry of November 19,  
2 1937, wherein is set forth a decision regarding liaison  
3 between Imperial General Headquarters and the govern-  
4 ment. The day before, on November 18, 1937, the General  
5 Staff had amended Imperial General Headquarters Regula-  
6 tions to include the establishment of Imperial Head-  
7 quarters by adding the words 'in the case of inci-  
8 dents,' to the existing limitation of 'in wartime.' I  
9 had nothing to do with this revision. On the contrary  
10 I deplored that it was done. I apprehended that as the  
11 result of the affair becoming included in the provisions  
12 of the Imperial Headquarters Regulations, revised at  
13 that time, the military authorities might abuse the  
14 said regulations. Therefore, I inquired of the Minister  
15 of War about the reasons for the revision and warned  
16 him against abusing the regulations.

17 "73. Prime Minister KONOYE set up an Educa-  
18 tional Council to revamp the educational system. In  
19 order to prevent militarists from becoming members of  
20 this council I sought and obtained the services of non-  
21 military men as president and members of it. My diary  
22 of November 27, 1937 says:

23 "November 27, 1937. At 9:30 a. m., called  
24 on President of the Privy Council HIRANUMA at his  
25 residence to obtain his consent to asking Vice-President



1 of Privy Council ARAI to be the president of the  
2 Council on Education, and Privy Councilor HARA and  
3 MINAMI to be its members.'

4 "The MINAMI mentioned is not the accused  
5 MINAMI.

6 "74. OUCHI, Hyoe testified for the prose-  
7 cution that I made a demand that Professor YANAIBARA  
8 be dismissed from the faculty of the Imperial Univer-  
9 sity of Tokyo. (He admitted on cross-examination  
10 his testimony was based on hearsay.) I deny ever  
11 making such a demand. As a matter of fact I refused  
12 to interfere and left the problem to the proper  
13 authorities of the university. My diary of November  
14 30, 1937 states:

15 "'At 3 p. m. consulted with Vice-Minister,  
16 Chief of the Bureau of Public Instruction YAMAKAWA  
17 about the dismissal of Professor YANAIBARA. HARADA  
18 called at 5 p. m.

19 "'At 5:30 p. m., Director YAMAKAWA called  
20 and reported the result of his interview with President  
21 NAGAYO of the Tokyo Imperial University.'

22 "75. Furthermore, the testimony of IKESHIMA,  
23 Shigenobu, who testified in this trial that 'the  
24 school system was reorganized and more time was de-  
25 voted to military training and teaching of military

1 subjects. . .' under my ministry is absolutely false.  
2 He admitted on cross-examination (record, 1,105-1,107)  
3 that this was hearsay.

4 "76. That I was endeavoring to terminate the  
5 China Incident further appears in my diary of December  
6 8, 1937.

7 "'December 8, 1937 - - At 10:00 p. m.,  
8 upon Prince KONOYE's call by telephone, called on the  
9 Prince at his residence. Messrs. ARIMA and OTANI were  
10 already present. We exchanged on views on our policy  
11 of how to terminate the war.'

12 "77. In December 1937, the question rose to  
13 open peace negotiation with Chiang Kai-shek through  
14 the intermediary of the German Ambassador in China, and  
15 I hoped that the negotiation might materialize. In this  
16 case there was no proper liaison between the cabinet  
17 and the High Command, whose attitude in the question,  
18 therefore, was not fully known to the cabinet, causing  
19 deep concern to Prime Minister KONOYE. I recall that  
20 I asked War Minister SUGIYAMA at a cabinet meeting  
21 about the possibility or otherwise of the peace negotia-  
22 tion, but failed to elicit any definite reply from him  
23 to my request.

24 "78. The peace terms, offered to China  
25 through the good offices of the German Ambassador, had



1 been studied and decided by the conference of those  
2 cabinet ministers concerned early in December 1937 be-  
3 fore they were submitted to the cabinet. Being Education  
4 Minister, I was not a member of the preliminary con-  
5 ference. I think that the conference had been preceded  
6 by a Liaison Conference, but I don't know what had  
7 happened before, because I did not take part in those  
8 conferences. Nor am I aware what proposals were made  
9 by General TADA, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, to  
10 the government.

11 "79. On the night of December 16, 1937,  
12 Mr. KISHI, secretary to the Prime Minister, called on  
13 me at the Koyokan (restaurant) and brought me a message  
14 from Prime Minister KONOYE. In his message, the Prime  
15 Minister stated that he could not grasp the army's real  
16 intentions and requested me to ask the War Minister on  
17 that point at next day's cabinet meeting. I thought it  
18 was a hard nut to crack, but at the cabinet meeting on  
19 the following day, that is, December 17, 1937, I asked  
20 War Minister SUGIYAMA:  
21

22 "It will be a matter for sincere congratula-  
23 tion, if the China Affair can be settled under the terms  
24 which are now being discussed by the cabinet meeting.  
25 I hope that it will be successful by all means. As it  
is a bilateral negotiation, however, I think it may

1 become necessary to make a further concession according  
2 to China's counter-proposals. Is the army prepared  
3 for it?'

4 "In reply, War Minister SUGIYAMA said:

5 "'No. These are the minimum terms. In case  
6 they are rejected by China, there will be no alterna-  
7 tive but to keep up military action against her.'

8 "80. I failed to fully understand, therefore,  
9 that the army had made a firm determination to bring  
10 about peace at all costs. Following the question and  
11 answer between me and War Minister SUGIYAMA, Admiral  
12 SUYETSUGU, Home Minister, submitted his views. And the  
13 plan for epitomizing the peace terms under four points  
14 was drafted by Home Minister SUYETSUGU himself. What  
15 I heard from Prince KONOYE was that he could not grasp  
16 the army's real intentions. But none the less, the  
17 cabinet decided upon peace proposals, which were sub-  
18 mitted to Chiang Kai-shek through the German Ambassador.  
19

20 "81. Prince KONOYE was anxious to restore  
21 peace with China without a single day's loss, so that  
22 he agreed to the abstract epitomization of peace terms,  
23 not to obstruct the peace negotiation, but on the con-  
24 trary make room for a future concession so as to ensure  
25 success for the peace negotiation. This was my idea  
also. It was suggested at the cabinet meeting of



1 December 18, 1937, that Chiang Kai-shek's answer should  
2 be requested before the end of the year. My diary for  
3 that day is:

4 "December 18, 1937. At 10:30 a. m. the  
5 cabinet conference was convened. We assiduously dis-  
6 cussed matters, which were being continued since  
7 yesterday, until 5:00 p. m. With regard to the media-  
8 tion of the German Ambassador, we decided that we  
9 would leave it to the Foreign Minister and, to let  
10 the Ambassador sound Chiang's views by showing com-  
11 prehensive conditions of our intention, and refrain-  
12 ing from showing details as far as possible. The  
13 deadline should be fixed as about the end of this year."

14 "82. As shown in prosecution exhibit 2259,  
15 diary of December 21, 1937, the German Ambassador had  
16 requested further instructions which were given him.  
17 As that exhibit also shows, we discussed at the cabi-  
18 net meeting, the principles for dealing with matters  
19 concerning the affair and I maintained that policies  
20 for cultural movement towards China should be estab-  
21 lished instead of carrying out military activities to  
22 no purpose and thus the way to Sino-Japanese friendship  
23 should be opened. Exhibit 2259 states:

24 "I urged the necessity of creating cultural  
25 measures in North China."

1 "83. China's reply to Japan's proposals was  
2 expected to be forthcoming by the end of December, but  
3 the expectation did not materialize. I understood  
4 that it was decided to wait for China's reply till  
5 January 15, 1938 (I did not directly participate in  
6 the decision, but later I happened to learn it). In  
7 view of the fact that the Diet would resume business  
8 on January 21, 1938, after New Year recess, the authori-  
9 ties concerned seemed to have been in a hurry in decid-  
10 ing on a new policy (I was not directly concerned with  
11 this matter, either). Prosecution exhibit 486-F,  
12 telegram of Dirksen confirms the haste.

13 "84. Prosecution exhibit 2260, as corrected  
14 page 16,223 of the record, my diary of January 14, 1938,  
15 deals with the all-day cabinet discussion of the pro-  
16 posed peace with Chiang Kai-shek and the Prime Minis-  
17 ter's statement. With respect to the former the cabi-  
18 net's decision not to deal with Chiang Kai-shek any  
19 more was made on the basis of a plan, drafted by the  
20 Foreign Office. Prior to the decision, the cabinet  
21 received a report from Foreign Minister HIROTA on the  
22 details of the peace negotiations with China. Further,  
23 the Foreign Minister told his cabinet colleagues on  
24 that occasion that he had arrived at the conclusion  
25 that no bona fides could be discerned on the Chinese



1 side, even judging by the result of his interview  
2 with the German Ambassador at 4:00 p. m. the same day.  
3 At that time the Foreign Minister met the German  
4 Ambassador at the latter's request when the German  
5 Ambassador handed him China's reply, which was of  
6 such a dilatory nature at this late stage as it  
7 sought an elucidation on the meaning of Japan's pro-  
8 posals. Mr. HIROTA, Foreign Minister, submitted  
9 a report to the Cabinet Council on the matter to-  
10 gether with his view that there were no bona fides  
11 to be discerned on the Chinese side. I recall that  
12 the War Minister spoke briefly and the general trend  
13 of his talk was in favor of peace with the new regime.  
14 I did not express my opinion at all. Hence, the  
15 cabinet's decision not to deal with the Kuomin Govern-  
16 ment any more and instead establish peace in the Orient  
17 in cooperation with a new China in anticipation of the  
18 formation of a new Chinese Administration. It was to  
19 be regretted that Japan missed the first opportunity  
20 to make peace with China.  
21

22 "85. At this time I wish to state that  
23 General TADA at no time was present at any of these  
24 cabinet meetings at which I was present. He may have  
25 been present at some liaison conferences, but I never  
attended these, as I was not a member of the liaison

1 conferences. I was at a loss to understand on what  
2 basis the prosecution in its cross-examination of  
3 KAWABE, Torashiro could ask him if General TADA told him  
4 that I vigorously opposed peace with China. KAWABE  
5 clearly denied this, and the prosecution produced no  
6 document to substantiate its inference. I was in favor  
7 of peace with China as shown above, but it was not to  
8 be.

9 "86. With respect to the statement issued  
10 by the Prime Minister dated January 16, 1938, first  
11 paragraph of prosecution exhibit 268, also in evidence  
12 as prosecution exhibit 972-A, there is no evidence I  
13 know of before the Tribunal that I signed this, but  
14 the fact is I did sign it as one of the cabinet. The  
15 statement speaks for itself. As it was ascertained that  
16 Chiang Kai-shek had no bona fides in restoring peace  
17 with Japan, the Japanese Government thought it a short-  
18 cut for settlement of the China Affair to take construc-  
19 tive measures in China in conjunction with those Chinese  
20 who share Japan's ideals rather than to overrun the vast  
21 territory of China with armed forces. Prior to the  
22 Nanking campaign, there was no unity between the military  
23 and the government. Not only that, the High Command kept  
24 all plans of military operation secret from the cabinet,  
25 which, therefore, was in no position to launch on timely



1 diplomatic demarches ahead of military operations. And  
2 the Nanking campaign was started with the cabinet losing  
3 the opportunity to take any timely diplomatic move in  
4 advance.

5 "87. The prosecution in its document 0003  
6 states that I made no reference to the horrors of Nan-  
7 king from December 11, 1937 to February 6, 1938, that  
8 the 'indignation of the world cannot have been unknown  
9 to him and the cabinet' and that 'he may not have  
10 been responsible for the outbreak of this orgy of  
11 atrocities, but he was certainly to blame for its con-  
12 tinuance.'" I will skip the next line. "The first  
13 time I ever heard of the Nanking atrocities was after  
14 the end of the war. My cousin, TOKINORI, Takeo, who  
15 went to China as an officer in the Japanese Army in  
16 1941, saw me for the first time after then after the  
17 surrender in August 1945. He was the first person who  
18 told me what he heard about Nanking, although he was  
19 not there in 1937-1938. If I had heard about it at  
20 the time I would certainly have tried to do something  
21 about it, even though it was not a matter of cabinet  
22 responsibility.  
23  
24  
25

1 "88. In March 1938 there was some public  
2 demand to judge Professor OUCHI (who testified in  
3 this trial) and other professors. They had been  
4 arrested in February and were awaiting trial on sus-  
5 picion of communistic activities. Notwithstanding  
6 this, I discussed the matter with three other profes-  
7 sors of the university, and refused to purge OUCHI  
8 and the others pending their trial. My diary states:

9 "March 29, 1938. At 8:30 a.m. three profes-  
10 sors, HOZUMI, TANAKA and TAKAGI came to see me.  
11 Talked freely with them over the problem of Professor  
12 OUCHI and of the purge concerning other university  
13 professors.'

14 "89. While Education Minister I sought and  
15 obtained the views of educational critics so I would  
16 be the better enabled to fulfill my duties. My diary  
17 states:

18 "April 28, 1938. At 2 p.m. held a tea  
19 party at the Chuotei Restaurant inviting a number of  
20 educational writers. Had a chance to hear views repre-  
21 senting all circles and of society.'

22 "90. Prosecution exhibit 266 is two pages  
23 of a four-page article which appeared in the 'Tokyo  
24 Gazette' of March-April 1938 entitled, 'The Japanese  
25 Spirit.' I did not write this article, I did not edit



1 it, nor did I publish it. The first time I saw it was  
2 in this Tribunal. It is not a policy-making document  
3 of the Ministry of Education. Its explanation is quite  
4 simple. It was the custom, not only in the Ministry  
5 of Education, but in other ministries, for various  
6 individuals in the innumerable departments to write  
7 articles for the 'Shu Ho,' a weekly publication com-  
8 piled by the Board of Information. This publication  
9 is written in Japanese. On the part of the various  
10 government departments, the chiefs of archives, and  
11 correspondence sections of those departments, in com-  
12 pliance with the request from the Board of Information,  
13 collected manuscripts and sent them over to the Board  
14 of Information after obtaining approval of the vice-  
15 ministers of their respective ministries. Accordingly,  
16 therefore, contributions to the 'Shu Ho' were exclu-  
17 sively in charge of the vice-ministers of various  
18 ministries, who handled the matter entirely at their  
19 own discretion.

20  
21 "91. An article entitled the 'Nihon Seishin  
22 no Koyo' (Enhancement of the Japanese Spirit) was  
23 published in the 'Shu Ho' on February 9, 1938 in its  
24 69th issue. I did not write, edit, publish or approve  
25 the printing of this article, nor did I ever see it  
until recently. Approval, if any, was given by ITO,

1 Nobukichi, Vice-Minister of Education at that time,  
2 who is now dead. My efforts to find out who wrote  
3 this article in the 'Shu Ho' have been unavailing.  
4 After it was published in the 'Shu Ho,' according to  
5 the practice then prevailing which I did not know of  
6 then, but which I just recently ascertained, the Bureau  
7 of Information would submit the articles in the 'Shu  
8 Ho' for translation and publication in English in the  
9 'Tokyo Gazette.' The article which appeared in the  
10 'Tokyo Gazette' (prosecution exhibit 266) and which I  
11 never read or saw until it was produced before this  
12 Tribunal, is a correct translation of the article which  
13 appeared originally in the 'Shu Ho' on February 9,  
14 1938, with the exception that it omits one sentence  
15 in paragraph 4 as follows:

16 "The Empire's action in the present affair  
17 (the China Affair) does not contemplate any aggression  
18 or conquest, as enunciated from time to time with  
19 regard to its significance and object.' If the Tri-  
20 bunal deems it of sufficient importance I will be glad  
21 to submit to it the 'Shu Ho' of February 9, 1938.  
22 Since I did not write the article I shall not read  
23 the second half of it which was not processed by the  
24 prosecution. Incidentally, the prosecution in docu-  
25 ment 0003, page 46 to 47, endeavors to attach great



1 weight to this general historical statement based on  
2 a suspicion that I wrote and approved it.

3 "92. As further evidence of my desire to  
4 settle the China Incident I refer to prosecution  
5 exhibit 2261 as corrected record 16,224, diary May 19,  
6 1938. General HONJO had the same opinion as ITAGAKI,  
7 ISHIHARA, and others that the China Affair had to be  
8 settled as soon as possible. This exhibit shows that  
9 he told me to the effect that the Japanese Government,  
10 having no dealings with Chiang Kai-shek was not good,  
11 and the said policy had to be changed at the first op-  
12 portunity. Having heard of Major General ISHIHARA's  
13 opinion which he had told to Prince KONOYE on Jan-  
14 uary 20, 1938, I also agreed with him and promised to  
15 make efforts to that effect, as shown in the exhibit.  
16 We had begun to realize that the breaking off of peace  
17 negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek on January 14, 1938  
18 was improvident. This is the thought behind my state-  
19 ment in my diary, 'It is necessary beforehand to give  
20 full consideration to prepare for the breaking of the  
21 impasse which has been caused by the statement of not  
22 dealing with the Chiang Government.' The translation  
23 of this sentence in prosecution exhibit 2261 (last  
24 sentence Paragraph II) and also in the Language  
25 Section's correction are not quite accurate.

1 "93. It seemed that the Prime Minister's  
2 mental attitude was greatly disturbed, so that it  
3 appeared difficult for him to remain at the helm of  
4 the state, if things went on as they were. On his way  
5 back from his trip in the Kansai district, Prime Minister  
6 KONOYE had called on me previously after nine p.m.,  
7 May 11, 1938 and told me to the following effect:

8 "I thought about it in various ways during  
9 my trip, but it must be arranged that we launch upon  
10 a new stage with the Hsueh campaign as turning-point.  
11 For the purpose, it is necessary to strengthen the  
12 Cabinet, but it is very hard to reconstruct the Cabinet.  
13 Therefore, I have two alternatives, either to carry  
14 out a resignation of the Cabinet en bloc so as to  
15 enable a suitable statesman to form a succeeding Cabi-  
16 net or to start afresh with a new lineup in case I am  
17 commanded again by the Emperor to form a new Cabinet.  
18 Will you think it over carefully?"

19 "94. I agreed with the Prime Minister to his  
20 way of thinking as a whole. It would be difficult  
21 to settle the China Affair if things were allowed to  
22 go on as they were. But what changed should be  
23 effected? When it came to a definite plan, it was no  
24 easy task. Suppose the Cabinet carried out a resig-  
25 nation en bloc, it would be impossible for the succeeding



1 one to settle the China Affair, unless suitable  
2 persons were appointed Ministers of War and Foreign  
3 Affairs. As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister felt  
4 dissatisfied with War Minister SUGIYAMA, with whom  
5 it was found impossible to get in full touch, while  
6 army circles, too, felt dissatisfied with War Minister  
7 SUGIYAMA. But no agreement of views was reached  
8 easily as to who should take his place. And even  
9 during the session of the Diet, various criticisms were  
10 hurled against HIROTA, Koki, Minister of Foreign  
11 Affairs, in connection with the statement, issued by  
12 the government, refusing to deal with Chiang Kai-shek  
13 any more. The intelligent classes were highly skeptical  
14 whether the statement would be well-advised for the  
15 settlement of the China Affair. When this was remem-  
16 bered I thought that the selection of a succeeding  
17 Foreign Minister would be also a big question. Con-  
18 sidered in this light, the retreat of the KONOYE  
19 Cabinet would have far-reaching effects on China,  
20 which would jump to the conclusion that the KONOYE  
21 Cabinet quit, because of its failure to settle the  
22 China Affair. This might add to the difficulty of  
23 settling the affair. Further, should a political change  
24 be brought to pass with those questions left unsettled,  
25 succeeding cabinet would not be in a position to obtain

1 any measure of success. I thought, therefore, that  
2 the matter must be handled cautiously and tactfully.  
3 Meanwhile, however, it transpired that War Minister  
4 SUGIYAMA would resign after the conclusion of the  
5 Hsuehchow campaign to be replaced by Lieutenant General  
6 ITAGAKI, on May 22; therefore, I called on Prince KONOYE  
7 and had an exchange of views with him on the reconstruction  
8 of the cabinet following a change of the War Minister,  
9 by enlisting the services of Mr. Kazushige, UGAKI,  
10 Mr. Seihin, IKEDA and others. This is recorded in my  
11 diary of May 22, 1938.

12 "May 22, 1938. At 9:00 a.m. I called on  
13 Prince KONOYE at Ogikubo. We exchanged opinions on  
14 the reorganization of cabinet and on the appointment  
15 of Mr. UGAKI and IKEDA on the occasion of the change  
16 of the War Minister and came to a definite plan."

17 "95. At Premier KONOYE's request I spoke with  
18 Foreign Minister HIROTA about his resignation so that  
19 General UGAKI could be appointed - as related in my  
20 diary:

21 "May 23, 1938. In the evening Premier KONOYE  
22 requested me to communicate with Minister HIROTA about  
23 the above concerning the reorganization of the cabinet  
24 and to seek his understanding about it. So immediately  
25 I asked for an interview with him but as he was then



1 going to attend the dinner party at the American Em-  
2 bassy he called on me on his way home from it about  
3 11:00. Then I told him the Premier's intention and  
4 asked him to think over his resignation. I felt re-  
5 lieved to hear him frankly say that he had entered the  
6 cabinet partly because he wanted to help Prime Minister  
7 KONOYE and partly because of the recommendation of the  
8 Elder Statesman. So, he continued, if his resignation  
9 is desirable for the sake of Prince KONOYE, he would  
10 resign at any time.'

11 "96. The War Ministry was opposed to any  
12 reconstruction of the cabinet, but Prince KONOYE and  
13 I exerted our best endeavors and vigorously opposed  
14 the War Ministry as we were determined to bring about a  
15 settlement of the China Affair. In order to accomplish  
16 this, we evolved an idea which we believed would be  
17 workable. It took form in the cabinet reconstruction  
18 of May 26, 1938 which made such men as Messrs. UGAKI,  
19 IKEDA and ARAKI join the cabinet, thereby adding to  
20 the cabinet's dignity and influence at home. The ap-  
21 pointment of Lieutenant General ITAGAKI, who not only  
22 understood China and the things Chinese, but was popular  
23 with the Chinese people was intended for the settlement  
24 of the China Affair; while the selection of Mr. UGAKI  
25 as Minister of Foreign Affairs was aimed at facilitating

1 a rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek. I ceased being  
2 Minister of Education on this date, May 26, 1938. My  
3 diary of May 26, 1938 records our efforts as follows:

4 "May 26, 1938. As to the reorganization of  
5 the cabinet, Chief Secretary KAZAMI told me by telephone  
6 that UGAKI wanted to postpone the reorganization until  
7 the change of the War Minister had been made, to which  
8 I replied that the cabinet should be completely formed  
9 today. At about 11:00, by telephone, the Premier  
10 requested me to call at his residence and I went im-  
11 mediately to the Premier's official residence. First I  
12 met KAZAMI. It seemed that Mr. UGAKI from his own ex-  
13 perience felt uneasy about the plan for the change of  
14 the War Ministers. However this reorganization plan  
15 had leaked out among the public. Furthermore, it was  
16 chiefly some members of the War Ministry who opposed  
17 the plan. If we hesitated at this stage, not only would  
18 it become difficult to reorganize the cabinet, but the  
19 appointment of ITAGAKI as War Minister also might fail.  
20 Besides if the opposition of the army is considerably  
21 strong, it would be all the more necessary to separate  
22 personnel changes of the army from this reorganization.  
23 Moreover, if reorganization should fail because of the  
24 opposition of the army, the result might be an unfavor-  
25 able impression among the financial circles. Taking



1 these points into consideration, I, while strongly  
2 advising the Premier to execute the reorganization at  
3 once, met Mr. IKEDA, Seihin, and told him the above  
4 opinion and strongly expressed my opinion, that if this  
5 reorganization failed, Prince KONOYE would have to keep  
6 the cabinet, if only for a month, to provide for future  
7 policies because otherwise there would be no way for  
8 KONOYE to apologize to the Emperor. Therefore, I stated  
9 it was by all means necessary to complete the reorga-  
10 nization today even by letting the Premier concurrently  
11 hold the office of Foreign Minister and by appointing  
12 IKEDA as Finance and Commerce Minister in case Mr. UGAKI  
13 does not consent. I also reported by telephone to  
14 HARADA concerning the situation and requested him to  
15 help us. When KAYA telephoned me, I told him, too,  
16 the situation and requested his assistance. These calls  
17 resulted in the persuasion on the part of Mr. YUKI and  
18 Mr. YAMASHITA, Kamesaburo, of Mr. UGAKI in an unexpected  
19 prompt consent from Mr. UGAKI. In this way, the reor-  
20 ganization plan reached its completion at 4 o'clock.  
21 During the whole time, that is, about five hours, the  
22 Premier and I were at the Premier's room working out  
23 various plans. Prince KONOYE was composing with a brush.  
24 At the time when the report came that Mr. UGAKI had  
25 consented, I took over the two pieces of Chinese poetry

1 which he had written down. These will make very fine  
2 souvenirs of the occasion. After 5:00, the Premier  
3 proceeded to the palace and made a confidential report  
4 to the Emperor. At 7 p.m. the ceremony of installation  
5 was held by His Majesty. Mr. UGAKI was appointed  
6 Foreign Minister; Mr. IKEDA, Finance and Commerce and  
7 Industry Minister; and Mr. ARAKI, Education Minister.  
8 I received a government order to the effect that I  
9 was dismissed from the office I had been holding and  
10 appointed 'Welfare Minister.'

11 "97. As the cabinet was reconstructed for  
12 the above purposes, I dined together with War Minister  
13 ITAGAKI on June 18, 1938, at Prince KONOYE's suggestion  
14 when I had a free and frank exchange of views with him  
15 on Prince KONOYE's frame of mind, the necessity for  
16 terminating the China Affair at the earliest possible  
17 opportunity and more open discussion by government as  
18 to each others views. The War Minister's intentions  
19 were revealed to me to my reassurance. This is reported  
20 in my diary of June 18, 1938.

21 "June 18, 1938. At 6 p.m. War Minister  
22 ITAGAKI came to see me at home and we dined together  
23 and we frankly exchanged opinions relating to the  
24 future development of the political and war situations  
25 until after 10. I felt much reassured when I knew him



1 to be a personage worth talking with.'

2 "98. On July 23, 1938 I had a long talk with  
3 Prince KONOYE and I stressed the necessity of concluding  
4 the China Incident. We agreed this should be accom-  
5 plished by the end of the year. My diary, July 23,  
6 1938, states:

7 "'July 23, 1938. We arrived in Karuizawa at  
8 11:59 a.m., and immediately visited Prince KONOYE's  
9 summer house and dined together. We talked on the sub-  
10 ject of the China Incident, and exchanged our views on  
11 the future prospect of the incident until 3 o'clock.  
12 We also talked about the progress of the Five Ministers  
13 Council. It was unanimously agreed upon that some  
14 measures must be taken to alter the situation by the  
15 end of this year.'

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17 "I was not a member of the Five-Minister  
18 Council mentioned above.  
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"99. On the other hand, however, the situation did not move as expected. Besides a string of new questions cropped up one after another in quick succession, giving one the impression that what was in store for Japan in the future would not be plain sailing. For instance, on July 20, 1938, the Changkufeng affair occurred when Soviet troops invaded Manchukuo territory across the border. It was closely followed by Soviet planes invading Korean territory and bombing places in Korea. The situation between Japan and the Soviet Union grew very tense. Prime Minister KONOYE, who felt deeply concerned over the situation sought my views, when I contended that the affair should be settled through peaceful channels patiently. Needless to say I had no part in the commencement of this incident.

"100. At the Cabinet meeting of August 2, 1938, certain policies were adopted as recorded in my diary of that date.

"August 2, 1938 - Tuesday - cloudy. At 10 a.m., I attended the Cabinet meeting. We listened to the reports on conditions by the War Minister (ITAGAKI) and Foreign Minister (UGAKI) concerning the Changkufeng Incident and the bombing by Soviet planes of Korea beginning yesterday.



1           " 'After discussion, we made the following  
2 resolution for the present: 1. In dealing with the  
3 present Incident, we are to adopt the policy of non-  
4 aggrandizement in order to avoid a war with the USSR.  
5 2. We are to solve this problem by diplomatic nego-  
6 tiations and if the developments, thereof, make it  
7 necessary, we had better withdraw from the Changkufeng  
8 line.'

9           "In pursuance of these policies, diplomatic  
10 negotiations were conducted, as the result of which  
11 the affair was settled amicably without causing any  
12 serious situations. The prosecution's claim in  
13 document 0003, P. 47, that I am responsible for the  
14 Incident has no basis in fact.

15           "101. About this time, Germany submitted  
16 serious proposals to Japan for the conclusion of a  
17 military alliance to strengthen the Anti-Comintern  
18 Pact. On August 9, 1938, when I learned it from Prime  
19 Minister KONOYE, I thought it was a serious question.  
20 As I was not shown any draft of the proposals, I ex-  
21 pressed no opinion, which can be verified by reference  
22 to prosecution exhibit 2262, diary of August 9, 1938.  
23 I believed that any policy, which might stimulate  
24 America and Britain and make them skeptical about Japan  
25 in the midst of the China Affair should be most

1 cautiously studied and drew Prime Minister KONOYE's  
2 attention, telling him to that effect. The Prime  
3 Minister who agreed with me was greatly embarrassed.  
4 As I understood that the Navy was opposed to the con-  
5 clusion of a military alliance with Germany, I  
6 stressed the necessity to the Prime Minister to make  
7 the Navy fully express its conviction and discuss the  
8 question without reserve.

9 "102. As may be noted, the political situ-  
10 ation became gradually complicated, so that I thought  
11 it might be necessary to effect a drastic change of  
12 policy in case of necessity. There would be much  
13 room for discussion if Japan further approached  
14 Germany, leaving the China Affair as it was. If the  
15 force of circumstances dictated, therefore, I thought  
16 it necessary to switch over to a reapproachment with  
17 America and Britain by adjusting relations with them.  
18 In addition I feared that certain groups of rightists,  
19 extremists and army officers who were opposed to  
20 settlement of the China Incident would create disturb-  
21 ances in Japan if peace was established with China.  
22 I thought it necessary to take precautionary measures  
23 to control these elements. Therefore, I had an inter-  
24 view with Prime Minister KONOYE on August 23, 1938.  
25 My diary for that date sets forth this interview. I



1 stated my opinion to the Premier as follows:

2 "August 23, 1938. With regard to the KONOYE  
3 Cabinet's political strategy, I understand that the  
4 Cabinet is criticized for its alleged indulgence to-  
5 ward the rightists. In view of the situation, both  
6 at home and abroad, particularly the impotence of the  
7 intelligent classes, it may be necessary to keep the  
8 safety valve ajar. Once, however, national policies  
9 are decided, necessitating a volteface, it will be  
10 vitally necessary to take a drastic measure. For the  
11 purpose, it will be important to make arrangements in  
12 advance so as to make the Home Office, especially the  
13 Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau and the Chief of  
14 Metropolitan Police move at the beck and call of the  
15 Prime Minister. I urged the Prime Minister to take  
16 measures to that end. On that occasion, the Prime  
17 Minister told me that when the Chief of the Police  
18 Affairs Bureau in the Home Office called on him the  
19 other day, he advised the Prime Minister to resign,  
20 pointing out the growing tenseness of the situation.  
21 Whereupon, I told the Prime Minister that it would be  
22 inexcusable to the Emperor to think of such a thing.  
23 I stressed that should the worst eventuality occur, it  
24 would be better to die, after doing our best. The  
25 Prime Minister fell in with my views. I discerned his

1 firm determination to my great relief. I stated  
2 almost the same opinion to SAZAMI, Chief Secretary  
3 of the Cabinet, and I stressed the necessity of  
4 firmly establishing this attitude toward home affairs.'

5 "103. As I was Minister of Welfare at this  
6 time it may be in order of interest and importance to  
7 review the home situation, then prevailing. The  
8 question of unemployment came to the fore, while the  
9 distressed condition of medium and small tradesmen  
10 and industrialists was appalling. It was a matter for  
11 deep concern for the maintenance of peace and order.  
12 With regard to the China Affair, too, the Government's  
13 statement, refusing to deal with Chiang Kai-shek any  
14 more came in for critical comments. Opinion was gain-  
15 ing even in a section of the General Staff of the Army  
16 that the China Affair should be terminated even by  
17 negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek in case of necessity.  
18 My diary of August 26, 1938, records:

19 "August 26, 1938 - Friday - fine. At 10 a.m.  
20 I attended the Cabinet meeting. After conferring on  
21 counter measures for the lame conditions of trade, it  
22 was decided that the War and Navy Ministries hold a  
23 conference under the auspices of Welfare Ministry with  
24 respect to the problem.  
25

"At noon, I dined with the Premier. The



1 Premier told me that as for the peace problem, some  
2 members of the Army General Staff were of the opinion  
3 that according to the circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek  
4 should be the party to contact to establish peace.  
5 We conversed freely with each other about the future  
6 prospect and how to cope with the situation.'

7 "104. A similar opinion also raised its head  
8 in the rightist camp, it appears. This, together with  
9 the distressed condition at home served to start a new  
10 party movement in party and other circles for the pur-  
11 pose of strengthening political power. On September 7,  
12 1938, Prince KONOYE asked for an interview with me to  
13 discuss these questions. My diary for September 7, 1938,  
14 prosecution exhibit 2263 as corrected, page 16,227 of  
15 the record shows that I saw Prince KONOYE at his re-  
16 quest. Prince KONOYE was depressed at various politi-  
17 cal matters which he found difficult to carry out as  
18 he intended, and above all had considerably unpleasant  
19 feelings as to the maneuvers of the UGAKI faction.  
20 Owing to the weakness of KONOYE's character, he once  
21 again expressed to me his intention to resign. How-  
22 ever, as I believed that except Prince KONOYE no one  
23 could possibly settle the Affair, I put emphasis on  
24 the necessity that he should summon up his courage and  
25 proceed resolutely to settle the China Affair even if

1 it had to be with Chiang Kai-shek. The translation  
2 of my diary states that I advised him to 'go ahead.'  
3 That refers to my advice to him to settle the China  
4 Incident. In view of the opposition at the time  
5 General UGAKI had been appointed to the post of  
6 Foreign Minister, I judged that there was still con-  
7 siderable opposition to him in the Army circles.  
8 Therefore I observed that so long as he remained  
9 Foreign Minister, opposition to him would not be so  
10 pronounced as it would be if his plan to overthrow  
11 KONOYE and became Prime Minister eventuated. Prince  
12 KONOYE was still supported by the general public. If  
13 UGAKI became Prime Minister, there would be political  
14 criticism of him and the anti-UGAKI feeling in Army  
15 circles would break out again which would result in  
16 various difficult situations and disturbances in Japan.

17 "105. Exhibit 2263 also mentions formation of  
18 a new party. The atmosphere for the formation of a  
19 new political party was suddenly brewed, so that it  
20 became necessary for the Home Ministry to consider the  
21 matter. Prime Minister KONOYE requested Home Minister  
22 SUYETSUGU to draft a plan, at the same time expressing  
23 his desire that I and Justice Minister SHIONO also  
24 take part in the formulation of the plan. In conse-  
25 quence, I met Home Minister SUYETSUGU and Justice



1 Minister SHIONO on September 27, 1938, to discuss the  
2 matter when I found that according to the plan, pre-  
3 pared by the Home Ministry, the new political party  
4 was patterned in many points after the German Nazi  
5 Party. At the opening of the meeting, a divergence  
6 of views developed between Home Minister SUYETSUGU  
7 and me, it being my conviction that party leadership,  
8 as practiced in Germany, would be impossible in Japan.  
9 Heated controversy took place between the Home Mini-  
10 ster and me. After several meetings the draft plat-  
11 form and declaration of the new political party were  
12 submitted to the Prime Minister on October 15, 1938,  
13 when another conference was called. Prime Minister  
14 KONOYE, too, was worried that the draft platform and  
15 declaration of the new political party were not freed  
16 from the party leadership complexion. On the other  
17 hand, strong opposition to the government-sponsored  
18 political party came from political circles, which  
19 got wind of the plan of the Home Ministry. The result  
20 was that the Home Office plan was dropped. Instead,  
21 it was decided to study a movement for national organ-  
22 ization as an organ for conveying the will of the ruling  
23 to the ruled and vice versa. On November 15, 1938, I  
24 met Justice Minister SHIONO and Home Minister SUYETSUGU  
25 to study the question together. All Ministers of State

1 concerned co-operated in evolving a definite plan for  
2 the purpose, but the Cabinet resigned en bloc before  
3 any definite plan was worked out.  
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1 "106. Prosecution exhibit 2264, my diary of  
2 November 2, 1938, records the decision of the Privy  
3 Council to cease cooperating with various bodies of  
4 the League of Nations. I was not a member of the  
5 Privy Council but once in a while, when I was in the  
6 Cabinet I attended Privy Council meetings; as shown  
7 in prosecution exhibit 271, I attended the meeting on  
8 this day. Japan had withdrawn from the League of  
9 Nations several years previously. The matter con-  
10 cerning the abandonment of cooperation with various  
11 organs of the League of Nations was proposed by the  
12 Foreign Minister. This measure was decided on in  
13 accordance with the investigation and deliberation on  
14 the part of the Foreign Office. The conclusion was  
15 that Japan could not but abandon such cooperation be-  
16 cause the relations between Japan and those organs  
17 with which she had been in cooperation became gradu-  
18 ally unfriendly owing to international circumstances.  
19 (See exhibit 66)

20 "107. The government failed to take any  
21 measures at home deserving popular confidence, and  
22 there was no prospect of early settlement for the  
23 China Affair abroad though information reached Tokyo  
24 that Wang Ching-wei would flee from Chungking on  
25 December 18, 1938. No wonder, therefore, that Prince

KONOYE was inclined to resign as Prime Minister.

"108. A survey of the situation, prevailing in Japan at that time shows that economic setup; while ideologically and intransigent Japanese spirit was stressed on the one hand and on the other Communists activities were brisk, so that a large number of Imperial University students were rounded up as Communists. The situation was marked with confusion, itself. This accounts for the fact that reform of the educational system was one of the planks of the platform of the first KONOYE Cabinet. The China Affair was more than twelve months old. Japan's outgoing trade with China and the south sea area was entirely paralyzed, due to a boycott, launched by the Chinese merchants in those regions against Japanese merchandise. A telling blow was dealt the miscellaneous industry and medium and small industrialists and traders in Osaka area who depended on the export trade with that quarter of the globe. The unemployment question came to the fore, so that an unemployment relief committee was set up in the Welfare Ministry. It was feared that the growing economic depression would be capitalized by the Communist agitators. This was the point which worried Prime Minister KONOYE most.

"109. Under such circumstances, Japan was



1 not in a position to flatly reject a policy, calcul-  
2 ated to check Communist infiltrations, but Prince  
3 KONOYE watched the development of the situation  
4 closely, as he thought that Japan would be called  
5 upon to study most cautiously what effects her coop-  
6 eration with Germany would have on America and Britain.  
7 (I did not take part in the Five-Minister Conference,  
8 so that I had no knowledge of its deliberations).  
9 On December 17, 1938 when I met Prime Minister KONOYE  
10 at the Peers Club, he told me that strengthening the  
11 Anti-Comintern Pact, Lieutenant-General OSHIMA,  
12 Hiroshi, Ambassador to Germany and others intended to  
13 conclude an agreement of a nature of military alliance  
14 with Germany even against England and France, entirely  
15 different from the policy, hitherto decided by the  
16 Five-Minister Conference, and apparently already pro-  
17 posed to the German authorities to that effect. He  
18 was so apprehensive about the matter that he stated  
19 that he would like to resign as Prime Minister as  
20 soon as possible, since he could not assume respon-  
21 sibility for such an extension of the Pact, over  
22 which he was not enthusiastic from the very beginning.  
23 Little informed as I was of the development of the  
24 question, it was easily understandable to me that  
25 Prince KONOYE, though he might have to assume heavy

1 responsibility for the settlement of the China Affair,  
2 would like not to be involved in the extension of the  
3 Pact, which I could not approve myself. My conver-  
4 sation of December 17, 1938 with Prince KONOYE is  
5 recorded in my diary for that day as follows:

6 "December 17, 1938. Saturday. Fine. At  
7 noon I had lunch at the Peer's Club. Conference with  
8 Prince KONOYE from about 1:30 p.m. to about 4:30 p.m.  
9 on the political situation and the fate of the cabinet.  
10 Deviating from the policy which was formerly adopted  
11 at the Five Ministers conference concerning the in-  
12 tensifying of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan  
13 and Germany. Ambassador OSHIMA in Germany and others  
14 desire to make an agreement of a military alliance  
15 nature against Britain and France as well. There  
16 being indications that this has already been proposed  
17 to the German authorities, Prince KONOYE is much wor-  
18 ried over this. He emphatically tells me of the  
19 necessity for the cabinet to resign much sooner if  
20 such circumstances are taken into consideration. We  
21 discussed the time and measures of realizing this."

22 "110. My diary of December 26, 1938, prose-  
23 cution exhibit 2265, as corrected, page 16, 231 of  
24 the record, records a conversation I had with Baron  
25 HIRANUMA that he thought the KONOYE Cabinet should



1 continue as it had been reported Wang Chao-Ming had  
2 escaped from Chungking. As shown in prosecution  
3 exhibit 2266, diary of December 29, 1938, Major  
4 General SUZUKI visited me to express the same  
5 opinion saying that Prince KONOYE's efforts were  
6 necessary for the settlement of the China Affair, so  
7 at that moment the resignation en masse of his  
8 Cabinet should not be realized. The situation of the  
9 Cabinet had gone so far that we could not at that  
10 time help it at all. I didn't express my opinion  
11 and only listened to him. So, too, at the confer-  
12 ence at Prince KONOYE's mansion, also recorded in  
13 prosecution exhibit 2266, I only listened to what  
14 other people said and expressed no opinion of my  
15 own. I felt from the conference as it went that  
16 there was no room for dissuading Prince KONOYE from  
17 resigning.

18 "111. Thus the KONOYE Cabinet resigned en  
19 bloc on January 4, 1939 ending my term of office as  
20 Welfare Minister. I wanted to retire to private  
21 life and pursue a wait and see policy for some time,  
22 but was invited by Baron HIRANUMA to his headquarters  
23 for Cabinet formation on January 5, 1939, when he  
24 offered me the portfolio of Home Affairs in his  
25 Cabinet, stating that it was virtually an accomplished

1 fact, as he accepted the Imperial command to form a  
2 succeeding Cabinet almost on condition that I be  
3 appointed Home Minister. He added that he had fully  
4 discussed the matter with Prince KONOYE. I declined  
5 the offer, however, as I was inclined to take a rest  
6 for some time; but Baron HIRANUMA insisted upon my  
7 accepting it for the abovementioned reasons. I was  
8 aware that an ideological reformist opinion had a  
9 strong following in the Home Office circles under the  
10 direction of Home Minister SUYETSUGU, so I requested  
11 that a free hand be given to me in dealing with many  
12 vexed political questions in the Home Office. I  
13 accepted the offer when my condition was approved.  
14 This appears in prosecution exhibit 2267, my diary  
15 of January 5, 1939, as corrected by the Language  
16 Section. One of the political problems referred to  
17 in this exhibit was as follows: The outgoing Minis-  
18 ter of Home Affairs was Admiral SUYETSUGU, a Fascist  
19 devotee of international fame. No wonder, therefore,  
20 that an atmosphere, surcharged with Fascism, pre-  
21 vailed among Home Ministry bureaucrats. And when the  
22 HIRANUMA Cabinet was formed, a troublesome pending  
23 question was left for the Home Ministry by the retir-  
24 ing Home Minister Admiral SUYETSUGU in the form of  
25 the Bill for reforming the municipality system



(chosonsei), which was drafted under his guidance. The Bill was aimed at fascistizing provincial administration by extending the powers of the executive organ at the sacrifice of the legislative or deliberative organ. Preparations had been completed by those officials of the Home Ministry in charge of clerical work for submitting the Bill reforming the municipality system, to the Diet, but I, as the new Minister of Home Affairs, decided not to introduce such a Fascist legislation to the Diet. I requested the Cabinet to meet on February 17, 1939 when I submitted to the meeting my decision to refrain from submitting the Bill in question to the Diet. The Cabinet Council approved of my decision. The same day, therefore, Parliamentary quarters and officials of the Home Ministry concerned, including the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs were communicated to that effect. This is corroborated by extracts from my diary for February 17, 1939, which reads:

"February 17 - Friday - fine. At 9 a.m. Welfare Minister HIROSE called on me and consulted with me to decide to shelve the Reform Plan of the Local Administration System.

1           "'"At 10 a.m. attended the Cabinet Conference.

2           "'"At noon, asking to hold a Cabinet Conference,  
3 I made a report on the course and prospect of the  
4 Reform Bill of the Local Administration System, and  
5 I asked for a decision on its adoption or rejection.  
6 Consequently, the Premier and I came to be entrusted  
7 with conduct of the matter.

8           "'"After the Cabinet conference, I consulted  
9 with the Premier and we decided not to submit the  
10 said Reform Bill alone to the present Diet, for,  
11 first of all, the present Cabinet should investigate  
12 the matter of autonomy in general such as the self-  
13 government of the city and that of prefectures, etc.

14           "'"At 3 p.m. in the House of Peers, I informed  
15 Messrs. KANNA, NAKAI, TACHI, and SAKA of the above  
16 matters.

17           "'"Returned to my official residence at 5 p.m.  
18 and informed the Vice-Minister, Chief of Local Bureau  
19 and Chief of Administration Section of the above matters.'

20           "The bill therefore died.

21           "112. The HIRANUMA Cabinet demonstrated that  
22 there was a continuity of policy in trying to settle  
23 the China Affair between it and its predecessor, KONOYE  
24 Cabinet, by appointing Prince KONOYE as Minister with-  
25 out portfolio. The most important political question,



1 which faced the HIRANUMA Cabinet was the question  
2 of alliance with Germany. It was advanced toward the  
3 latter part of the KONOYE Cabinet, the Army most  
4 enthusiastically advocating the conclusion of an  
5 alliance with Germany. The KONOYE Cabinet failed to  
6 arrive at any conclusion and transferred the question  
7 to the HIRANUMA Cabinet. The HIRANUMA Cabinet referred  
8 the question to the so-called Five Minister Conference,  
9 which, however, met more than seventy times and yet  
10 failed to reach an identity of views, due to the Navy's  
11 stout opposition to the projected alliance with  
12 Germany, which the Army zealously advocated. Under  
13 those circumstances, the question did not emerge from  
14 the stage of discussion by the Five Minister Conference,  
15 so that I, then Minister of Home Affairs, and not a  
16 component member of the Conference, had no direct  
17 connection with the question.

18 "113. My only concern in the Tripartite  
19 Alliance question while I was Home Minister consisted  
20 in maintenance of peace and order at home, which I  
21 was duty bound to secure. My diary of March 22, 1939  
22 shows my interest.

23 "March 22, 1939. 4 p.m. I went to my official  
24 residence and discussed with the Vice-Minister, the  
25 Superintendent General of the Metropolitan Police and

1 the Director of the Police Bureau the several matters  
2 concerning the Military Alliances viewed from the  
3 maintenance of peace and order.'

4 "114. Prosecution exhibit 2268, diary of  
5 March 31, 1939, shows that the Premier told me about  
6 the proposed Alliance and the difficult situation con-  
7 cerning the problem. It also shows that I had an inter-  
8 view with Prince KONOYE after a long interval, at which  
9 we talked about the forecast as to the dealing with the  
10 China Affair and exchanged views with each other con-  
11 cerning the settlement of the Affair.

12 "115. I was not in favor of strengthening  
13 the alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.  
14 Negotiations had been started in diplomatic circles  
15 without my knowledge or participation. The Five  
16 Minister Conference of the HIRANUMA Cabinet which was  
17 deliberating over the question of conclusion of the  
18 Tripartite Military Alliance Pact was meeting in session  
19 almost constantly but was unable to arrive at any  
20 definite decision, because the Army wanted to conclude  
21 the Tripartite Alliance Pact, and the Navy was opposed  
22 to it. If the Army and the Navy come into a frontal  
23 clash, it was easily imagined that the Army or the Navy  
24 would have staged its favorite coup d'etat and  
25 assassinated the Senior Statesmen close to the Throne



and the leaders of the Government. It was but  
1 natural that I, who had served close to the Throne  
2 for many long years, should be seized with apprehension  
3 about such an untoward incident, as I was then Minister  
4 of Home Affairs. My diary of April 14, 1939 shows  
5 my concern in endeavoring to avert a frontal clash  
6 between the Army and the Navy.

7 "April 14, 1939. At 9:00 a.m. I met Vice-  
8 Minister, Commissioner General and the Director of  
9 Police Bureau at my official residence, and as they  
10 said that the Military appeared somewhat uneasy owing  
11 to the recent deadlock of the Military Alliance among  
12 Japan, Germany and Italy, we heard how things stood from  
13 the Commissioner General.

14 "At 10:00 I called at the Premier's official  
15 residence and heard the latest circumstances of the  
16 said problem before the Cabinet Council.

17 "Although I was informed of the not easy  
18 situation Japan was confronted with, it seemed to me,  
19 taking a long-range view of it, that the cabinet should  
20 by no means resign en bloc. I laid stress on that  
21 it was necessary for the cabinet to surmount every  
22 obstacle and to do its utmost to overcome the present  
23 political difficulties. I was a little relieved as  
24 the Premier agreed with me.  
25

1           " Cabinet Council was held at 10:30 after  
2       which I consulted with War Minister ITAGAKI on the above  
3       matter and we agreed to exert both of our efforts to  
4       tide over this situation. I also consulted with  
5       Foreign Minister ARITA, who stated his opinion that  
6       there was nothing for it but for the Premier to send  
7       letters to Hitler and Mussolini personally to explain  
8       our assertion and circumstances with respect to this  
9       matter. I stressed that this must necessarily be done  
10      and it was quite necessary to tide over this deadlock  
11      by all means. If we should make a mistake in disposing  
12      of the matter I was afraid, as a problem of home  
13      administration, it should result in leaving to posterity  
14      the root of more calamity than that caused by the  
15      problem of the London Naval Treaty, and as a result  
16      of it the so-called Senior Statesmen would necessarily  
17      and positively be eliminated. If this should happen,  
18      what should become of the court? It's dreadful even to  
19      imagine. Besides, to think that the Emperor who has  
20      been concerned about the transaction of the Incident,  
21      irrespective of day and night, should feel more lonely  
22      by that.

23           " It is unbearable even to suppose. When we  
24      think of this and that, we clearly see that it is a  
25      duty of a subject, to defy and exclude all the



1 difficulties not to bring about such circumstances which  
2 point, I have already told, to the Premier and War  
3 Minister. I told him emphatically as above stated.'

4 "116. If a clash occurred between the Army  
5 and the Navy on the home front, riots and disorders  
6 would spring up and when China became aware of this  
7 breach between the Army and Navy, it would react  
8 unfavorably to Japan. So, in my conversation with  
9 Premier HIRANUMA on April 19, 1939 (prosecution exhibit  
10 2269, Diary April 19, 1939) I told him that from  
11 the viewpoints of chiefly maintaining public peace at  
12 home and settling the China Affair, I only desired him  
13 to exert his best endeavor in dealing with the matter  
14 so as not to bring about unfavorable effect on these  
15 problems whether this Agreement was concluded or not.

16 "117. This same view is apparent from an  
17 examination of prosecution exhibit 2270, as corrected,  
18 record 16,235 (diary of May 2, 1939) which reports  
19 conversations I had with Mr. OTA and Navy Minister  
20 YONAI as follows: Having heard from OTA, Chief  
21 Secretary to the Cabinet, that there was still a  
22 difference in view between the Army and Navy regarding  
23 the Military Alliance, I thought that if the Cabinet  
24 would collapse owing to such process of this problem,  
25 it would give uneasiness and discontentment to our

1 people and therefore the Cabinet had to avoid, from  
2 the viewpoint of public peace at home, resignation en  
3 bloc leaving the problem as it was. Then I met  
4 Minister of the Navy YONAI and requested him to deal  
5 prudently with this problem. He agreed to do so.

6 "118. This record of my diary reads: 'Since  
7 there is the other party with whom we must negotiate,  
8 it is not necessary for us to be forced to conclude  
9 the alliance.' This shows that I was not eager for the  
10 conclusion of this alliance and the focus of my concern  
11 was on the maintenance of public peace in our country.



1 "119. I vigilantly watched the development  
2 of the Tripartite Alliance question from the angle of  
3 maintaining peace and order at home. My diary for  
4 May 5, 1939, states:

5 "May 5, 1939 -- At 2:00 p.m. heard that the  
6 official residence a report from the Superintendent-  
7 General and the Director of the Police Bureau on the  
8 opinions of the military concerning the Military  
9 Alliance.'

10 "120. The prosecution has singled me out  
11 for particular responsibility for aggression against  
12 USSR in the summer of 1939 (document 0003, P. 47).  
13 I, as a member of the Cabinet, knew nothing of this  
14 until after the incident started. As a Cabinet  
15 member, I had no responsibility for its short con-  
16 tinuances. The facts regarding this border incident  
17 have been fully presented to the Tribunal, which  
18 show it was duly settled diplomatically.

19 "121. On July 22, 1939, the Cabinet adopted  
20 a statement for submission to the Japanese-British  
21 Conference which it was expected would lead to the  
22 settlement of the China Affair, insofar as Great  
23 Britain was concerned. This was opposed by the Army,  
24 so I took steps to see that public order would be  
25 maintained. At this time the Army was also spreading

1 propaganda in its efforts to obtain public support  
2 for the Tripartite Alliance. I was opposed to this  
3 and asked my subordinates, ANDO and HASHIMOTO, to  
4 control this agitation and keep me advised, which they  
5 did. Both of these events appear in my diary of July  
6 22, 1939.

7 "July 22, 1939 -- At 9 a.m. an extraordinary  
8 Cabinet meeting was held. At the meeting, the draft  
9 of a statement regarding general principles of the  
10 Japanese-British Conference was discussed and adopted.  
11 After the meeting, I conferred with the Premier on the  
12 maintenance of public order.

13 "At 10:30 a.m. I conferred with the Inspec-  
14 tor General and the Director of the Police Bureau about  
15 the control policy after a peaceful conclusion of the  
16 Tokyo Conference.

17 "At 4:30 p.m. ANDO and HASHIMOTO called on  
18 me. They gave me the full particulars of the  
19 opposition of opinions between the government and  
20 military circles concerning the movement for the  
21 furtherance of the military alliance."

22 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half  
23 past nine tomorrow morning.

24 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was  
25 taken until Wednesday, 15 October 1947, at 0930.)